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Abstract 
Violent offender rehabilitation programs aim to reduce violent offenders’ risk 
of re-offending by targeting a range of needs, including anger regulation and crime-
supporting cognitions, on the assumption that they are criminogenic for all violent 
offenders. Such programs have proven efficacy in reducing recidivism for some, but 
not all, violent offenders, although there have been few previous attempts to identify 
the particular offenders who benefit most. This thesis investigates whether different 
subtypes of violent offender can be identified on the basis of self-report measures of 
anger experience, expression and control and criminal thinking styles, and whether 
these subtypes differ in the extent of change in anger, criminal thinking and assessed 
risk of re-offending after completing a violent offender treatment program.  
Study 1 involved 305 male violent offenders serving a custodial sentence in a 
Victorian correctional centre who were being assessed for participation in a violence 
intervention program. Predominantly classified as having a moderate risk of violent 
re-offending, this group held moderate levels of beliefs supportive of a criminal 
lifestyle when compared with offenders generally, and had lower trait anger, lower 
anger control and higher anger expression than members of the general population. 
Using scores from the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; 
Spielberger, 1999) and the Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles 
(PICTS; Walters, 1995), cluster analysis was used to identify three distinct types of 
violent offenders. The ‘unregulated’ group had high levels of anger experience and 
expression and low levels of anger control, and held beliefs that were strongly 
supportive of a criminal lifestyle. The ‘regulated’ group demonstrated levels of anger 
and beliefs supporting criminal activity that were not in a range that warranted 
xviii 

treatment. Finally, the ‘overregulated’ group held low pre-program levels of anger 
experience and expression and an absence of beliefs supporting criminal activity. 
Study 2 involved 131 male violent offenders from Study 1 who had 
completed a moderate or high intensity violent offender treatment program. Analysis 
of pre- and post-program data on anger, criminal thinking styles and violent re-
offending risk for treatment completers revealed that the ‘unregulated’ group 
demonstrated the greatest reduction in these needs post-program. The ‘regulated’ 
group showed a reduction in anger experience and expression, an increase in anger 
control and changes in criminal thinking styles post-treatment, to a lesser degree than 
the ‘unregulated’ group. For the ‘overregulated’ group, however, treatment changes 
were limited, and there appeared no significant benefit to this group in participating 
in a program addressing these needs. 
These findings offer support for the hypotheses that anger and criminal 
thinking style factors are not criminogenic for all violent offenders, and that violent 
offender treatment programs are likely to be most effective when targeted at 
particular violent offender types. The results are discussed in terms of implications 
for the future provision of violent offender treatment, particularly assessment for 
treatment suitability. It is concluded that providing treatment tailored to each of the 
three subtypes may help to promote higher levels of engagement in rehabilitation, 
achieve greater change in subtype-specific treatment needs and, ultimately, lead to 
greater reductions in violent re-offending and enhanced community safety. 
1 

Chapter 1. Introduction 
Australian and international public health and policy makers have identified 
the prevention of violence and violent offending as a priority. Many acts of violence 
are committed by repeat offenders; accordingly, a strong rationale exists to provide 
treatment to those individuals who have a history of violent offending. An 
increasingly popular approach has been to implement group-based violence 
intervention programs given evidence that groups of offenders who complete 
appropriate treatment re-offend at lower rates than those who do not (see Andrews & 
Bonta, 2010b; Andrews et al., 1990). However, knowledge of the program 
mechanisms that reduce an individual offender’s propensity to re-offend is limited, 
and often restricted to group-level or program-level considerations. As a 
consequence, relatively little is known about the variables that explain which 
offenders benefit from treatment (and which do not) (Serin, Lloyd, Helmus, 
Derkzen, & Luong, 2013). This thesis investigates individual differences that exist 
between violent male offenders, and how these influence treatment performance. 
Specifically, the two studies reported examine the extent to which scores on self-
report measures of emotional regulation (anger) and cognition (criminal thinking 
styles) can be used to identify the treatment needs of different subgroups of violent 
offenders. The findings of these studies are then discussed in terms of their 
implications for violent offender treatment.  
 
Rationale 
International surveys, including reports by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), estimate that violence results in death for over 1.5 million people worldwide 
every year (Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002) and is a leading cause of 
2 

death for people aged 15-44 years (WHO, 2009). Violence may have profound 
adverse effects on the physical and psychological health of victims (see Kessler, 
Davis, & Kendler, 1997; Kilpatrick, Acierno, Resnick, Saunders, & Best, 1997; 
Krug et al., 2002). The impact of violence affects many, including perpetrators, 
witnesses, family and friends, police, health and legal professionals and community 
members who may fear potential victimisation (Lorion, 2001). In addition, exposure 
to violence, either as a victim or a witness, is associated with an increased risk of 
engaging in violent behaviour (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1990).  
A significant number of violent offences occur each year in Australia. These 
offences have a high economic cost. The crimes of homicide, assault and sexual 
assault were estimated to cost Australia over $3 billion in 2005, accounting for 
nearly 10% of the estimated total cost of all crime in that year (Rollings, 2008). 
Violent offences accounted for 6% of crime but over 25% of crime costs in 2005 
(Mayhew, 2003).Criminal justice statistics indicate that in 2010, 204,555 people 
were victims of homicide, assault, sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping or abduction1 
(Australian Institute of Criminology [AIC], 2012). The most commonly recorded 
violent crime was assault (excluding sexual assault)2. The State of Victoria (the 
jurisdiction in which this thesis is based) currently faces an increase in violent 
offending; rates of police-recorded violent ‘crimes against the person’3 have 
increased from 835 per 100,000 people in 2009-10 to 868.5 in 2010-11 (Victoria 
 
1
 This value is likely lower than actual incidences of crime; crime statistics 
invariably underestimate the number of offences committed as not all crimes are 
reported or recorded. 
2
 Rates of assault appear to be decreasing since peaking in 2009; rates of victims of 
assault per 100,000 people increased from 623 in 1996 to 840 in 2007, and fell to 
766 per 100,000 people in 2010 (AIC, 2012). 
3
 ‘Crimes against the person’ refers to offences of homicide, rape, sexual assault, 
robbery, assault, abduction and kidnapping. 
3 

Police, 2011). Given the high level of harm caused, violent crime is considered 
particularly serious and often attracts a custodial sentence. In 2010, the violent 
offences of homicide, assault, sexual offence or robbery were the ‘most serious 
offence’ recorded for 51.4% of all sentenced adult male prisoners across Australia 
(AIC, 2012)4; acts intended to cause injury (including assault; 19%), sexual assault 
(13%) and homicide (10%) were most common (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
[ABS], 2011b). In Victoria, violent offenders accounted for 44.5% of all male 
offenders as at June 2010 (Corrections Victoria, 2010).  
Statistics which indicate that a significant number of prisoners re-offend post-
release highlight the importance of providing effective rehabilitation to violent 
offenders. Of all Australian prisoners released in 2007-08, 38% had returned to 
prison under sentence by 30 June 2010 (AIC, 2012). In Victoria in June 2010, 49.9% 
of sentenced male prisoners had served prior prison sentences (Corrections Victoria, 
2010). Re-offending rates for perpetrators of violent crime appear even higher: of the 
54.5% of prisoners incarcerated for a violent offence in Australia in 2010-11, over 
52% had served at least one prior prison sentence (ABS, 2011b). 
Violent offender treatment programs aim to identify and change the 
individual characteristics that are associated with an increased risk of violent re-
offending. Programs generally target a large number of psychological and 
behavioural factors that are considered relevant to violent offending. The current 
evidence base supporting the efficacy of these programs is limited, but it is possible 
to conclude that programs which follow best practice principles of offender 
 
4
 An increase from 49% in 2007 (AIC, 2009). 
4 

rehabilitation5 will be most successful in reducing rates of violent re-offending (see 
Andrews & Bonta, 2010b; Andrews et al., 1990; Di Placido, Simon, Witte, Gu, & 
Wong, 2006; Fylan & Clarke, 2006; Gendreau, Goggin, French, & Smith, 2006; 
McGuire, 2008; Polaschek, Wilson, Townsend, & Daly, 2005; Serin et al., 2013; 
Smith, Gendreau, & Swartz, 2009; Wong, Gordon, & Gu, 2007; Wong et al., 2005).  
 
Aims 
Identifying the variables that determine which offenders are most likely to 
benefit from violent offender treatment is important as researchers and clinicians 
seek to understand the mechanisms that reduce an individual’s risk of re-offending 
(Serin et al., 2013). The aim of this thesis is to examine the proposition that violent 
offenders are a heterogeneous group and that violent offender treatment programs 
will be more effective for certain subgroups of offenders than for others. 
Specifically, this thesis investigates the extent to which violent offenders can be 
meaningfully classified into subtypes, and whether such classifications are useful in 
explaining the outcomes of group-delivered violent offender treatment.  
 
Outline 
This thesis begins by considering contemporary definitions of violence and 
the relationship of violence to the constructs of aggression, hostility, and anger. 
 
5 The three core empirically-derived best practice principles state that, at a minimum, 
treatment intensity should be matched to risk level (treating the offenders who are 
mostly likely to reoffend; the risk principle), individual-level criminogenic needs 
(variables empirically associated with offending) should be targeted in treatment (the 
needs principle), and cognitive-behavioural techniques should be employed, tailored 
to individual responsivity factors such as literacy skills and learning styles (the 
responsivity principle) (see Andrews & Bonta, 2010b; Andrews et al., 1990). Other 
principles have also been identified, addressing factors such as program integrity, 
therapeutic alliance and treatment readiness. 
5 

These distinctions are crucial for any investigation of this type, given the 
considerable confusion that exists within the research community and amongst 
practitioners in defining violence and how this influences the selection of appropriate 
candidates for treatment. Integrated theories of aggression and violence are then 
reviewed, followed by an overview of current research that has sought to document 
the outcomes of violent offender treatment.  
Evidence of the heterogeneity of violent offenders is then reviewed. The 
constructs of over- and under-controlled anger, instrumental and reactive aggression, 
criminal thinking styles and the relationships of these individual characteristics with 
violent behaviour are considered, leading to the rationale for the two empirical 
studies. The first study, a cross-sectional analysis of a sample of male violent 
offenders who were assessed for suitability for a violence intervention program, 
identifies subgroups of offenders, classified on the basis of their anger (experience, 
expression and control) and use of criminal thinking styles (to justify, rationalise and 
minimise violent offending). The second study provides a longitudinal analysis of 
treatment outcomes from the violent offender treatment program for the different 
subgroups identified in the first study. Finally, the findings are discussed in terms of 
the implications for the further development of theory and practice of violent 
offender assessment and treatment. 
 
  
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Chapter 2. Definitions 
In any cursory reading of the existing literature on violence and violent 
offender treatment, it soon becomes apparent that a number of terms are utilised to 
describe overlapping constructs. Despite different meanings, terms such as 
‘violence’, ‘aggression’, ‘anger’ and ‘hostility’ are often used interchangeably (see, 
e.g., Kingsbury, Lambert, & Hendrickse, 1997; Reidy, Shelley-Tremblay, & 
Lilienfeld, 2011). Researchers and clinicians clearly have difficulty agreeing on the 
necessary elements that denote an offence as violent (Fagan & Harstone, cited in 
Loeber, Farrington, & Waschbusch, 1998) and have drawn on a broad range of 
criteria in the psychological, criminological and sociological literature, including 
legal definitions of violent offending; violent offences in criminal history, index 
(current), most frequent or most serious offending; victim selection (e.g., spousal 
assault); attitudes (e.g., hostility); or emotions (e.g., anger). These definitional and 
methodological inconsistencies contribute to a lack of clarity regarding the main 
findings of research in this area (Kenny & Press, 2006; Serin & Preston, 2001). 
Accordingly, it becomes important to clarify the definition of ‘violent offending’ 
employed in this thesis, and the relationship of violent offending with several other 
associated constructs. 
In this thesis, the term ‘violent offence’ is used to refer to acts of violence 
that contravene the legal code. Although offences are defined by a legislative 
framework, the labelling of an offence as ‘violent’ is based on a psychological 
definition of violence. Violent offending is considered a subset of violence, and 
violence a subset of aggression, as depicted in Figure 1. All acts of violence are 
considered aggressive, although not all acts of aggression are violent (Howells, 
Daffern, & Day, 2008). 
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Figure 1. The relationship between aggression, violence and violent offending. 
 
Aggression 
Many definitions of aggression have been proposed, often stemming from 
differing perspectives across the disciplines of psychology, biology and sociology 
(Megargee & Hokanson, 1970). Definitions vary in breadth and scope. Rosenzweig 
(1977), for example, broadly defines aggression as encompassing constructive and 
destructive actions taken to overcome an obstacle or progress toward a goal. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1993), however, limit their definition of aggression to 
“unprovoked, senseless or unjustifiable violence or threat of violence” (p. 52). While 
Rosenzweig (1977) argues that aggression should not inherently imply negative 
behaviour (as the negative elements of aggression are captured by the terms 
‘hostility’ and ‘violence’), definitions of aggression predominantly incorporate 
negative elements, considering the harmful intent or impact of the aggressive 
behaviour on others in defining the construct. 

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The concepts of intent and harm are generally considered to be important 
components of aggression (e.g., Averill, 1982; Bandura, 1973; Blackburn, 1993; 
Hamberger & Guse, 2002). This is reflected in Blackburn’s (1993) concise definition 
of aggression as the intentional infliction of harm (physical or psychological). For 
behaviour to be aggressive, it has been suggested that the perpetrator (actor) must 
intend and believe that the behaviour will cause harm or injury (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002; Baron & Richardson, 1994), that it has a subjective probability of 
reaching the target, and that it will deliver a noxious stimulus to the target and/or 
remove the target from impeding the actor’s goal (Kaufmann, 1965).  
There are variations in whether factors such as the nature and motivation of 
the target and the time frame of the act are considered. Anderson and Bushman 
(2002), for example, require aggressive behaviour to be carried out with the 
proximate (immediate) intent to cause. The aggressive behaviour may be directed at 
an individual (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002), living being (e.g., Baron & 
Richardson, 1994) or a target (e.g., Kaufmann, 1965). Some researchers further 
require that the target be motivated to avoid the behaviour (e.g., Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002; Baron & Richardson, 1994).  
Such definitions typically exclude acts of unintended aggression or harm that 
occurs as an accidental by-product of helpful actions and harmful acts that the victim 
does not want to avoid (e.g., pain administered in sexual masochism; see also 
Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Baumeister, 1989; Kingsbury et al., 1997). This 
highlights the importance of Okey’s (1992) observation that labelling any behaviour 
as aggressive requires knowledge of the social context of the behaviour, the actor’s 
intentionality, the harm caused to the target, and the target’s motivation to avoid 
harm. 
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Subtypes of aggression. 
Several subtypes of aggression have been proposed across a range of 
disciplines. Primarily bimodal in classification, these include: reactive and proactive 
(Dodge & Coie, 1987), hostile and instrumental (Kingsbury et al., 1997), reactive 
and instrumental (Patrick & Zempolich, 1999) and affective and predatory 
aggression (McEllistrem, 2004; Meloy, 2006; Vitiello, Behar, Hunt, Stoff, & 
Ricciuti, 1990; Weinshenker & Siegel, 2002). While Barratt (1991) distinguished 
between three forms of aggression: spontaneous/impulsive, premeditated, and 
psychopathology/medically-related, the first two seemingly correspond to the 
dichotomous models proposed above.  
Several elements are common to the typologies, despite differing 
nomenclature. There appears to be two distinct (though not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) subtypes of aggression. Distinguishing features include whether the act is 
planned / premeditated or impulsive, the presence (or not) of a perceived threat or 
provocation is present and immediacy of response to that threat, the intentionality of 
the aggression, the role of arousal and affect, and the presence of an external goal of 
aggression. In short, these two distinct forms of aggression are:  
1. An instrumental, premeditated, non-affect-driven reward-seeking 
behaviour in which threats or injury facilitate achievement of non-
injurious goals (e.g., harming a victim to obtain money; described as 
predatory, proactive, non-angry, planned, premeditated, offensive or 
cold-blooded); and  
2. A reactive, affect-driven, highly aroused impulsive response to perceived 
threat, provocation or frustration, in which causing harm to the victim is 
thought to decrease unpleasant internal feeling states in the aggressor, 
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possibly through reduced physiological arousal or tension (described as 
hostile, expressive, angry, affective, defensive, impulsive or hot-
blooded) (see Aronson, 1992; Barratt & Slaughter, 1998; Berkowitz, 
1993; Blackburn, 1993; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Buss, 1961; 
Cornell et al., 1996; DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007; Dodge & Coie, 1987; 
Hodgins, 2007; Houston, Stanford, Villemarette-Pittman, Conklin, & 
Helfritz, 2004; Howells et al., 2008; Kingsbury et al., 1997; McEllistrem, 
2004; McGuire, 2008; Meloy, 2006; Ramírez & Andreu, 2006).  
There is some evidence that the basis for these two types of aggression lies in 
brain structure and functioning, mediated by different neural architectures. Reactive 
aggression appears related to a fight response to threat, mediated by subcortical 
systems, whereas instrumental aggression is likely uses the neural systems involved 
in goal-directed motor process (e.g., the temporal cortex and amygdala) (Blair, 2002, 
2010; Fabian, 2010; Glenn & Raine, 2009; Panksepp & Zellner, 2004; Raine et al., 
1998a; Raine, Stoddard, Bihrle, & Buchsbaum, 1998b; Wall, Blanchard, & 
Blanchard, 2003).  
The reactive-instrumental dichotomy has, however, been criticised for failing 
to capture the range of possible motivations for aggression, raising challenges in 
reliably categorising aggressive acts as either hostile (reactive) or instrumental, and 
for failing to consider that an individual may engage in instrumental and reactive 
aggression at the same time (see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Barratt & Slaughter, 
1998; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Wall et al., 2003). For example, anger-mediated 
reactive aggression may not always be impulsive and unplanned: an individual may 
ruminate angrily over a perceived provocation for some time before engaging in 
aggression (Howells et al., 2008). 
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Violence 
Notions of what constitutes violent behaviour differ considerably between 
and within societies and groups, at different times and in different contexts (Jones, 
2000). Substantial variation also exists in what are considered to be the ‘critical’ 
features of a violent act (see Tolan, 2007; Tolan, Gorman-Smith, & Henry, 2006), 
although contemporary definitions of violence tend to vary along six dimensions, 
related to the level of the action, the nature and degree of force, the outcome of the 
force, the type of injury, significance and nature of the target and the intentionality of 
the action (Jackson, Zahn, & Brownstein, 2004).  
The World Health Organisation (Krug et al., 2002) broadly defines violence 
as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has 
a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment 
or deprivation” (p. 4). This definition encompasses a wide range of acts of 
interpersonal violence, suicidal behaviour and armed conflict, including physical 
acts, threats and intimidation, and those that lead to some of the less obvious 
consequences of violence which compromise the well-being of individuals, families 
and communities. The notion of intent, generally central to violence (and aggression) 
definitions, allows violent acts to be differentiated from disease or accidental injury 
(Tolan, 2007). 
Anderson and Bushman (2002) distinguish between aggression and violence 
in terms of the extent of harm inflicted, They define violence as aggression that has 
extreme harm as its goal (see also Meloy’s [2006] and Blackburn’s [1993] 
definitions of aggression as the intention to cause [psychological or physical] harm, 
and violence as the physical infliction of harm). These definitions identify violence 
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as goal-directed intentional behaviour. Uncertainty and disagreement still arise, 
however, when attempting to label an act as violent, particularly with regard to the 
operationalisation of notions of intent and harm. For example, some researchers have 
suggested that ‘violence’ should include intimidating, intentionally coercive or 
oppressive practices not clearly leading to physical harm (Chalk & King, 1998; 
Jouriles, McDonald, Norwood, & Ezell, 2001; Tolan, 2007; Tolan et al., 2006). 
Others argue that the identification of a behaviour as violent should be separated 
from the victim’s and observers’ perception of the threat and the extent of injury 
experienced (Heelas, 1982; Hines & Malley-Morrison, 2004).  
Loeber et al. (1998) argue that there is a need to establish a common 
language for research into violence, to promote information communication and 
further develop policies and interventions. The lack of consensus about the definition 
of violence has implications for how we understand violence, identify risk factors 
and patterns of violence, and determine the most appropriate interventions and 
policies to reduce violence. The inconsistency in defining violence naturally has 
implications for the clarity and consistency of definitions of violent offending, 
contributing to challenges in violent offender research.  
 
Violent Offending  
Violent offending, or violent crime, forms a subcategory of violence, with 
violent offences being those acts of violence which contravene the legal code 
(Howells, 2010; Howells et al., 2008). In an Australian Institute of Criminology 
report, Bricknell (2008) defines violent crime as having the intention of causing or 
threatening physical harm or death to the victim, and includes the offence categories 
of homicide, assault, sexual assault and robbery (armed and unarmed). Similarly, the 
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Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2006) defines violence as any incident 
involving the occurrence, attempt or threat of either physical or sexual assault; 
physical assault involves the use of physical force with the intent to harm or frighten, 
with attempts or threats to inflict physical harm included only if a person believes it 
is likely to be carried out. The variance in these definitions may stem from cross-
jurisdictional differences in local or Federal legislation. It is, however, criminal law 
that determines whether a behaviour is criminally violent (Blackburn, 1993; Kenny 
& Press, 2006; McGuire, 2008). 
Criminal law in Australia, as in many countries, consists of common law 
(formed from decisions in legal cases) and statute law (laws made by Parliament). In 
Victoria, two pieces of legislation are particularly pertinent to discussions of 
violence and violent offending: the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and the Sentencing Act 
1991 . The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) refers to violence in relation to particular offences, 
including unintentional killing in the course or furtherance of a crime of violence 
(Section 3A) or piracy with violence (Section 70A). No overarching legal definition 
of violence is provided, however, beyond the definition proscribed in Section 9AH 
that relates specifically to offences of family violence; there, violence is defined as 
actual or threatened physical, sexual or psychological abuse, including intimidation, 
harassment and property damage (see Appendix A for a comparison of Australian 
states and territories).  
The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) outlines offences deemed to be violent or 
serious violent, although fails to provide a specific definition of violence. Violent 
offences proscribed in Clause 2, Schedule 1 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) are 
outlined in Table 1. Several offences are further codified as ‘serious violent’ in the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) (Clause 3, Schedule 1); these are also listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1  
Violent and Serious Violent Offence Classifications According to the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic)  
 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
Violent offences Murder; manslaughter; child homicide; defensive homicide; 
intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury; intentionally 
causing a very serious disease; making threats to kill or inflict 
serious injury; kidnapping; intentionally causing, inflicting or 
intending to cause grievous bodily harm; or conspiring, inciting 
or attempting to commit any of the above offences. 
Serious violent 
offences 
Murder; intentionally causing serious injury, a very serious 
disease or grievous bodily harm; making threats to kill, injure or 
endanger life; or conspiring, inciting or attempting to commit any 
of these offences. 
 
Defining violent offending according to legislation provides a degree of 
consistency within jurisdictions in the offences recognised as violent and that may 
prompt a referral for violence treatment. Comparing cross-jurisdictional data or 
research can be problematic, however, as actions considered violent in one 
jurisdiction may not be considered violent in others, contingent on law, cultural and 
societal norms.  
Several offence categorisation tools have been developed to address this 
issue. The two systems utilised in this thesis are the Australian and New Zealand 
Standard Offence Classification system (ANZSOC; ABS, 2011a) and the National 
Offence Index (NOI; ABS, 2009). More detailed information regarding these 
systems is provided in Appendix B. Briefly, the NOI provides an ordinal ranking of 
offences according to perceived seriousness, to determine a principal or ‘most 
serious’ offence (ABS, 2009) that enables the representation of an offender by a 
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single offence in the case of multiple charges. The ANZSOC system, a system for 
classifying criminal behaviour in a manner that overcomes differences in legal 
definitions across jurisdictions, provides a framework for organising key behavioural 
characteristics of criminal offences. Of the 16 ANZSOC divisions, the first six are 
particularly relevant to violent offending: these are offences against the person, 
comprising culpable (intentional, negligent or reckless) acts that result in harm 
(physical or non-physical) against a specific person (ABS, 2011a).  
 
Challenges Associated With the Use of Legal Definitions to Identify Violent 
Offenders 
These classification systems attempt to overcome some of the cross-
jurisdictional issues that arise in using legislation to identify violent offenders for 
research purposes. In practice, however, it can be challenging to identify violent 
offenders. For example, questions arise as to whether an offender who has 
convictions for both violent and sexual offences should be treated as a violent 
offender or a sex offender. Studies of criminal careers suggest that most violent 
offenders are generalist offenders who rarely conform to a narrow pattern of 
criminality (see Broadhurst & Maller, 1991; Farrington & Lambert, 1994; Indermaur 
& Ferrante, 1993; McGloin, Sullivan, & Piquero, 2009; Simon, 1997) and often 
engage in other types of offending (e.g., drug, property or sexual offences). As such, 
identifying violent offenders solely on the basis of their commission of a ‘violent 
offence’ may be problematic, for several reasons:  
1. Nature of behaviour and offence type 
Considerable disparity exists between those offences that are considered 
violent in research and clinical literature and those that are labelled violent in the 
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legislation. Clinical definitions of violence result in a greater range of offences 
designated violent, while ‘violent offences’ identified in legislation may capture a 
greater range of potentially non-violent behaviours.  
The offence of assault provides an example. The offence is considered violent 
for clinical and legal purposes, although the behaviour constituting the assault charge 
may potentially be minor (e.g. touching that does not result in physical injury), such 
that the lay community would not consider it violent (Kenny & Press, 2006). Assault 
offences can be readily classified into common (or simple) assault or aggravated 
assault (Blackburn, 1993). Although researchers rarely classify individuals convicted 
of common assault as violent (Farrington, 1997), an offender may be inappropriately 
identified as violent for treatment purposes if classification is based solely on 
criminal conviction (Kenny & Press, 2006).  
Acts that constitute a legal definition of a violent offence encompass diverse 
behaviours (including threatening, touching, pushing, hitting, striking, kicking, 
fighting or throwing objects). Labelling offenders as violent based only on their 
offending may fail to capture the frequency or considerable diversity of these 
behaviours (Taylor, 2003). Violent offenders admit to committing a higher number 
of violent offences than their records indicate (Farrington, 2000), and violent 
convictions generally do not reflect the frequency of an individual’s violent 
behaviours. Furthermore, charges may be downgraded prior to or during court 
proceedings; labelling an individual as violent (or not) on the basis of their final 
conviction may thus fail to capture the severity of the violent behaviour.  
2. The role of intent and resulting level of harm 
Criminal law commonly distinguishes between an accident (with no intent), 
negligence (failure to show due caution or care, resulting in an injury or harm), 
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recklessness (acting in a manner that greatly increases the potential for injury) and 
crimes, such as murder or assault, which require proof that the crime occurred (actus 
reus) and was intended (mens rea) (Tolan, 2007). As noted earlier, intent is a key 
component in psychological definitions of violence (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 
2002); intent is not necessary, however, for an action to be legally classified as 
violent. Some legislated violent offences require proof of intent (e.g., murder), some 
require the intention to use violence or an awareness that conduct may be violent 
(e.g., riot or affray; Section 93D, Crimes Act 1900 [NSW])  while others constitute 
reckless6 or negligent (unintended) action (e.g., manslaughter or recklessly causing 
serious injury; Clause 2, Schedule 1, Sentencing Act 1991 [Vic]).  
Psychological definitions of violence often emphasise the extent of physical 
harm resulting from the violent act, although as noted earlier, there is considerable 
disagreement regarding the extent and nature of the harm required to constitute a 
violent act. Some describe violence as inflicting physical injury (Blackburn, 1993). 
Others argue that the extreme harm intended by violence includes non-physical harm 
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Offences proscribed as violent in the legislation 
include those with a goal of extreme harm (e.g., murder or intentionally causing 
serious injury), but also several without extreme harm as the goal (e.g., acts of 
reckless or negligent behaviour that are not intended to cause extreme harm).  
3. Severity of behaviour 
Assessment of the severity of violent behaviour is crucial in clinical practice, 
particularly when determining suitability for treatment. Offences discriminate 
between levels of severity of the violent act outcome, but generally not between 
 
6 The term ‘reckless’ refers to the taking of an unjustified risk – that is, where a 
person realises their actions may have a particular (undesirable) consequence, but 
decides to proceed. 
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levels of severity of the violent act itself. For example, assault causing injury and 
assault causing serious injury differentiate the level of severity of the outcome of the 
violent act, but not the level of severity of the behaviour involved. The distinction 
between murder and manslaughter provides one exception: the extent of harm caused 
and the outcome of the act are the same in both offences; the distinction, instead, is 
based on intent and severity of the behaviour. Empirical studies also often fail to 
consider severity of the violent act, with researchers routinely dichotomously coding 
offenders as violent or non-violent (rather than by degrees of severity of violence; 
Kenny & Press, 2006). 
In sum, the above review highlights a number of issues associated with 
defining violent offending that cause confusion in the classification and 
understanding of violent criminal behaviour. The lack of common language across 
disciplines affects inconsistency across legal and clinical domains and a lack of 
comparability across jurisdictions. The lack of a common clinical definition of 
violent offending creates inconsistency when determining which offences warrant 
referral to violent offending treatment. Furthermore, diversity in legislation, 
definitions and classifications of violent offending affects statistical reporting of 
violent crime and any understanding of the pattern of relationships observed between 
violence and other variables (Kenny & Press, 2006).  
In this thesis, legal convictions form the basis for referral to an assessment 
for suitability for violent offender treatment; these convictions are not necessarily 
proscribed as violent in the legislation. Rehabilitation practice in Victoria relies on a 
criminal law determination of the illegality of behaviour, but does not consider 
whether legislation proscribes the offence as violent. This is important when 
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considering the broader application of the findings reported in this thesis to other 
jurisdictions.  
 
Serious Violent Offenders 
A final point that requires clarification regards the use of the ‘serious violent 
offender’ label, which appears periodically in the violent offender rehabilitation 
literature, clinical practice and legislation. The label has utility in the identification, 
assessment and treatment of those violent offenders considered to be at significant 
risk of re-offending, and is also used in legal settings to identify offenders who face 
potentially stricter sentences or parole requirements. However, the criteria attached 
to this label do differ across contexts. 
As noted earlier, in legal settings, the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) proscribes 
several offences as ‘serious violent’ (e.g., murder or manslaughter; outlined in Table 
1above). The purpose of this label is to provide an indication on an offender’s 
criminal record of their ‘serious offender’ status, for enhanced community protection 
(e.g., parole requirements).  
In the context of research, the term ‘serious violent offender’ label appears 
most frequently in the broader criminological literature that considers developmental 
and life course perspectives on crime. Commonly referred to as ‘serious’ or 
‘persistent’ violent offenders, the label separates the small number of individuals 
who commit a relatively large proportion of serious violent crime from the 
substantially larger proportion of those who act aggressively or violently at some 
point in their lives (e.g., Loeber et al., 1998; Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington, & Milne, 
2002; Serin, 1995). ‘Serious violent offenders’ typically exhibit antisocial and 
aggressive behaviour from childhood or early adolescence that continues throughout 
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much of adulthood, engage in more frequent and more violent offending and are 
usually assessed as being at high risk of violent reoffending (Loeber & Hay, 1997; 
Moffitt, 2003; Serin & Preston, 2001; Whitehead, Ward, & Collie, 2007).  
In clinical practice, application of the ‘serious violent offender’ label is used 
to prioritise assessment and treatment of particular offenders. Some jurisdictions use 
the label to identify offenders who are considered to be at high risk of violent re-
offending. Others identify serious violent offenders on the basis of particular index 
offences (e.g., murder, manslaughter, kidnapping). This discrepancy again impacts 
on the ability to compare program evaluations from different jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, when serious violent offender labels are based on an individual’s index 
offence, rather than their assessed level of risk of violent re-offending, there is 
potential for finite clinical resources to be utilised for offenders at low risk of re-
offending, at the expense of assessing and treating offenders who are at higher risk. 
This appears to disregard the best practice principles of offender rehabilitation, 
whereby the level of rehabilitation services provided to an offender should be 
proportional to that offender’s risk of re-offending (Bonta & Andrews, 2007).  
 
Definitions Employed in this Thesis 
The inconsistency and disparity in definitions of aggression, violence, violent 
offending and serious violent offenders that are used in legal, research and clinical 
arenas highlight the need to clarify terms that are utilised in this thesis. 
Throughout this thesis, ‘aggression’ is defined as any form of behaviour with 
the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such 
treatment (Baron & Richardson, 1994; Howells et al., 2008; Parrott & Giancola, 
2007). By virtue of the sample, and consistent with many researchers in the social 
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sciences (e.g., McGuire, 2008; Polaschek & Collie, 2004), ‘violence’ is used to refer 
to acts of personal violence, committed by one individual against another, in a 
context where such actions are specifically proscribed by societal norms and codified 
in formal law. As with most research in crime and justice, the term ‘violent offence’ 
is used to refer to acts of violence that contravene the legal code (Howells, 2010; 
Howells et al., 2008). While the offence is defined by a legislative framework, the 
labelling of an offence as violent is based on definitions of violence from the 
psychological literature. Thus the range of offences considered violent is broader in 
scope than those labelled as violent in the local (Victorian) legislation.  
This thesis is limited in scope to discussion of male offenders, due to 
empirical evidence which suggests that female offenders have unique risk factors 
and treatment needs (e.g., Serin & Preston, 2001). Violence that is self-inflicted (e.g., 
suicide) or carried out as societally-sanctioned behaviour (e.g., police and military 
actions) is also excluded; extensive research demonstrates the distinct causes, 
impacts, outcomes and intervention needs for these forms of violence (see, e.g.,Tolan 
& Guerra, 1994). Violence that is predominantly sexual or family-oriented is 
excluded for similar reasons (see Bowen & Gilchrist, 2004; Laws & O'Donohue, 
2008; Serin & Preston, 2001; Tolan & Guerra, 1994). 
  
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Chapter 3. Contemporary Approaches to Violence and Aggression  
The vast array of factors that are associated with violence illustrates the 
complex and multidimensional nature of violent behaviour and hints at the 
heterogeneity of violent offenders. The aim of this chapter is to establish that no 
single factor can explain why some people engage in violence in some situations; 
rather, that violence is the product of multiple interacting factors, with each causal 
factor able to explain only a small proportion of the individual differences in 
aggression and violence (see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 
2006; Huesmann & Guerra, 1997; Rappaport & Thomas, 2004). For example, while 
aggression and violence appear to have evolved as a strategy for many species, 
expression (or inhibition) is dependent on factors including previous social 
experiences, the current social context and individual differences in an individual’s 
propensity for violence.  
Integrated theories of violence attempt to provide an overarching framework 
for understanding human aggression and violence in its various forms, incorporating 
ecological, social, psychological, biological and economic factors into a single 
coherent theory that explains a greater proportion of individual differences. The 
current dominant integrated theory of aggression and violence, the General 
Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), is outlined, along with the 
Algebra of Aggression model proposed by Megargee (1993, 2009).  
 
Causal Factors 
Social factors associated with violence include environmental factors such as 
economic deprivation (Baron, 2004; Bellair, Roscigno, & McNulty, 2003; Eisler & 
Schissel, 2004), or residing in ‘socially disorganised’ neighbourhoods with high 
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residential mobility, high poverty levels, low collective efficacy or a limited sense of 
community (Cantillon, 2006; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; Shaw & 
McKay, 1942; Tolan, Gorman-Smith, & Henry, 2003). Parental factors include 
family disruption (McNulty & Bellair, 2003; Sampson, 1986; Sampson & Groves, 
1989), parental rejection or having parents with criminal convictions or limited 
education (Gray, 1997; Hoeve et al., 2009). Finally, social learning or modelling of 
aggression or violence contributes to the development of future violence (Agnew, 
1992; Akers, 2009; Bandura, 1973, 1983, 2001; Blackburn, 1993; Gerbner, Gross, 
Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; Mischel, 1973, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Okey, 1992; Sutherland & Cressey, 1978).  
Biological factors associated with violence include higher levels of 
hormones, particularly testosterone (Book, Starzyk, & Quinsey, 2001; Ellis, 2005; 
Raine, 2002; Rappaport & Thomas, 2004), and nutritional deficiencies (Carré, 
McCormick, & Hariri, 2011; Fishbein, 2001; Liu, 2011; Virkkunen, 1986). 
Neurological impairments are also associated with violence, including abnormal 
levels of some neurotransmitters (e.g., dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine and 
monoamine oxidase) (Badawy, 2003; Ellis, 1991; Huizinga et al., 2006; Virkkunen, 
Goldman, Nielsen, & Linnoila, 1995), and the impact of brain injuries and diseases 
including Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (Fast & Conry, 2009; Fishbein, 2001; 
Raine et al., 2001; Streissguth et al., 2004), tumours, head injuries and central 
nervous system diseases such as Huntington’s chorea and epilepsy (Brower & Price, 
2001; Ellis, 2005; Fishbein, 2001; Raine et al., 2001; Shiwach, 1994; Williams, 
Cordan, Mewse, Tonks, & Burgess, 2010). Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity 
Disorder, with suspected biological causes including neurological damage, prenatal 
stress, food allergies and genetics, is also strongly associated with the early onset of 
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chronic delinquency and persistent violent behaviour (Eklund & Klinteberg, 2003; 
Moffitt et al., 2002; Nagin & Tremblay, 1999; Retz & Rösler, 2010). Others have 
theorised the involvement of innate aggressive instincts and evolution (Hobbes, 1651 
cited in Baker, 1999; Freud, 1915; Lorenz, 1966; Wilson, 1975) and the 
inheritability of certain violent personality traits (Carey & DiLalla, 1994; Walters, 
1992), although any relationship may be via a complex interaction of these factors 
with social conditions that increase the probability of violent behaviour. 
The involvement of psychological factors in developing and maintaining 
violent behaviour for some individuals is well-established. Emotions such as anger 
(Cornell, Peterson, & Richards, 1999; Craig, 1982; Kay, Wolkenfeld, & Murrill, 
1988; Lindqvist, Dåderman, & Hellström, 2005; Michie & Cooke, 2006; Novaco, 
1976, 2011; Polaschek & Reynolds, 2000; Suter, Byrne, Byrne, Howells, & Day, 
2002), shame (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Geer, Estupinan, & Manguno-Mire, 2000; 
Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996), frustration and other 
‘negative’ emotions (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) are well-
researched causal factors. Mental illness (particularly delusional thoughts and 
hallucinations; Elbogen & Johnson, 2009; Monahan, 1992; Swanson, Holzer, Ganju, 
& Jono, 1990; Teasdale, 2009; Tedeschi & Felson, 1994), cognitive deficits (Ellis & 
Siegler, 1994; Loeber & Hay, 1997; Piquero, 2000) and impaired social skills 
(Polaschek & Reynolds, 2000) may also contribute to an individual’s propensity to 
act violently.  
The relationship between aggression, violence, antisocial personality disorder 
(Coid et al., 2009; Friedmann, Melnick, Jiang, & Hamilton, 2008; Hodgins & Côté, 
1993) and psychopathy (Cornell et al., 1996; Hare & McPherson, 1984; Hemphill, 
Hare, & Wong, 1998; Serin, 1991) has been extensively researched. Other 
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personality traits, including irritability, trait aggressiveness and narcissism 
(Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006; Jones & Paulhus, 2010; 
Martinez, Zeichner, Reidy, & Miller, 2008), neuroticism and antagonism (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987), and paranoid and borderline personality disorders (Blackburn & Coid, 
1999; Coid, 2002) have been associated with an increased risk of violence, as have 
other characteristics such as limited capacity for empathy (Burke, 2001; Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2007; Owen & Fox, 2011), or dismissive or insecure attachment style 
(Allen, Hauser, & Borman-Spurrell, 1996; van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 1997; Weiler & Widom, 1996) .  
The role that self-esteem plays in violent behaviour has been the subject of 
some contention (Ostrowsky, 2010); some suggest that violence is associated with 
low self-esteem (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Walker 
& Bright, 2009b; Webster, 2006), while others argue that high self-esteem is a 
contributing factor (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Hughes, Cavell, & 
Grossman, 1997; Papps & O'Carroll, 1998; Salmivalli, 2001). 
Finally, a range of cognitive processes are thought to be involved in violent 
behaviour (Berkowitz, 1989, 1993, 2010; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Crick & Dodge, 
1996). These include developing scripts for violent behaviour (Abelson, 1981; 
Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Huesmann, 1988; Shahinfar, Kupersmidt, & Matza, 
2001), misattribution of hostile intent (Copello & Tata, 1990; Seager, 2005; Serin & 
Kuriychuk, 1994), threat perception (Athens, 1980; Katz, 1988), high levels of 
impulsivity or low levels of behavioural inhibition, self-control or self-regulation (af 
Klinteberg, Andersson, Magnusson, & Stattin, 1993; Baron, 1983; Barratt, 1994; 
Caspi, 2000; DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990; Polaschek & Reynolds, 2000). In the context of physiological arousal 
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or excitation (Zillmann, 1983), these cognitive processes may change. The 
motivation to engage in violence (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Felson, 2009; 
Tedeschi & Felson, 1994) and the presence of criminal thoughts, cognitive 
distortions and violence-supporting beliefs (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & 
Gibbs, 2000; Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Skaptadottir, & Helgadottir, 2011; Maruna & 
Mann, 2006; Sykes & Matza, 1957; Walker & Bright, 2009b; Walters, 2007a; 
Yochelson & Samenow, 1976) are strongly associated with violent offending. 
 
General Aggression Model 
The General Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; 
Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007) was developed to integrate a number of 
existing ‘mini-theories’ of aggression into a parsimonious unified theory. The GAM 
draws on theories including social learning and interaction, excitation transfer, 
affective aggression and script theory (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall, 
Anderson, & Bushman, 2011). As with other models of aggression and violence, the 
GAM is influenced by the definitions of aggression and violence utilised in its 
development: aggression is defined as any behaviour intended to harm another 
person who does not want to be harmed, and violence as any aggressive act that has 
extreme physical harm as its goal (Anderson & Bushman, 2002).  
The GAM is a social-cognitive model which emphasises that aggressive acts 
rarely occur without the interaction of precipitating situational factors and 
predisposing personal characteristics (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), incorporating 
affective, behavioural, cognitive, psychophysiological, personological and situation 
variables, short and long term processes and decision processes (DeWall et al., 
2011). Current situational variables (known as proximal causes and processes) 
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include both personological (e.g., mood, scripts, beliefs, values, long-term goals, 
schemata) and contextual variables (e.g., aggressive cues, provocation, substance 
use, incentives). Enduring causes and processes (referred to as distal factors) include 
biological and environmental modifiers manifest in personality that influence an 
individual’s preparedness to act aggressively (e.g., personality traits, genetic and 
neurophysiological disposition). According to the GAM, an individual constructs 
‘knowledge structures’ from their experiences; these structures contribute to the 
establishment of personality and guide interpretations and behavioural responses to 
social and physical environments. Knowledge structures may become automatised 
with use, and may contain or be linked to affective states, behavioural programs and 
beliefs. Internal states (cognition, affect and arousal) are interconnected and 
influence subsequent decision-making and behavioural expression (Howells et al., 
2008). 
The GAM proposes that a single episodic cycle of aggression has three 
critical stages: (a) person and situation inputs; (b) present internal states (cognition, 
arousal, affect, brain activity); and (c) outcomes of appraisal and decision-making 
processes. A feedback loop may influence future cycles of aggression, producing a 
violence escalation cycle (Anderson, Buckley, & Carnagey, 2008; DeWall & 
Anderson, 2011). Figure 2 provides a pictorial outline of the GAM. 
The General Aggression Model has consistently received support as a general 
model of aggression (for reviews, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall & 
Anderson, 2011). The GAM has primarily been tested using laboratory aggression 
experiments, although an increasing body of empirical research has applied the 
model to aggression in the ‘real world’, including acts of intimate partner violence, 
intergroup violence and suicide. The GAM has also been used to explain non-violent 
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behaviour, and the non-occurrence of violence in relatively peaceful societies (see 
DeWall et al., 2011) although has been criticised regarding its failure to adequately 
explain aggression processes (Ferguson & Dyck, 2012). Nonetheless, it remains the 
dominant theory of aggression. 
 
 
Figure 2. The General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). 
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Algebra of Aggression 
The Algebra of Aggression is an alternative framework that seeks to explain 
all forms of human aggression and violence (e.g., verbal, physical, legal, criminal, 
mild, extreme) by focusing on the factors that determine whether an individual 
performs a given aggressive act against a specific target at a particular point in time 
(Megargee, 1993, 2009, 2011). The framework proposes that at any given moment, 
multiple aggressive and non-aggressive responses may be competing for expression 
in a balance that may be altered by further interactions or changed conditions. At a 
particular moment, in specific circumstances, responses in which inhibitory factors 
outweigh aggression-promoting factors are blocked, while responses in which 
excitatory factors outweigh inhibitory factors compete with each other and with all 
possible non-aggressive responses. The behaviour chosen in an (often unconscious) 
internal bargaining process or ‘response competition’ is the behaviour that offers the 
most satisfaction at the least cost; the ‘reaction potential’ or net strength of an 
aggressive response is determined by balancing factors promoting and deterring each 
response. Figure 3 provides an approximate depiction of the Algebra of Aggression 
process. The Algebra of Aggression has not been subject to the rigorous empirical 
validation of the General Aggression Model, however provides a useful clinical tool 
to guide identification and interpretation of the complex factors contributing to 
violent behaviour. 
Factors that promote or foster aggressive responses may be personal or 
situational. Personal factors are the intrinsic or extrinsic instigations to aggression, 
and habit strength (Megargee, 2011). Intrinsic instigation to aggression (or the 
conscious or unconscious drive to attack, injure or harm someone) is motivated by 
anger, hostility, rage or hatred and leads to angry (or reactive) aggression; sources  
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Figure 3. An approximate depiction of Megargee’s Algebra of Aggression.  
 
may be psychological (e.g., frustration, aversive events, provocation, threats, attack 
or territorial intrusion) or physical (e.g., genetic predisposition, physical disease, 
Competing aggressive and non-aggressive responses 
Hindering factors for 
aggressive behaviour 
Fostering factors for 
aggressive behaviour 
Personal 
Variables 
Habit 
Strength 
Intrinsic 
Instigator 
Extrinsic 
Instigator 
Situational 
Variables 
Personal 
Variables 
Situational 
Variables 
Response Competition: 
Decision to perform a particular aggressive behaviour 
directed at a particular target at a particular point in time (the 
behaviour that offers the most satisfaction at the least cost) 
Reaction Potential: 
Net strength of aggressive response, determined by factors 
promoting and deterring each response 
Internal 
Inhibitions 
Pragmatic 
Concerns 
31 

central nervous system disorders, hormones, fatigue, stress, pain or chemical 
influence). Extrinsic instigation leads to instrumental aggression, used as a means to 
acquire ends (other than injuring the target) or attain goals (e.g., acquisition, self-
defence, dominance, power, self-esteem, enjoyment of aggression or the 
accomplishment of personal, social, religious, occupational or political objectives).  
Habit strength refers to the prior extent of reinforcement of aggressive acts; 
stronger habit strength for a particular aggressive response increases the likelihood 
that the act or a similar behaviour will be chosen again. The framework suggests that 
angry aggression is reinforced by pain or discomfort inflicted on the victim, and 
instrumental aggression by attaining extrinsic goals through aggressive behaviour. 
Situational factors that foster aggressive responses range from environmental 
influences (e.g., being in a war zone) to specific stimuli (e.g., being cheered or jeered 
by bystanders). The most widely-researched situational factors facilitating 
aggression include crowding, contagion, anonymity, ambient temperature, 
architecture, access to potential victims and weapon availability (Megargee, 2009). 
Factors that inhibit aggressive responses may also be personal (e.g., internal 
inhibitions, pragmatic concerns) or situational (e.g., presence of witnesses, barriers 
between the aggressor and target, perception that the target is physically superior or 
well-armed) (Megargee, 2011). The chief source of internal inhibitions are learnt 
ethical prohibitions (e.g., taboos, morals or conscientiousness) that may be general or 
specific, temporary or lasting, and vary as a function of the aggressive act, target and 
circumstances, largely determined by culture, family group and peer influences. 
Other sources of internal inhibitions include empathy, identification with a potential 
victim, or the involvement of physiological factors such as the inhibitory areas of the 
central nervous system, inhibitory actions of certain neurotransmitters (e.g., 
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serotonin), hereditary and genetic influences, chemical influences or physical 
disability or illness. Pragmatic concerns include fear that the intended act may not 
achieve its objectives, or may elicit negative consequences (e.g., punishment, 
retaliation or retribution).  
In summary, the most useful theories of aggressive and violent behaviour are 
multidimensional, and commonly consider affective, behavioural, cognitive, 
situational and personal factors. The premise of this thesis is that typologies 
differentiating violent offenders on the basis of behaviour (e.g., categories based on 
offence types and classifications) have only limited utility in the selection of 
appropriate candidates for violent offender treatment. Across differing contexts and 
individuals, the same behaviour may serve different functions (e.g., instrumental 
goal attainment or reactive removal of provoking stimulus) and be fostered by 
different treatment needs (e.g., emotional dysregulation, entitlement beliefs). These 
needs are inadequately recognised when violent offender types are distinguished 
solely on the basis of behaviour. Consideration of the differences that exist in the 
way violent offenders think and regulate angry emotion has the potential to improve 
treatment outcomes.  
 
Subtypes of Violence and Violent Offenders 
The heterogeneity of the role of cognition and emotional regulation in violent 
offending is perhaps most evident when considering the factors motivating 
aggressive acts committed by males in licenced premises (e.g., Graham & Wells, 
2003; Spence, Williams, & Gannon, 2009). Researchers have identified several 
motivators: (a) ‘male honour and face saving’, an individual’s perception that their 
‘masculine’ reputation is at stake (Archer, Holloway, & McLoughlin, 1995; Felson, 
33 

1982; Graham & Wells, 2003); (b) ‘addressing a grievance’, the perception that 
another’s actions are insulting or wrong (Archer et al., 1995; Graham & Wells, 
2003); (c) ‘fighting for fun’, the perception that aggression is an enjoyable and 
pleasurable activity (Burns, 1980; Graham & Wells, 2003; Tomsen, 1997); or (d) 
emotions such as anger and frustration (perhaps elicited by situational aspects, e.g., 
overcrowding), leading the individual to act aggressively as a result of emotional 
dysregulation (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Finney, 2004; Graham et al., 2011). 
Thus aggressive behaviour committed in a single environment may be motivated by 
heterogeneous thoughts and emotions that are overlooked by a behaviour-based 
classification system.  
The two dominant violent offender typologies identified in the research are 
the instrumental/reactive violence classification, and the original 
undercontrolled/overcontrolled violent offender dichotomy, subsequently developed 
into a four-group taxonomy with the incorporation of personality research. These are 
considered next.  
 
Instrumental and reactive violence. 
The bimodal classification of subtypes of aggression has been applied to 
violent behaviour. Cornell et al. (1996) proposed a bimodal model of reactive and 
instrumental violence. Consistent with Berkowitz’s (1989) frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, reactive violence is described as violence in reaction to a dispute or 
interpersonal conflict, whereas instrumental violence is described as violence 
committed for a clearly identifiable purpose, other than in response to provocation or 
frustration, consistent with Bandura’s (1978) social learning theory. The model is 
more appropriately applied to acts, rather than actors, as perpetrators of aggression 
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may engage in both reactive and instrumental acts, or may engage in acts that have 
multiple goals and functions (Howells, 2009). Application of the bimodal 
classification to violence has, however, been criticised for being too narrow in its 
explanation of why people commit violence, leading to attempts to account for the 
presence of dual motives during violent offences. Woodworth and Porter (2002), for 
example, adapted the traditional dichotomy to a four-level typology: purely reactive, 
reactive-instrumental, instrumental-reactive and purely instrumental violence. 
Nevertheless, the bimodal classification remains a useful way of identifying the 
functionality of violence for an individual, and has impacted on the treatment 
pathways for violent offenders.  
 
Overcontrolled and undercontrolled violent offenders. 
Megargee (1966, 1979) proposed a dichotomous typology of violent 
offenders based on the relationship between emotion inhibition and violent 
offending. This was in response to two key observations: many homicide offenders 
had no prior recorded history of assaultive behaviour (Berg & Fox, 1947; Berkowitz, 
1962; Wolfgang, 1957); and assaultive offenders demonstrated lower levels of 
hostility and higher levels of control than non-assaultive offenders (Megargee & 
Mendelsohn, 1962). Megargee (1979) described ‘undercontrolled aggressive’ violent 
offenders as frequently and chronically angry, with lower anger tolerance, little self-
control in conflict situations, lower inhibitions, and aggressive responses to 
frustration or provocation. Conversely, ‘chronically overcontrolled’ violent offenders 
experience low or no trait anger while committing acts of violence, and rarely 
experience or express anger even when provoked, partly due to rigid inhibitions 
blocking the expression of anger and violence. Undercontrolled violent offenders are 
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more frequently and less severely violent than overcontrolled violent offenders, who 
commit extremely violent acts once their threshold of control is breached. 
Megargee’s theory has developed further through research utilising the 
Overcontrolled Hostility (OH) scale7 (Megargee, Cook, & Mendelsohn, 1967) and 
cluster analyses of personality traits to determine empirically distinct groups of 
violent offenders (Biro, Vuckovic, & Djuric, 1992; Blackburn, 1971, 1975, 1986, 
1996; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Henderson, 1982, 1983b; Holcomb, Adams, & 
Ponder, 1985; Kalichman, 1988; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979). 
Although methodologies, samples (e.g., violent offenders, general offenders, 
hospitalised forensic patients) and data sources (e.g., observer ratings, or, typically, 
MMPI-derived scales) have varied, four empirical clusters have consistently been 
identified: (a) ‘primary psychopath8’; (b) ‘secondary psychopath’; (c) ‘controlled’; 
and (d) ‘inhibited’. The first two are considered subtypes of Megargee’s (1966) 
undercontrolled type, and the second two are subtypes of his overcontrolled type9.  
Overcontrolled and undercontrolled offenders are both thought to have low 
ego resiliency (Block & Block, 1980) and high continuity in stability of 
 
7
 Derived from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway 
& McKinley, 1967). 
8
 The ‘psychopath’ label used here differs from the more common construct of 
‘psychopathy’, although some elements are related. While primary and secondary 
psychopath-type offenders often score highly on psychopathy scales such as Hare’s 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991; Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 
1989), this is not always the case. Blackburn (1986) found a high prevalence of 
psychopathy diagnosed in the undercontrolled primary psychopath-type offenders in 
his sample of homicide offenders committed to a secure hospital under a mental 
health act. However, McGurk and McGurk (1979) found no elevations on 
psychopathy scales in their primary and secondary psychopath types in a remand 
prisoner and prison officer sample.
9
 Characteristics of the four types and theories of the development of violence in 
each type come from an amalgamation of research from numerous sources, including 
(Biro et al., 1992; Blackburn, 1971, 1986, 1996; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; 
Chambers, 2010; Henderson, 1982, 1983a, 1983b; Holcomb et al., 1985; Kalichman, 
1988; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003). 
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characteristics (Asendorpf & van Aken, 1999). In comparison to undercontrolled 
offenders, overcontrolled offenders are typically more responsible, cautious and 
conscientious, less impulsive, tense, hostile and apprehensive, less assertive, tend to 
repress or deny conflict, and express less aggression and hostility outwards (du Toit 
& Duckitt, 1990; Henderson, 1982, 1983a, 1983b; Hershorn & Rosenbaum, 1991; 
Lane & Kling, 1979; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Quinsey, Maguire, & Varney, 1983; 
White, 1975; White, McAdoo, & Megargee, 1973). Overcontrolled offenders thus 
tend to be introverted, shy, dependent and emotionally unstable (Robins, John, 
Caspi, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1996). Violence occurs following the 
accumulation of instigation to aggression (anger arousal) that develops into an 
explosion of anger and rage that exceeds excessive defences, and is often 
accompanied or preceded by intense feelings of despair and humiliation (see 
Megargee, 1966; Tsytsarev & Grodnitsky, 1995). Violent offenders have less control 
over their hostility than controlled non-violent offenders (Henderson, 1982, 1983a). 
Some researchers have found a higher prevalence of serious violent offences in 
overcontrolled offender groups (D'Silva & Duggan, 2010; Verona & Carbonell, 
2000), although this may reflect study methodology. Violence pathology is thought 
to develop later than in undercontrolled offenders. Chambers (2010) argues that 
social learning theory does not appear to adequately explain why overcontrolled 
offenders engage in violence, suggesting that they should be more aware of the 
negative consequences of violence and be less likely to rehearse violent behaviour. 
In contrast, undercontrolled offenders are described as impulsive, 
manipulative, low on emotional stability and have strong antisocial tendencies 
(McGurk, 1978; Robins et al., 1996). These offenders appear to commit a range of 
offence types, and commonly escalate conflict situations through arguments and 
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violence. In general population samples, undercontrolled-type traits are linked to 
aggression and offending behaviour (Caspi, 2000). Blackburn (1993), for example, 
suggested that undercontrolled individuals experience cognitive restructuring of 
morals following exposure to deviant modelling from others that neutralises the 
effects of violence and replaces them with positive reinforcements. Chambers (2010) 
proposed that social learning theory provides an appropriate explanation for 
progressive development of aggressive behaviour in this group, given that consistent 
and cumulative displays of aggression (Hart, Hofmann, Edelstein, & Keller, 1997), 
consideration of few social deterrents to crime (Caspi, 2000) and a lack of inhibition 
to act violently (Chambers, 2010) leads to violent offending. Some researchers have 
proposed that undercontrolled individuals may not have deficits in control or the 
capacity to inhibit their aggressive impulses; rather, they choose not to exercise that 
control due to identification with norms and values from socialisation in criminal 
subcultures (du Toit & Duckitt, 1990). 
Primary psychopath. 
The ‘primary psychopath’ (or ‘psychopath’) might be regarded as a subtype 
of undercontrolled violent offender. Primary psychopath-type violent offenders 
generally have higher levels of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy (as 
measured by the PCL-R; Hare, 1991; Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989) than 
overcontrolled-type offenders, particularly on items suggesting interpersonal and 
affective deficits (e.g., callousness or lack of empathy, self-centredness, 
manipulation). Narcissistic, histrionic and paranoid personality traits are also seen in 
this population. Primary psychopath-type individuals tend to be extroverted, 
demonstrate high levels of impulsivity, poor socialisation, are least troubled by 
interpersonal sensitivities, have a moderate level of anxiety and paranoid suspicion, 
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but lack subjective distress, frequently have substance abuse histories, and direct 
hostility outwards to deal with interpersonal problems (Blackburn, 1971, 1986).  
Primary psychopaths have been shown to have more extensive histories of 
offending with higher levels of criminality and more violent convictions. Violence 
appears instrumental, used as a means to achieve goals (Pardini et al., 2003). The 
development of violent offending appears associated with positive outcome 
expectancies of dominance and tangible rewards for violence and a lack of 
consideration or awareness of punishment (see Chambers, 2010; also Blackburn, 
1971, 1986, 1995; Henderson, 1982, 1983a, 1983b; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & 
McGurk, 1979; O'Brien & Frick, 1996), driving forethought and modelling from 
others perceived as powerful or dominant (Bandura & Walters, 1963). Primary 
psychopath-type offenders are thus thought to reflect Moffitt et al.’s (2002) 
childhood-onset type offender.  
Secondary psychopath. 
The term ‘secondary psychopath’ (‘paranoid-aggressive’ or ‘disturbed’) is 
used to refer to a second subtype of undercontrolled violent offender. Secondary 
psychopath-type violent offenders similarly have high levels of antisocial personality 
disorder and psychopathy, though tend to score higher on PCL-R items suggesting 
antisocial behaviour (e.g., boredom, impulsivity, lack of planning) (Hare, 1991; 
Harpur et al., 1989). Passive-aggressive, avoidant, schizoid, paranoid, dependent and 
borderline personality traits are also seen in this population (Blackburn, 1986). 
Secondary psychopath-type individuals are introverted, impulsive, act out, have a 
more hostile-detached interpersonal style, significantly more psychopathology 
(particularly anxiety, paranoid schizophrenia, severe personality disorder, 
depression, psychosis and hypochondriasis, frequently have substance abuse 
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histories and higher levels of anger and hostility (Blackburn, 1986; McGurk, 1978; 
McGurk & McGurk, 1979). Blackburn (1998) suggests the secondary psychopath 
type differs from the primary psychopath in the degree of withdrawal; the secondary 
psychopath type is low in self-confidence, submissive and withdrawn while the 
primary psychopath type is extroverted, confident and dominant (see also Skeem, 
Johansson, Andershed, Kerr, & Louden, 2007).  
Secondary psychopaths are rarely found in non-disordered offending 
populations (McGurk & McGurk, 1979). Like primary psychopaths, they have more 
extensive histories of offending, with higher levels of criminality, although their 
impulsive offending appears unrelated to offence type (Chambers, 2010). Violence is 
used more reactively (Pardini et al., 2003). The development of violent offending 
appears related to deficits in self-regulation, leading to impulsive violent behaviour 
that overrides moralistic attitudes (see Chambers, 2010; also Blackburn, 1971, 1986, 
1995; Henderson, 1982, 1983a, 1983b; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979; 
O'Brien & Frick, 1996). Secondary psychopath-type offenders are thought to reflect 
Moffitt et al.’s (2002) adolescent-onset type offender.  
Controlled. 
The ‘controlled’ (‘overcontrolled’ or ‘normal’) type is a subtype of 
overcontrolled violent offender. Controlled violent offenders generally have a 
relatively normal personality profile, with few antisocial personality traits; 
compulsive and dependent traits are sometimes evident (Blackburn, 1986). 
Controlled individuals describe themselves as sociable, conforming and free of 
anxiety. Compared to other groups, they have higher defensiveness, denial and 
impulse control, lower anxiety and hostility, and express some interpersonal 
difficulties (Blackburn, 1986). They do not report psychological deviance, with the 
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exception of mild depressive tendencies, and distress is internalised (Caspi, 2000). 
Controlled offenders deny experiencing anger, report low trait anger and have no 
history of aggression. Emotional arousal (including anger) is dealt with through 
avoidance, denial or repression (Blackburn, 1971).   
Controlled offenders have less significant criminal histories and less 
institutional misconduct. Causal factors for crime are likely to be environmental, 
rather than psychopathology, offences are more likely to be violent, and offenders 
are more likely to be treated as disordered, due to their unusual criminal behaviour 
(Chambers, 2010; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979). Violence is likely 
triggered by situationally-specific interpersonal problems, erupting into violence 
when experiencing a traumatic or dramatic provocation.  
Inhibited. 
The ‘inhibited’ (‘depressed inhibited’ or ‘excessively inhibited’) type is also 
a subtype of overcontrolled violent offender. Inhibited violent offenders generally 
have few antisocial personality traits. Introversion and inhibition are common 
personality traits in this population, with avoidant, schizoid, dependent and 
schizotypal traits also evident (Blackburn, 1986). Inhibited individuals are more 
likely to have a diagnosis of mental illness (particularly high levels of depression and 
moderate anxiety), a poor self-image and have more interpersonal and social 
difficulties, avoiding social interaction. They also have strong impulse control, and 
moderate hostility that is directed inward. Inhibited offenders have a history of 
experiencing strong feelings of anger that they have great difficulty expressing 
(Blackburn, 1971). 
Inhibited offenders have less significant criminal histories and less 
institutional misconduct. Internalising of hostility appears to be a mechanism for 
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violence unique to this type (Blackburn, 1971). Violence is likely to be triggered by 
situationally-specific interpersonal problems, with anger levels increasing gradually 
over time to a level that impairs judgement and results in inappropriate violence at 
the next provocation (Chambers, 2010; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979). 
The stronger pattern of violence seen in the inhibited type compared to the controlled 
type appears associated with the experience of depression (Chambers, 2010). The 
inhibited type tends to be most prevalent in disordered and violent offenders and 
absent in non-violent offender and general population samples, perhaps because their 
unusual violent behaviour leads to higher representation in disordered samples 
(Chambers, 2010; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979). 
Several longitudinal studies of general populations have found different 
developmental pathway between the subtypes (see Caspi, 2000; Hart et al., 1997). 
Caspi (2000) compared inhibited, undercontrolled and well-adjusted groups, and 
found differences evident as early as 3 years old. At age 3, inhibited individuals are 
introverted, fearful and upset, and by ages 13-15 demonstrate more internalising of 
distress. In personality assessment at age 18, they report being cautious, self-
controlled, low in aggression, non-assertive, submissive and harm avoidant; friends 
describe them as unaffectionate, introverted and unpopular. By age 21, inhibited-
type individuals are more likely to be diagnosed with depression and significantly 
less likely to have been involved in crime; Chambers (2010) suggested that this may 
result from a high perception and fear of being caught for crime.  
In contrast, by age 3, undercontrolled individuals are impulsive, restless, 
negative, easily distracted and emotionally changeable (Caspi, 2000). By age 5-11, 
they demonstrate more externalising of problems, and by age 13-15 display more 
externalising behaviour and problems with internalising. In personality assessment at 
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age 18, they report enjoying dangerous activities, being impulsive, aggressive and 
socially alienated through feelings of betrayal and deception by others; friends 
describe them as unreliable and untrustworthy, with conflictual relationships. By age 
21, undercontrolled individuals are more likely to have antisocial personality 
disorder and alcohol dependency, significantly more likely to have been involved in 
crime in the past 12 months, and have convictions for multiple crimes. Chambers 
(2010) suggests that criminal activity may be supported by the consideration of 
fewer social deterrents to offending. Thus the signs of aggressive tendencies are seen 
early in undercontrolled individuals, culminating in offending as an adult.  
Within the subtypes of undercontrolled offenders, there are early differences 
in developmental pathways. The secondary psychopath traits of boredom, 
impulsivity and lack of planning and the primary psychopath traits of callousness, 
self-centredness and manipulation are observed in children from 6 years old (Frick, 
O'Brien, Wootton, & McBurnett, 1994; Pardini et al., 2003), indicating early 
differences in developmental pathways. By adolescence, secondary psychopaths 
demonstrate significantly higher behaviour dysregulation and higher personal 
distress and fearfulness, whereas primary psychopaths demonstrate deficits in 
cognitive and emotional empathy and negative relationships to personal distress and 
fearfulness (Pardini et al., 2003). 
Undercontrol and the externalising of distress is well-developed in 
adolescence, while for inhibited individuals, internalising of hostility and distress 
appears to develop in adolescence (Kruh, Frick, & Clements, 2005; Salekin, Ogloff, 
Ley, & Salekin, 2002; Truscott, 1990). These traits are not predictive of violence in 
the same manner as the development of aggression and crime-supporting attitudes in 
undercontrolled individuals (Caspi, 2000); Chambers (2010) suggests instead that 
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the traits may represent the development of depression. Differences in brain function 
in areas managing attention, self-regulation, goal-directed behaviour and other 
executive cognitive functions have been linked to differences in subtypes, reflective 
of differences in developmental pathways.  
Two particular areas of the brain appear to be associated with violence: the 
amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. Impaired amygdala function hinders the 
development of stimulus-punishment associations, stunting the development of 
empathy for others’ distress; impairment in this area is thought to be associated with 
the callous, unemotional traits of primary psychopaths (Blair, 2006). Amygdala 
dysfunction appears less related to the impulsivity of secondary psychopaths.  
The role of the prefrontal cortex includes inhibition of aggression (Giancola, 
1995); impairment reduces executive functions, including attention, self-regulation, 
planning, goal-directed behaviour and responding to changes in environmental 
demands. The violence of secondary psychopath-type individuals is thought to 
reflect greater impairment of these executive functions (Blair, 2010; Broomhall, 
2005; Lykken, 1995; Ross, Benning, & Adams, 2007), particularly in the areas of 
cognitive flexibility, verbal inhibition and the ability to see future consequences, 
consistent with a higher degree of impulsivity. While both primary and secondary 
psychopaths have aggressive impulses from the amygdala and limbic situations, 
researchers suggest that these impulses are directed into more instrumental, goal-
directed behaviour by primary psychopaths, while deficits in the executive cognitive 
function of self-regulation result in an inability to control these impulses by 
secondary psychopaths. Prefrontal cortex dysfunction from depression is also 
associated with impulsive behaviour (Drevets, 1998; Giancola, 1995), and may 
contribute to violent behaviour by inhibited individuals.  
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The instrumental / reactive violence dichotomy is evident in both 
overcontrolled and undercontrolled individuals. Chambers, Ward, Eccleston, and 
Brown (2009) examined the relationship between instrumental and reactive violence 
and overcontrolled and undercontrolled violent offenders using grounded theory 
analysis of interview transcripts from 35 assault offenders. They suggested that 
primary psychopath and controlled individuals appeared to commit instrumental 
violence, while secondary psychopath and inhibited offenders committed reactive 
violence, as outlined in Figure 4.  
 
 Instrumental Violence Reactive Violence 
Undercontrolled Primary Psychopath Secondary Psychopath 
Overcontrolled Controlled Inhibited 
 
Figure 4. The relationship of instrumental and reactive violence and undercontrolled 
and overcontrolled personality types. 
 
Implications for Treatment of Violent Offender Subtypes 
Researchers have suggested that the overcontrolled and undercontrolled type 
violent offenders require different treatment approaches to address the diverse risk 
factors that contribute to violent offending by each type. Undercontrolled-type 
(primary and secondary psychopath) offenders are likely to be at high risk of re-
offending, given their offence supportive attitudes and propensity for violence (see, 
e.g. Chambers, 2010). Chambers suggests that given the early emergence of traits 
related to their offending, undercontrolled-type offenders would likely be receptive 
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to intervention at many stages throughout their life span, to prevent or address these 
emerging traits. Both undercontrolled types would benefit from treatment aimed at 
improving self-control, inhibiting the acting out of aggressive impulses, learning 
non-aggressive ways of responding to frustration, and developing social skills 
(Blackburn, 1986; Davey, Day, & Howells, 2005; Henderson, 1982; Hershorn & 
Rosenbaum, 1991; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Megargee, 1966; Quinsey et al., 1983; 
Verona & Carbonell, 2000). Additionally, primary psychopath type offenders would 
likely benefit from reward-oriented programs to reduce re-offending risk, given their 
lack of concern for punishment and sole focus on the positive outcomes of violence 
(Pardini et al., 2003). In contrast, secondary psychopath type offenders would likely 
obtain greater benefit from treatment aimed at improving self-control over their 
impulsivity, and treatment addressing executive cognitive function deficits (e.g., 
social-cognitive programs, anger management) (Paschall & Fishbein, 2002). 
Programs aimed at improving anger and behaviour controls and targeting criminal 
attitudes and lifestyle appear more appropriate for repeat violent (undercontrolled) 
offenders, but seem unlikely to be of benefit for single violent (overcontrolled) 
offenders (D'Silva & Duggan, 2010). 
Overcontrolled offenders are more likely to be assessed as low risk of re-
offending, in part due to a lack of previous offending behaviour (Chambers, 2010). 
Subtle internal processes including rumination and internalised hostility appear to 
precede the uncharacteristic violent behaviour of overcontrolled offenders, and they 
would likely gain greater benefit from programs addressing rumination, increasing 
self-awareness of anger, improving communication of feelings and assertiveness 
training (Blackburn, 1986; Davey et al., 2005; Henderson, 1982; Hershorn & 
Rosenbaum, 1991; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Megargee, 1966; Quinsey et al., 1983; 
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Verona & Carbonell, 2000). Anger management programs aimed at controlling anger 
would likely be unproductive, and perhaps harmful for, individuals who ruminate 
(Davey et al., 2005), potentially leading to further suppression of anger. Instead, 
controlled individuals may benefit from treatment interrupting the cycle of violent 
fantasising that contributes to breach of anger control; inhibited individuals may 
benefit from treatment addressing internalised hostility, to manage depressive 
tendencies that may lead to explosive outbursts (Chambers, 2010).  
Alternative treatment approaches for offenders engaging in reactive and 
instrumental violence would also be recommended. Offenders using violence 
reactively would likely benefit from treatment addressing their ability to self-regulate 
their violent impulses arising from anger (Cavell & Malcolm, 2007; Howells, 2010; 
Howells et al., 2008; Novaco, 2007); in contrast, instrumentally violent individuals 
would likely benefit from treatment challenging violence-supportive beliefs and 
identifying prosocial means of achieving desired outcomes. Indicative of differential 
outcomes of treatment on different thinking style, Walters (2009a)found that 
following an 8-hour, 6-session anger management program, the reactive criminal 
thinking of 47 medium security male offenders had reduced significantly from pre-
program levels; there was no significant change in proactive criminal thinking. 
Walters suggested that skills-based programs were likely better at addressing 
reactive criminal thinking, while proactive criminal thinking may be better treated by 
targeting positive outcome expectancies, developing discrepancies, resolving 
ambivalence and ‘rolling with resistance’ (Miller & Rollnick, 2002).  
 
  
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Conclusion  
This section reviewed current research on the causal factors of violence and 
contemporary dominant theories of aggression and violent offender typologies, 
concentrating particularly on the General Aggression Model, Algebra of Aggression 
model, and subtypes of instrumental and reactive violence and overcontrolled and 
undercontrolled violent offenders. These typologies indicate the diversity in 
development of violent offending and the role of anger and cognition in initiating 
and maintaining violent behaviour. This highlights the need for type-specific 
treatment addressing factors associated with violence. Typologies based on 
distinctions in emotional regulation (e.g., undercontrol or overcontrol) and cognition 
(e.g., instrumentality, reactivity, criminal thinking patterns) may have greater utility 
in identifying distinct treatment needs than typologies based on offence types. 
Violent offender programs are increasingly multi-dimensional and attempt to address 
a wide range of factors, rather than targeting an individual’s specific treatment needs. 
The following chapter discusses current theories and trends in violent offender 
rehabilitation and issues of program effectiveness.  
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Chapter 4. Violent Offender Rehabilitation  
The emphasis on rehabilitation as a strategy to reduce re-offending is evident 
in its inclusion as one of five principles of sentencing in Victoria’s Sentencing Act 
1991, in conjunction with punishment, deterrence, denunciation and community 
protection. Violent offender rehabilitation programs represent a significant 
component of service delivery for correctional services in Australia (Day & Collie, 
2013; Heseltine, Day, & Sarre, 2011) and internationally (e.g., Canada, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom; see Cortoni, Nunes, & Latendresse, 2006; Polaschek et al., 
2005; Serin, Gobeil, & Preston, 2009). Rehabilitation programs can best be regarded 
as a tertiary-level public health prevention approach to antisocial activity (Guerra, 
Tolan, & Hammond, 1994; McGuire, 2008), targeting individuals who have already 
been convicted of an offence.  
The term ‘rehabilitation’ commonly refers to the provision of psychology-
based interventions to offenders to reduce their risk of further offending and assist 
them to lead law-abiding lives. The term ‘treatment’ is also often used, although 
refers more broadly to any form of intervention designed to change how offenders 
think, feel and behave, including medical treatment, case work, counselling and 
education (see Crow, 2001; Day, Howells, & Rickwood, 2003; McGuire, 2002). 
Rehabilitation strategies typically focus on assessing causal (or risk) factors that 
contribute to offending behaviour and providing interventions that address those 
factors, with the aim of reducing an offender’s risk of re-offending. Violent offender 
rehabilitation programs are guided by theories of crime, theories of violence and 
aggression, and theories of behaviour change. Programs predominantly draw on 
general personality, cognitive and social learning perspectives of crime which 
emphasise individual differences in offending (Andrews & Bonta, 1994).  
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Evidence consistently and conclusively indicates that offenders provided with 
appropriate treatment re-offend at lower rates than those offenders who are excluded 
from treatment (see Andrews & Bonta, 2010b; Andrews et al., 1990). Meta-analytic 
reviews of program evaluations demonstrate reductions in re-offending rates by an 
average of 10-50%.  
Programs that adhere most closely to the principles of the Risk-Need-
Responsivity (RNR) model of offender rehabilitation (Andrews & Bonta, 2006) 
produce larger effect sizes (Andrews & Dowden, 2006; Andrews et al., 1990; Bonta, 
Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney, 2000; Gendreau & Andrews, 1990; Lipsey & Wilson, 
1998; Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004). The greatest potential for change occurs when 
more intensive programs are delivered to higher risk offenders (the risk principle), 
programs target dynamic individual factors empirically associated with offending10 
(the need principle), and programs employ cognitive-behavioural and social learning 
perspectives tailored to individual needs and abilities that facilitate or hinder 
treatment (e.g., motivation, readiness to change, cognitive and psychological 
functioning, learning style, communication skills, literacy, age, gender, and culture) 
(see Andrews & Bonta, 2010; also Allen, MacKenzie, & Hickman, 2001; Andrews 
et al., 2012; Andrews et al., 1990; Birgden & McLachlan, 2004; Cullen & Gendreau, 
1989; Day & Collie, 2013; Dowden & Andrews, 2004; Howells, Watt, Hall, & 
Baldwin, 1997; Husband & Platt, 1993; Ogloff & Davis, 2004; Ross & Fabiano, 
1985; Ward, Melser, & Yates, 2007; Wilson, Bouffard, & MacKenzie, 2005).  
 
10
 Also referred to as ‘criminogenic needs’: empirically-determined dynamic risk 
factors directly associated with criminal behaviour that, when changed, are related to 
changes in recidivism risk. Static risk factors (e.g., age, gender, offending history) 
may predict re-offending, but are immutable to treatment. Addressing dynamic risk 
factors not directly related to offending behaviour (e.g., low self-esteem, physical or 
psychological illness) in treatment rarely results in reduced recidivism risk (Andrews 
& Bonta, 1994; Bonta & Andrews, 2007; Day & Howells, 2002). 
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Substantial evidence exists to suggest that cognitive-behavioural approaches, 
focusing on links between beliefs, attitudes and behaviours, are effective in the 
rehabilitation of adult offenders (e.g., Lipsey & Cullen, 2007; Lösel, 1995; McGuire, 
2002, 2008; Polaschek et al., 2005), and more successful than other treatment 
approaches (see Day & Howells, 2002). Other empirically and theoretically 
important individual and program considerations include program integrity and 
quality, professional discretion, well-trained facilitators with skills including the 
ability to build strong therapeutic relationships with offenders and recognise 
therapeutic moments, and methods for enhancing offenders’ ability and opportunities 
to engage in treatment and motivation to change (Andrews, 2011; Andrews & Bonta, 
2010a; Day & Doyle, 2010; Gendreau & Smith, 2011; Lowenkamp, Flores, 
Holsinger, Makarios, & Latessa, 2010; McMurran, 2009; Polaschek, 2012; Ross, 
Polaschek, & Ward, 2008; Ward, Day, Howells, & Birgden, 2004). 
Eight core risk factors directly associated with crime have been identified: 
criminal history (a static factor), and the dynamic antisocial attitudes, antisocial 
associates, antisocial personality pattern, substance abuse, family and marital 
relationships, lack of engagement in school or work, and lack of engagement in 
prosocial activities (Andrews & Bonta, 2010b). Other offending-related needs 
include poor problem solving skills, high impulsivity, low self-management, 
cognitive processing deficits and lack of empathy (Andrews, 1995; Howells & Day, 
1999; McGuire, 2002). Violent offenders share many of these criminogenic needs 
with other offender types, since many violent offenders are generalist and engage in 
a range of offending (Howells et al., 2008). However, relatively little empirical 
research has sought to identify the specific criminogenic needs of violent offenders 
(see Polaschek & Collie, 2004).  
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Australian violent offender treatment programs aim to promote better 
understanding of violent offending and consequences of violence, identifying and 
challenging cognitive distortions associated with violence, improving arousal 
management, emotional regulation and coping strategies, enhancing perspective 
taking, problem solving, interpersonal and conflict resolution skills, and developing 
individualised relapse prevention plans (Heseltine, Howells, & Day, 2010). 
Education and role-modelling of new prosocial behaviours to replace antisocial and 
aggressive behaviours, while emphasising positive reinforcement contingencies for 
prosocial behaviour, is also important.  
Violent offender programs internationally have been classified in terms of the 
following three types: anger management, cognitive skills or multi-modal (the latter 
based on the assumption that some components relate to the criminogenic needs of 
every offender; Polaschek & Collie, 2004). The evidence supporting the delivery of 
each type is considered next. 
 
Anger Management Programs for Violent Offending 
Cognitive-behavioural anger management programs were, until relatively 
recently, the most common approach to violent offender treatment. This stemmed in 
part from the extensive research demonstrating the efficacy of these programs in 
addressing specific anger problems in clinical settings (see Del Vecchio & O'Leary, 
2004). Anger management programs are generally shorter in duration than other 
program types and focus on assisting offenders to recognise, monitor and find 
appropriate ways to express anger (Howells & Day, 1999). They aim to increase 
self-awareness of anger and triggers, strengthen anger control and decrease anger 
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arousal with social skill development, relaxation training, coping strategies and 
cognitive restructuring (Howells, 1998; Walker & Bright, 2009a). 
Anger management program evaluations with offending populations have 
produced mixed results. Although several meta-analyses suggest that anger 
management programs achieve at least moderate effect sizes with general 
populations (e.g., Beck & Fernandez, 1998; DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2003; 
Edmondson & Conger, 1996; Gansle, 2005; Sukhodolsky, Kassinove, & Gorman, 
2004), studies with offender populations, however, produce less consistent findings. 
Dowden, Blanchette, and Serin (1999), for example, found an 86% reduction in 
violent re-offending in 110 participants over a 3-year follow-up after anger 
management program completion. Conversely, evaluations of Australian anger 
management programs with violent offenders reveal only small effects (Howells et 
al., 2002; Watt & Howells, 1999); although these findings may result from shorter, 
less intense programs than that evaluated by Dowden et al. (1999), the Australian 
evaluations have found improvements in anger knowledge following treatment, 
perhaps reflecting change at a psycho-educational level rather than a therapeutic 
level (Heseltine et al., 2010; Howells et al., 2002; Howells et al., 2005; Watt & 
Howells, 1999). 
The limited effectiveness of anger management programs observed in 
Australian evaluations may reflect issues resulting from the link assumed to exist 
between anger and violence. While violent acts have been labelled as ‘angry 
behaviours’ (see Howells, 2004), some studies have failed to find support for the link 
between anger and violence (see Polaschek & Collie, 2004). Extensive research has 
confirmed that anger is neither necessary nor sufficient for violence to occur 
(Bandura, 1973; Blackburn, 1986; Howells, 2004; Novaco, 1976; Polaschek & 
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Collie, 2004) and anger is not implicated in acts of instrumental or sadistic violence. 
It would appear, then, that, anger management is inappropriate and unresponsive to 
the needs of violent offenders for whom violence is unrelated to anger (Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2007; Loza & Loza-Fanous, 1999; Polaschek, 2006). 
 
Cognitive Skills Programs 
Cognitive skills programs vary significantly in duration (see Bush, 1995; 
Henning & Frueh, 1996; Robinson, 1995), but are generally shorter and less intense 
than multi-modal programs. Cognitive skills and cognitive self-change programs are 
two approaches that focus on violent offender cognitions. The first approach focuses 
on assisting offenders to acquire new capacities for thinking about and solving 
problems, particularly in the interpersonal and self-management domains; the second 
approach assists offenders to recognise and change the thought patterns and 
processes conducive to violent crime (e.g., ‘irrational thinking’) (see McGuire, 2008, 
Polaschek & Collie, 2004; also Bush, 1995; Serin & Preston, 2001; Yochelson & 
Samenow, 1976, 1977). Affect labelling, self-instruction and self-regulation are 
other examples of cognitively-based interventions, although limited guidance is 
available regarding the forms of cognition that should be targeted in treatment of 
violent offenders (Polaschek, Calvert, & Gannon, 2009; Polaschek & Collie, 2004).  
Evaluations of cognitive skills and cognitive self-change program evaluations 
have produced mixed outcomes. Several studies have, however, reported reductions 
in recidivism after cognitive skills program completion (Hollin et al., 2008; 
Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; Lipsey, Landenberger, & Wilson, 2007; McGuire et 
al., 2008; Palmer et al., 2007; Polaschek et al., 2005). Henning and Frueh (1996), for 
example, found significant reductions in recidivism rates at 2-year follow-up (an 
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average rate of 50% in treatment attendees compared with 71% in matched non-
treatment attendees). A large-scale Canadian study (n = 1444) demonstrated 
reductions in recidivism of up to 36% following completion of a 36 x 2 hour prison-
based program (Robinson, 1995), with violent offenders less likely to be reconvicted 
than offenders convicted of property crimes. Similar large-scale cognitive skills 
program evaluations from England and Wales demonstrated reductions in recidivism 
rates following treatment completion, although at 2-year follow-up there was no 
difference in re-offending rates between treatment completers and matched controls 
(Cann, Falshaw, & Friendship, 2005; Falshaw, Friendship, Travers, & Nugent, 
2004). Offenders who had dropped out of treatment had higher rates of recidivism, 
and there were inconsistent findings when comparing outcomes across risk 
categories. 
Ward and Nee (2009) argue that the theoretical rationale for cognitive skills 
programs requires further development, and that programs should include the 
concepts of rationality, emotion, distributed cognition and embodiment to further 
conceptualise the relationship between cognitive skills and behaviour. As with anger 
management programs, cognitive skills programs are considered unlikely to meet the 
needs of serious high risk violent offenders who hold well-rehearsed, entrenched 
beliefs and attitudes about aggression and violence. They are based on a relatively 
narrow approach to changing cognitions that may be insufficient for reducing 
reoffending by violent offenders with multiple treatment needs. 
 
Multi-modal Programs 
Multimodal, or multi-faceted, programs are increasingly utilised in many 
jurisdictions. Programs are designed to address a range of treatment needs, based on 
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the assumption that many factors are involved in the causation and maintenance of 
violent behaviours and that targeting a large number of psychological and 
behavioural factors (e.g., social skills, cognition, anger management and substance 
abuse) may achieve greater reductions in violent re-offending risk (Polaschek, 2006). 
Programs consist of several discrete modules that address different treatment 
domains; offenders are ostensibly matched to treatment modules responsive to their 
individual needs. Programs are typically more intensive than anger management and 
cognitive programs (e.g., over 300 hours for some programs). In Australia, programs 
range from between 100-140 hours for moderate risk violent offenders and 180-450 
hours for high risk violent offenders (Heseltine et al., 2011). The greater program 
intensity theoretically allows for an enhanced level of individualisation of 
therapeutic targets within treatment programs, and more time to achieve these. 
However, multimodal interventions offered within correctional agencies tend to offer 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach, attempting to address a broad range of criminogenic 
needs relevant to the offender population. There is an assumption that by providing 
interventions for a broad range of treatment targets, the program will provide 
adequate coverage of most individual treatment needs.  
Multimodal programs appear to achieve modest reductions in reoffending 
rates. For example, an evaluation of the Canadian prison-based Violence Prevention 
Program (Serin & Preston, 2001) compared program completers with matched 
prisoners; program completers had lower rates of violent-reoffending than the non-
completers or comparison group (8.5%, 24.5% and 21.8% respectively)11 (Cortoni et 
al., 2006). The program incorporated motivational enhancement, behavioural change 
 
11
 Results may have been confounded by higher levels of treatment motivation and 
slightly higher rates of other violence-related program completions prior to current 
program commencement for the program group than the matched group. 
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methods, and a focus on arousal management, impulsivity, aggressive beliefs, 
cognitive distortions, conflict resolution, empathy enhancement, problem solving 
and relapse prevention. An evaluation of New Zealand’s Rimutaka Violence 
Prevention Unit residential treatment program for high risk violent offenders also 
demonstrated reductions in violent recidivism at 2-year follow-up, with significantly 
fewer program completers reconvicted for a violent offence than a matched untreated 
sample (32% v 63%). The average number of days to violent re-offence was more 
than double that of the comparison group, although non-violent re-offending rates 
were not significantly different (Polaschek et al., 2005). This 330-hour cognitive-
behaviour program includes modules on offence chain identification, offence-
supportive thinking restructuring, emotional regulation, victim empathy, moral 
reasoning, problem solving, communication and relationship skills and relapse 
prevention planning. Finally, an evaluation of the 144-hour Canadian Persistent 
Violent Offender program (Serin, 1995; Serin et al., 2009) at five-year follow-up 
found few differences between program completers, non-completers and a matched 
sample who completed a program targeting anger and arousal management on 
measures of aggression, anger, hostility, impulsivity, empathy, institutional 
misconduct and returns to custody (Serin et al., 2009). Serin and colleagues proposed 
two alternative explanations: either the program lacked integrity and intensity, or the 
program was effective only with certain violent offender groups. 
Relatively few violence-specific program evaluations have been reported. 
Program evaluations are affected by methodological and ethical issues concerning 
the random assignment of participants to non-treatment control groups and service 
delivery demands mean that many evaluations do not employ designs robust enough 
to establish causality. Studies also suffer from high rates of attrition (McGuire, 
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2008). Treatment non-completion is a very real issue associated with increased risk 
of recidivism. Dowden et al. (1999) found the highest rates of violent re-offending 
by program drop-outs (40%), compared with untreated (17%) and program 
completer (5%) groups. Cortoni et al. (2006) found that violent re-offending rates 
were 4.25 times higher for treatment non-completers than treatment completers.  
While most evaluations report some evidence of reducing general or violent 
recidivism, Polaschek and Collie (2004) concluded that programs require greater 
theoretical and empirical integrity. Joliffe and Farrington’s (2007) subsequent review 
of violent offender treatment identified 11 outcome studies meeting methodological 
criteria12. Interventions with violent offenders were effective at reducing general and 
violent re-offending (by 8-11% and 8% respectively), however program 
effectiveness varied considerably according to factors including intervention content 
and delivery. Multi-modal treatments were reported to be more effective than those 
with a narrow focus, and programs that included cognitive skills, role-play and 
relapse prevention appeared to be particularly effective.  
In a large scale review of meta-analyses of offender treatment, McGuire 
(2008) found numerous positive outcomes from treatment general or specific violent 
offending behaviour treatment; the most consistent effects were associated with 
methods derived from cognitive social learning theories (behavioural, cognitive, 
interpersonal and problem-solving), and emotional self-management approaches 
generally demonstrated reliable positive effects. McGuire again concluded that 
systematic, carefully-designed interventions can reduce violent re-offending, and 
 
12
 Studies investigated the effects of intervention or treatment on adult male violent 
offenders (identified through official criminal justice system contact or self-report), 
measured at least one quantitative offending outcome variable, included a control 
group, had minimum sample size of 50, and were published between 1975 and 2007 
(Joliffe & Farrington, 2007). 
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reiterated the need for higher quality outcome studies to further investigate the 
relationship between variables such as intervention methods, offence typologies and 
participant characteristics.  
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the evidence base regarding the effectiveness of psychological 
treatments in reducing violent re-offending, although limited, suggests that 
appropriate programs can achieve modest and socially significant effects in reducing 
general and violent re-offending. While anger regulation and cognitions are often 
targeted in violent offender programs, the effectiveness of these interventions seems 
compromised by the limited knowledge that exists about the specific types of 
cognitions that should be targeted and evidence that not all types of violent offending 
are caused by anger dysregulation. It appears then that programs may be 
differentially effective, achieving greater change in particular subtypes of violent 
offenders. The next two chapters provide an analysis of current knowledge about 
anger and thinking styles respectively. 
  
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Chapter 5. Anger  
Many violent offender programs incorporate anger management 
interventions, based in part on the widely-held assumption that all violent offenders 
have anger problems (Loza & Loza-Fanous, 1999). The accurate identification of 
anger as a criminogenic need for violent offending is therefore crucial to ensuring 
that interventions address relevant treatment needs to reduce risk of recidivism. The 
following chapter reviews contemporary anger research, including anger definitions, 
the triggers, functions and temporal processes of anger and the relationship of anger, 
aggression, violence and cognition, highlighting potential areas of diversity between 
subtypes of violent offenders. 
 
What is Anger? 
Anger, like aggression and violence, is defined in different ways in the 
literature, incorporating physiological, cognitive, subjective and behavioural 
components. For centuries, anger has been viewed by many as a ‘bad’ emotion. 
While Darwin (1872/1998) optimistically viewed anger as an adaptive emotion that 
habitually leads to action (see Tavris, 1989), most theorists focused on maladaptive 
or dysfunctional concepts of anger, rooted in the historical conceptualisation of anger 
as a ‘passion’, an emotion by which one could be ‘gripped’ or ‘seized’, with the 
resultant loss of mental control potentially leading to ‘insanity’ or violence (see 
Novaco, 1994). Plato, for example, described anger as an extremely negative 
emotion that should be controlled through reason (see Tavris, 1989); Aristotle and 
Seneca similarly viewed anger as a strong emotion, provoked by the perception of 
being treated badly, that motivates a desire for vengeance (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 
2007). The general theme of anger as an emotion that is provoked and motivates 
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action remains evident in more recent research, including the three dominant 
perspectives provided here.  
Berkowitz (1993, 2010; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004) defined anger as 
an experience of conscious feeling that forms part of the anger/affective aggression 
syndrome, a constellation of physiological patterns, behavioural tendencies and 
cognitions linked to the inclination to attack or injure an available target. Berkowitz 
required that anger experience be linked to an urge to hurt or destroy someone. 
Highlighting the subjectivity of labelling an emotion as anger, Berkowitz (2012) 
suggested that frustrations generate anger and aggressive inclinations only to the 
extent that they are ‘decidedly unpleasant’. Berkowitz also emphasised the different 
reactions resulting from anger as an affective reaction to precipitating circumstances 
(e.g., situational stressors) and the feelings and sensations that may accompany 
proactive or instrumental aggression (see also Hubbard et al., 2004; Potegal & 
Stemmler, 2010; Scherer, 2001). 
Novaco (1976, 1978, 2010, 2011) proposed a model of anger that included 
subjective emotional states, environmental circumstances, physiological arousal, 
cognitions of antagonism and corresponding behavioural reactions. Novaco 
described anger as the combination of physiological arousal and subjective cognitive 
labelling of that arousal as anger or a similar emotion (e.g., annoyance, frustration or 
irritation). Cognitive labelling of the arousal is highly automatic; inherent in the label 
is an impulse to act confrontationally or antagonistically toward the perceived source 
of provocation. This action impulse (regulated by internal and external mechanisms 
of control) differentiates anger from other sources of arousal (e.g., being upset).  
Finally, Spielberger (1999; Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983; 
Spielberger & Reheiser, 2010) defined anger as a psychobiological emotional state 
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that varies in intensity (e.g., from mild irritation or annoyance to intense fury and 
rage) and fluctuates over time, accompanied by the activation of neuroendocrine 
processes and autonomic nervous system arousal. Lewis (2010) conversely noted 
that the terms ‘anger’, ‘aggression’, ‘rage’ and ‘wilfulness’ were often used 
interchangeably, choosing instead to separate anger and rage, rather than viewing 
rage as intense anger. Lewis described anger as having a restricted, focused 
response, a specific object, and appears bounded (i.e., it can be resolved); in contrast, 
rage is more intense, longer-lasting, less focused, generally diffused in occurrence 
and object, and may be a response to shame. 
 
Distinguishing Hostility and Anger 
As noted earlier, the terms ‘anger’, ‘hostility’ and ‘aggression’ are sometimes 
used interchangeably in the literature, despite their different, but related, theoretical 
conceptualisations (Parrott & Giancola, 2007). Anger generally refers to an 
emotional state. Hostility, in contrast, is variously defined as a behavioural response 
(Hart & Joubert, 1996); negative evaluations or attitudes of resentment, mistrust or 
hate (Blackburn, 1995); the experience of angry feelings in conjunction with a 
complex set of attitudes that provide motivation to cause injury, harm or damage 
(Spielberger & Reheiser, 2010); or the tendency to make violent threats towards 
others (Copello & Tata, 1990). Distinctions between the constructs include 
descriptions of anger as an emotion, hostility as an attitudinal disposition and 
aggression as harm-doing behaviour (Novaco, 2011); or view anger as an internal 
emotional response and hostility as the negative cognitive evaluation of people or 
events (Howells et al., 2008). Anger and hostility may, or may not, lead to 
aggressive behaviour. Additionally, the three constructs may all describe particular 
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events or acts, or may involve dispositional aspects. Given the overlap in conceptual 
definitions, several researchers coined the anger, hostility and aggression (AHA!) 
syndrome (Spielberger & Reheiser, 2010) to refer to the constructs collectively. 
Within the syndrome, anger refers to emotional states, hostility to antagonistic 
beliefs and aggression to harmful behaviour. Anger is viewed as the core component, 
strongly associated with hostility and often motivating aggressive behaviour.  
 
Causal Factors for Anger 
Anger has many causes, particularly obstacles to goal attainment, external 
agency and blame, and perceptions of actions as unjust or unfair (Berkowitz, 2010). 
While theoretical perspectives of anger vary across cognitive, behavioural, social 
learning theory and psychodynamic paradigms, the conceptualisation of anger across 
these perspectives typically includes a focus on the interrelatedness of angry 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour. Cognitive-behavioural perspectives regard anger as 
a multidimensional construct with physiological, cognitive, phenomenological and 
behavioural domains that interact with each other to influence the experience (or not) 
of anger (Day, Howells, Mohr, Schall, & Gerace, 2008). Novaco (1978) proposed 
that the cognitively-mediated emotional state of anger is determined by external 
events, internal cognitive processes (e.g., appraisal, expectation, self-talk) and 
behavioural reactions, with bidirectional causal relationships. Anger is considered an 
effective stress reaction that occurs in response to exposure to environmental 
demands or stressors (physical, biological, psychological or social) in the absence of 
coping resources. 
Obstacles to goal attainment are consistently identified by appraisal theorists 
as causal factors for anger. Anger is generally viewed as a reaction to an adverse 
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event or situation, most likely to occur when the individual perceives that they have 
the ability to cope with the situation. This perception typically follows an appraisal 
and decision that sufficient power, control or resources are available to reinstate a 
goal or acquire a desired outcome. For anger to occur, researchers argue that the 
instigating occurrence must have held personal significance and relevance to a goal 
or motivation to attain that goal, an external agent must be considered responsible for 
the negative event, and the negative event must be perceived as unfair or improper 
(Averill, 1982; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1996; Solomon, 1993). Researchers disagree, 
however, on how important the goal needs to be to generate anger (Berkowitz, 2010; 
Lazarus, 1991), whether anger occurs in response to voluntary and justified acts 
(Averill, 1982), if the external agent must be perceived as having power to control 
the event (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982), whether aversive conditions may be 
internal (Berkowitz, 2010; Venable, Carlson, & Wilson, 2001), and whether blame 
may be consequential rather than antecedent for anger (Frijda, 1993; Quigley & 
Tedeschi, 1996; Stein & Levine, 1999).  
Anger varies in intensity within and across situations, rising and falling 
within a given episode. Anger tends to escalate, even when provocation remains 
constant or is repeated, and typically outlasts the event that triggered it (Potegal, 
2010). Anger then decays (gradually declining over time), is quenched when 
overridden, disrupted or terminated by an extrinsic process, or is expressed through 
catharsis, relieving psychological and physiological tension and the likelihood of 
further acts of anger (Potegal, 2010).  
 
  
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Functions of Anger 
Anger has many functions, both adaptive and maladaptive. Positive functions 
of anger include energising behaviour; overriding inhibition; focusing attention on 
threatening elements; expressing negative sentiment; fear suppression; self-assertion; 
defending self-worth (by externalising blame for misfortune); instigating aggressive 
behaviour for survival and self-defence; signalling information about one’s personal 
state or situation for self-monitoring; and facilitating perseverance (Novaco, 1976, 
2010). Anger motivates the removal of obstacles blocking goals, and angry feelings 
signal a need to search for and change anger-eliciting situations; an angry face also 
typically serves as an alert to others (Schultz, Grodack, & Izard, 2010). Lerner and 
colleagues (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) suggest that anger triggers optimism about one’s own 
outcomes, rather than the pessimism typically triggered by other negative emotions. 
Anger has many negative or maladaptive functions as well. Freud, for 
example, emphasised the destructive, violent aspects of anger (Tavris, 1989). Anger 
may disrupt task performance and problem-solving, activate aggressive behaviour 
(Levey & Howells, 1990), instigate inappropriate aggression, impede social 
relationships, impair physical or psychological health and adjustment (Novaco, 
2010), and is considered an instrument of interpersonal threat, intimidation, coercion 
and domination (Fridlund, 1991; Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). Anger-regulation 
problems have been associated with a range of behavioural, psychological and 
physical health problems, including cardiovascular disease (Spielberger et al., 1985), 
substance abuse (Bond, Verheyden, Wingrove, & Curran, 2004), personality disorder 
(DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007), organic brain disorder, including dementia (Rosen et 
al., 2002), depression, schizophrenia, psychoneuroses and post-traumatic stress 
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disorder (Franklin, Posternak, & Zimmerman, 2002; Orth & Wieland, 2006; 
Spielberger & Reheiser, 2010). 
 
Individual Differences in Anger 
State and trait anger. 
The experience of anger differs between individuals in several ways. Early 
research considered anger a unidimensional conception, until Spielberger (1988) 
proposed two separate facets of anger: state and trait anger. State anger is the 
present, transient emotional experience of anger, a psychobiological state consisting 
of subjective feelings that vary in intensity and occur concurrently with activation or 
arousal of the autonomic nervous system (Spielberger, 1988; Spielberger & 
Reheiser, 2010). Trait anger refers to the predisposition to feel anger and perceive 
events as annoying or frustrating; trait anger is a personality state that explains 
individual differences in frequency and intensity of state anger experiences over time 
(Spielberger, 1988; Spielberger & Reheiser, 2010). Trait anger consists of two 
components: angry temperament and angry reaction (Spielberger et al., 1983). Angry 
temperament refers to individual differences in the disposition to experience angry 
feelings and express anger without provocation; angry reaction reflects the frequency 
of angry feelings when unfairly criticised or otherwise treated badly or unjustly.  
Frequent experiences of state anger leads to the development of trait anger 
(Spielberger, 1988). Individuals high in trait anger perceive a wider range of 
situations as anger-provoking and experience state anger more frequently than those 
low in trait anger (Deffenbacher, 1992; Spielberger, 1988; Spielberger & Reheiser, 
2010). Stable individual differences in the frequency and intensity of anger arousal 
are evident from the first year of life (Denham, Lehman, Moser, & Reeves, 1995; 
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Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993; Lemery, Goldsmith, Klinnert, & Mrazek, 
1999), and are thought to arise from both genetic and environmental influences 
(Schultz et al., 2010). 
 
Anger experience, expression and control. 
Spielberger (1988) developed a model of anger subtypes in recognition of 
clear individual differences in the proclivity to express anger, and the need to 
distinguish between anger experience (the subjective experience of anger varying in 
duration and intensity) and anger expression (the tendency to act on anger by 
expressing, suppressing or actively coping with it). Spielberger’s model, based on 
the factor structure of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; 
Spielberger, 1988) comprised three anger subtypes: anger-out, anger-in and anger-
control. The factors reflect how often anger is experienced but suppressed (anger-in), 
expressed toward others or objects (anger-out) or controlled (anger-control-out) 
(Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, 1988). Individuals with high anger-out scores 
frequently engage in either verbal or physical expression of anger, endorsing items 
such as “[when] I lose my temper, I strike out at whatever infuriates me”. High 
anger-in scores are associated with suppressing anger expression (e.g., “I boil inside, 
but I don’t show it; I keep things in”). Individuals with high anger-control scores 
have strong anger experiences, but are vigilant about controlling expression of these 
feelings. Anger-in and anger-out subscales are empirically independent (Spielberger 
et al., 1988).  
Spielberger (1988) theorised that high trait anger and anger expression 
(anger-out) would be associated with aggression, while high anger suppression and 
control (anger-in and anger-control) scores would be associated with a lack of 
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aggression. Berkowitz (2012) suggested that individuals scoring highly on either the 
anger-in or anger-out scales experience strong psychophysiological reactions to a 
triggering event and likely have an urge to attack an appropriate target because they 
feel angry and are “boiling inside”. High anger-in scores, however, indicate strong 
inhibition or suppression of this aggressive impulse. Berkowitz suggested that 
cognitive controls appeared vital in this process of inhibiting and separating 
aggressive impulses from automatic, anger-related physiological reactions. 
The factor of anger control is somewhat more contentious. Some researchers 
have suggested that extreme anger may be associated with a sense of loss of control, 
with some individuals reporting periodic experiences of very impulsive angry 
outbursts in the context of feeling out of control (Fava et al., 2000; Potegal, 2010; 
Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Stemmler, 2010). Even at low intensity, some 
individuals experience anger as not completely volitional (Sukhodolsky, Golub, & 
Cromwell, 2001). Conversely, some appraisal theorists argue that anger is preceded 
by a sense of control: individuals will not become angry unless they believe that they 
can cope with the provocative occurrence. Other researchers have found that some 
individuals describe a sense of control accompanying their anger, rather than clearly 
preceding it (see Berkowitz, 2010; also Geen, 1968; Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, 
Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). Berkowitz (2010) 
suggests that if angry people always think (consciously or unconsciously) that they 
can master a disturbance before becoming angry, then angry outbursts may stem less 
from a deficit in control, and more from a choice not to use that control. Thus anger 
control appears to be a point of individual difference. 
Spielberger’s (1988) model of anger has received strong empirical support. 
The STAXI, and its successor, the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 
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(STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999), have frequently been used in offender research, 
though application with violent offenders specifically has been limited. 
 
Anger, Aggression and Violence 
Anger is the emotional state most commonly identified as an antecedent for 
aggression and violence (Howells et al., 2008; Novaco, 1997). While anger is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for violence (Bandura, 1973; Blackburn, 1986; Howells, 
2004; Novaco, 1976, 1994; Polaschek & Collie, 2004), anger is recognised as a 
contributing factor in the presence of other environmental and intrapersonal 
conditions, and considered a significant antecedent for many violent offences. Anger 
has consistently been identified as a risk factor in the prediction of violent behaviour 
and recidivism among violent offenders (e.g., Douglas & Skeem, 2005; Novaco, 
1994; Zamble & Quinsey, 1997), and the relationship between overcontrolled and 
undercontrolled anger and violent behaviour has been explored in detail (e.g., 
D'Silva & Duggan, 2010; Megargee, 1966; Verona & Carbonell, 2000). 
Some researchers have argued that anger arousal facilitates aggression (Rule 
& Nesdale, 1976); others suggest that the relationship is mutual, with anger levels 
influencing aggression levels and vice versa (Novaco, 1976). Factors that determine 
whether provocation will induce aggression include the magnitude and appraisal of 
provocation, reinforcement contingencies, expected outcomes, modelling influences, 
situational constraints and preferred coping styles; these factors also influence 
aggression in the absence of anger (Novaco, 1976). Anger is thought to cause 
disorganisation of cognitive processes, impulsive reactions and behaviour disruption; 
the combination of agitation, frustration and hostile internal dialogue cumulatively 
stimulates aggressive behaviour (Novaco, 1976). Furthermore, the average violent 
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offender may have difficulty controlling the expressive, disruptive, defensive and 
instigative functions of anger. Polaschek and Reynolds (2000) suggest that violent 
offenders tend to over-label their arousal such that anger is their predominant 
emotional experience. Some violent offenders find anger satisfying, and may 
deliberately expose themselves to arousing situations so that they feel justified in 
their subsequent use of violence. 
In prisoner samples, many researchers have found a predictive relationship 
between anger and violence: anger (self-reported and staff-rated) predicted general 
recidivism (Wood & Newton, 2003), adult violence without a weapon (Michie & 
Cooke, 2006) and adolescents’ physical and verbal aggression (Cornell et al., 1999). 
Anger also predicted male adolescents’ motivation for offending on probation 
(Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2007). Other studies with incarcerated offenders, 
however, have suggested mixed results. Two studies found that anger was not 
predictive of violence (Loza & Loza-Fanous, 1999; Mills & Kroner, 2003); in both 
studies prisoner-reported anger levels were lower than standardised norms and other 
prisoner samples (Baker, Van Hasselt, & Sellers, 2008; Ford, 1991; Lindqvist et al., 
2005; Suter et al., 2002), perhaps indicative of measurement reactivity. Loza and 
Loza-Fanous (1999), for example, compared STAXI scores for 122 violent and 142 
non-violent Canadian prisoners; there was no difference in STAXI scores between 
the violent and non-violent offenders. The constructs measured by STAXI subscales 
may not have been treatment needs for the violent offender group. Alternatively, 
within the group, some subgroups may have differed significantly on certain 
constructs (e.g., anger control); when analysed as an entire group, however, high and 
low scores may have been offset to an average similar to the non-violent offender 
group. Insufficient details are provided in this study to determine if this is the case. 
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Many researchers argue that poor anger control often contributes to violent 
offending, and therefore can be considered a criminogenic need for a large 
proportion of violent offenders (see Andrews, 1995; Howells & Day, 1999; Louw, 
Strydom, & Esterhuyse, 2005; Megargee, 2009; Powis, 2002; Tavris, 1989). While 
the relationship between anger and violence is well-researched, comparisons of 
violent offender program outcomes for offenders with overcontrolled anger, 
undercontrolled anger and ‘normal’ anger control have been limited. As explored 
earlier, the control or regulation of anger is a key component of the overcontrolled / 
undercontrolled dichotomy first proposed by Megargee (1966). Both overcontrolled 
and undercontrolled violent offenders have deficits in anger control, excessively or 
insufficiently controlling their anger respectively (although some researchers argue 
that levels of anger control are ‘normal’ in one type or the other in some samples). 
Using the four-type classification discussed above, conforming violent offenders 
appear to have deficits in anger experience while inhibited violent offenders have 
deficits in anger expression.  
The reactive / instrumental dichotomy of violence and aggression also clearly 
delineates the role of anger in some violent offending. Anger generally forms a 
significant part of affect-driven, highly-aroused reactive violence. The role of anger 
in instrumental violence is not as definite: anger is not necessarily involved in 
premeditated, non-affect-driven instrumental violence, although this type of violence 
may still occur in the context of anger. Some researchers argue that instrumental and 
reactive violence is affected by levels of behavioural inhibition, drawing on 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) suggestion that antisocial behaviour results from 
low self-control (impulsivity, risk seeking, present orientation, temper and 
carelessness) in interaction with criminal opportunity. In the presence of weak 
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behavioural inhibition, lower levels of anger are needed for an individual to engage 
in instrumental aggression and violence to take control of a situation that is causing 
anger, conduct a tactical appraisal and determine whether to use the threat of force to 
subdue perceived opponents (Driscoll, Zinkivskay, Evans, & Campbell, 2006). For 
individuals with stronger behavioural inhibition, higher levels of anger are needed to 
cross a higher threshold before engaging in reactive violence to express anger. 
Driscoll et al. (2006) suggest that individuals engaging in reactive (or expressive) 
violence have higher levels of emotional arousal and less ability to monitor and 
control their behaviour, triggering a loss of self-control with the aim of discharging 
anger (although not necessarily with the intent to harm a target).  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, anger appears to be related to violent offending in one of the 
following ways: 
• Insufficient anger control (likely associated with reactive violence); 
• Excessive anger control and insufficient anger experience; 
• Excessive anger control and insufficient anger expression; 
• ‘Normal’ levels of anger control; or 
• No involvement of anger (possibly associated with instrumental 
violence). 
Several factors are involved in the experience, expression and control of 
anger that may represent treatment needs for violent offenders. The success of anger 
management interventions with some, but not all, violent offenders indicates that 
there are may be some groups of violent offenders for whom particular anger factors 
are criminogenic, and it is these groups for whom anger management programmes 
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are effective. While the typology of overcontrolled and undercontrolled anger is still 
evident in research, it has been somewhat ignored in violent offender treatment. 
Many programs appear to focus on addressing undercontrolled anger, likely 
associated with reactive aggression and violence. Instrumental aggression and 
violence, however, may not be associated with anger dysregulation, and violent 
offenders who have engaged in instrumental aggression may have treatment needs 
that remain unaddressed in these programs. It does not make sense to offer anger 
management interventions to violent offenders who have normal or low levels of 
anger (Howells, 2004). The treatment need of overcontrolled anger has largely been 
ignored in the literature. Davey et al. (2005) reported that the majority of theoretical 
and clinical analyses of anger associated with violence to date had focused on 
understanding and managing high levels of angry experience and low levels of anger 
control. This remains true, despite ever-increasing clinical and empirical 
observations of individuals with histories of extreme violence who report 
antecedents of inhibited or unexpressed anger contributing to violent offending.  
  
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Chapter 6. Criminal Thinking  
Cognition is frequently implicated in the effect of a stimulus on the 
experience of anger, generally through appraisal. Crime-supportive cognitions 
appear to be a condition that facilitates the use of violence in the presence and in the 
absence of anger. The following chapter will investigate crime-supporting 
cognitions, and explore their role in violent offending, and in the instrumental / 
reactive and undercontrolled / overcontrolled typologies discussed above. 
Cognition is considered a key component in a range of theories of aggression 
and violence, and as with anger, crime-supporting cognitions are considered a 
treatment need for many violent offenders. A series of meta-analyses have 
demonstrated that antisocial cognitions are one of the top four dynamic predictors of 
general recidivism (Andrews & Bonta, 2010b; Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2006; 
Jones, Miller, & Lynam, 2011), predicting future criminality better than traditional 
criminological variables such as family structure and social class (Walters & DeLisi, 
2013). Many cognitive-behavioural rehabilitation programs include components to 
address antisocial cognitions, and large scale longitudinal evaluations support the 
conclusion that changes in cognitive constructs are associated with changes in rates 
of offending (see Andrews & Bonta, 2010a; also Ashford, Wong, & Sternbach, 
2008; Hubbard & Pealer, 2009; Lowenkamp, Hubbard, Makarios, & Latessa, 2009; 
McGuire et al., 2008). However, evaluations of programs addressing criminal 
cognitions of violent offenders have demonstrated limited efficacy in reducing 
violent offender recidivism rates.  
Limited empirical evidence is available indicating the types of criminal 
cognitions that should be targeted in treatment (Polaschek & Collie, 2004). Thus 
there is a need to understand the nature of criminal cognition and how it deviates 
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from non-criminal thinking and decision making (Walters, 2009b), and how 
violence-supportive cognitions deviate from general criminal cognitions. It is 
important to determine the types of violence-supportive cognitions that underpin 
violent behaviour, so that these can be targeted with treatment to reduce rates of 
reoffending by violent offenders. The rationale for examining crime-supporting 
cognitions is that this is a common basis for treatment, and is often assumed to be 
problematic for most violent offenders. Research of treatment programs addressing 
cognitions suggests, however, that this is not the case for all.  
 
Definition of Criminal Thinking 
Criminal thinking is defined as cognition designed to initiate and/or maintain 
criminal activity, and violence-supportive cognition is defined as cognitions that 
contribute to the initiation or maintenance of violent behaviour; that is, thoughts that 
give permission to break the law and to behave violently. Criminal thinking 
constitutes the attitudes, values and beliefs supportive of crime and is considered one 
of the ‘big four’ criminogenic needs vital in predicting and managing recidivism risk 
(Andrews & Bonta, 2010b; Andrews et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2011). Attitudes are 
the evaluative cognitions and feelings that organise an individual’s decision to act 
toward a person, thing or action; antisocial attitudes are the thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours supportive of criminal conduct.  
Criminal thinking is relative to the society in which is takes place, and needs 
to be viewed within cultural, temporal and developmental contexts (Walters, 2009b). 
Cultural context acknowledges that a culture defines what is criminal. Temporal 
context refers to the crime initiation and maintenance phases: criminal thinking may 
contribute to the initiation phase (explaining how crime begins) and the maintenance 
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phase (explaining how crime continues), although the role of criminal thinking likely 
varies across the phases. Developmental context, finally, is exemplified by 
comparing Dodge’s (1991) proactive and reactive aggression distinction in children 
with Walters’ (2006c) proactive and reactive criminal thinking in adults. Criminal 
thinking is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for criminal behaviour: a 
criminal act requires criminal thoughts and the decision to act on those thoughts 
(Walters, 2009b). Cognitive factors are partially responsible for crime continuity, 
with antisocial cognition seemingly exerting its influence over crime-related 
constructs by mediating important crime relationships (e.g., serving as a link 
between past and future criminality) (Walters & DeLisi, 2013). 
 
Structure of Cognition 
Cognitive factors often exert their effect by mediating relationships between 
other variables (Bandura, 1986). Cognition consists of three key components: 
cognitive structures, processes and content (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hollon & 
Kriss, 1984; Huesmann, 1988; Ingram & Kendall, 1986; Monsell, 1981; Turk & 
Salovey, 1985). The nature of cognition is to construct an individual’s perception of 
the world, selectively encode information, perform behaviour measured against 
values and expectations, and impose structure on one’s own actions. Cognitive 
structures form the basic architectural components of the information processing 
network that guides the structure of cognition in memory (Kendall, 1992; Rumelhart, 
1984). Cognitive structure refers to the architecture or form of the cognitive content, 
and the relationship of that content to other concepts in memory. Within the 
cognitive structures of the long term memory, memory nodes make up networks of 
information through connections to other nodes containing similar information. 
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Activation of one node, though sensory priming, causes the activation of related 
nodes; this pattern of node activation is a cognitive process known as a ‘schema’ 
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Rumelhart, 1984). Cognitive content, or cognitive 
products, such as attributions, decisions, thoughts and accessed beliefs, are the end 
result of information processing (Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Kendall, 1992) stored in 
long-term memory and consciously accessed. 
Cognitive processing refers to the complex mechanisms that lead to cognitive 
content or knowledge (Collie, Vess, & Murdoch, 2007); the mechanisms by which 
pre-existing knowledge structures affect subsequent understanding of the world. 
Cognitive processing includes processes such as perception, encoding, appraisal, 
interpretation, acquisition, rehearsal and retrieval of information. Schemas are used 
in cognitive processing to perceive, guide attention, encode, alter or retrieve 
information to assess the stimuli we encounter and help us make sense of the world 
around us (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Hollon & Kriss, 1984), influencing the processing 
and inhibition of information at a pre-conscious level. Schemas are generally defined 
as clusters of beliefs, attitudes and other types of cognition that are closely associated 
in enduring networks as a result of experience and learning (Huesmann, 1988), 
although the term ‘schema’ has several diverse meanings in psychology (Ward, 
2000). Implicit theories are a form of schema (Polaschek et al., 2009) that are 
composed of structured interconnected belief networks organised around an 
underlying dominant theme or theory and guide behaviour implicitly, allowing 
individuals to predict and anticipate what usually happens during a social situation 
(Ward, 2000). Scripts are collections of simple event schema that contain 
information about the events that happen in an environment, how an individual 
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should respond and behave during those events and the likely outcomes. Scripts 
evolve over time, guided by factors such as culture. 
 
Criminal Cognition 
Criminal thinking is defined by content, structure and process. Some 
individuals entertain criminal thoughts without ever acting on them (content) 
(Walters, 2009b). Others demonstrate a pattern of thinking that follows some of the 
same rules and conventions as criminal thinking (process), yet are not chronic 
offenders. Criminal thought content describes what an offender thinks or imagines at 
the various stages of committing an offence, criminal thought structure refers to the 
nature of the schema that underpin this thought, and criminal thought process entails 
how an offender thinks, including biases and deficits in information processing that 
may promote the use of offending as a goal-attainment or problem-solving strategy 
(see Collie et al., 2007). Cognitive deficiencies (the absence of thinking; e.g., not 
thinking of the consequences of behaviour) are distinguished from cognitive 
distortions (i.e., distorted processing of social information) (Kendall, Ronan, & 
Epps, 1991). Cognition may contribute to violent offending in a variety of ways, 
including through offending-supportive cognitive processes, cognitive processing 
deficits, or cognitive content, such as violence-supportive beliefs. These impacts 
may occur at the pre-conscious information-processing level, or the conscious 
cognitive product level. The relationship between some of these cognitions and 
violence remains controversial (Maruna & Mann, 2006), however, and there is little 
guidance regarding which cognitions should be targeted in rehabilitation and how 
(Polaschek et al., 2009).  
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Criminal thinking, according to the lifestyle theory of crime (Walters, 1990, 
2009b) is hierarchically organised. At the lowest level of the hierarchy are schemes, 
or meanings; schemes develop through ongoing interactions with the environment, 
with new information being assimilated into existing schemes, or accommodated 
through the creation of a new scheme to conceptualise the information (Walters, 
2009b). Criminal schemes (e.g., getting even with someone for a perceived injustice) 
may be content schemes (encompassing the specific acts of the crime – the act itself, 
target and deterrents) or process schemes (involving the steps taken to enact the 
crime – motive, opportunity, priority). Schemes are guided and reinforced by higher 
order cognition.  
The second level of the hierarchy is comprised of schematic subnetworks 
(groups of interrelated schemes that help promote criminal behaviour); the 
juxtaposition of the content and process schematic subnetworks for crime set the 
stage for criminal behaviour (Walters, 2009b). Content schematic subnetworks are 
cognitive templates focused on a central theme (e.g., crime and justice). Process 
schematic subnetworks are groups of schemes that focus on the means by which a 
crime is planned, enacted and later justified, but are devoid of crime. Process 
schematic subnetworks include criminal thinking styles (e.g., entitlement, 
discontinuity), criminal attributions (e.g., blaming others), self-efficacy for crime 
(e.g., belief that “I am good at crime”), outcome expectancies for crime (e.g., crime 
will bring power, respect and money), criminal goals and criminal values (e.g., self-
centred, hedonistic).  
Finally, the top level of the hierarchy consists of uniquely-organised belief 
systems (collections of content and process schematic subnetworks) that are global 
impressions the individual forms of themselves (self-view; through reflected 
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appraisals, social comparisons, self-representations, role identity, possible self), the 
external environment (world-view), the past (past-view; through recollections), the 
present (present-view; through perceptual and executive functions) and the future 
(future-view; through anticipations). Although there is very limited research into the 
belief systems of violent offenders, Walters (2009b) speculates that habitually 
violent offenders have negative and antisocial self-views, world-views that highlight 
mechanistic, fatalistic and malevolent sides of life, past-views dominated by past 
criminal exploits, present-views affected by processing and decision-making deficits 
and future-views that anticipate the benefits and minimise the costs of future crime.  
It is difficult to separate criminal thought content and process, as the two are 
tightly linked. Measures designed to assess criminal thinking generally focus on 
either one or the other. For examples, the Psychological Inventory of Criminal 
Thinking Styles (PICTS; Walters, 1995) measures criminal thinking process. The 
question arises whether criminal thinking styles are an indication of general 
antisociality or whether they are context-specific. That is, as with anger, whether 
criminal thinking styles are an indication of trait- or state-based factors. The 
following sections will briefly outline some of the more dominant perspectives of 
cognitions involved in general and violent offending, before focusing particularly on 
a discussion of the influence of criminal thinking styles as a cognitive process. 
 
Violent Crime-Supporting Content and Process Cognitions 
A variety of theories have been developed to explain the role of cognition in 
aggression, violence and violent offending, and generally indicate a cyclical 
relationship. Aggression results from cognitions associated with frustration at goal 
attainment or provocation (Berkowitz, 1990; Dollard et al., 1939), as discussed 
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earlier. Aggression also biases the cognitive processes involved in social learning, 
information processing and decision making (Bandura, 1978, 1983, 1986; Dodge & 
Crick, 1990; Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990b; Huesmann, 1988; 
Milner & Webster, 2005; Novaco & Welsh, 1989). Aggressive individuals 
selectively attend to and recall aggressive cues from the environment, and have 
difficulty identifying non-aggressive solutions to situations. Several social 
information processing and other cognitive biases are associated with aggression and 
violence, including biases in social attribution for negative events and attentional, 
goal-setting, problem-solving and representational deficits (Crick & Dodge, 1996; 
Howells et al., 2008). Social learning may also be fundamentally impeded in violent 
offenders due to impaired executive cognitive functioning (e.g., attentional control, 
goal planning, abstract reasoning, cognitive flexibility, hypothesis generation, 
temporal response sequencing and the ability to use information contained in 
working memory) (Giancola, 1995; Hawkins & Trobst, 2000; Moffitt, Lynam, & 
Silva, 1994; Raine, 2002).  
Several schemas, such as the hostile attribution bias (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 
1990a) and violence-supportive implicit theories (Polaschek et al., 2009), have been 
implicated in violent offending, affecting social learning and information processing. 
Frequent violent thoughts reinforce schemas and promote aggression, assisting in the 
perpetuation and increased risk of violent and aggressive behaviour (Grisso, Davis, 
Vesselinov, Appelbaum, & Monahan, 2000). The hostile attribution bias refers to the 
tendency to attribute hostile intent to others’ behaviour, even when there is no 
objective evidence with which to do so (e.g., interpreting an unexpected bump from 
another individual as having malicious intent, even when independent others view 
the intent as ambiguously benign) (Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 1980; Polaschek et 
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al., 2009). The hostile attribution bias appears a relatively automatic occurrence for 
highly aggressive people (see, e.g., Tiedens, 2001; Zelli, Huesmann, & Cervone, 
1995); there has, however, been limited research with offender groups specifically 
(Polaschek et al., 2009). Of the few studies that have examined the hostile attribution 
bias in violent offenders, the results of two (Copello & Tata, 1990; Seager, 2005) 
could not be generalised to violent offenders held in general prison populations, 
because all violent offender populations studied were either diagnosed with 
psychopathy or personality disorder, or scored highly on Hare’s (1991) Psychopathy 
Check List-Revised (PCL-R). A third found no relationship between violent 
behaviour and hostile attribution bias in a study of 150 American violent prisoners, 
but cited measurement error as a possible explanation (Vitale, Newman, Serin, & 
Bolt, 2005). 
The identification of other schemas in violent offending behaviour remains a 
focus of research. Notably, there are some differences in terminology, with some 
researchers (e.g., Huesmann, 1988) using the terms ‘schema’ and ‘script’ 
interchangeably, while others (e.g., Ward & Keenan, 1999) choose to use the term 
‘implicit theory’ instead of schema. Some consider implicit theories, structured, 
connected belief networks organised around an underlying theme or theory, to be a 
type of schema (Polaschek et al., 2009). The structures are thought to guide 
behaviour implicitly and allow individuals to predict and anticipate likely 
occurrences in social situations (Ward, 2000) through the construction of hypotheses 
about others’ beliefs, intentions and desires. Once developed, well-formed implicit 
theories are highly resistant to revision, with individuals likely to ignore or disregard 
evidence that contradicts or invalidates an implicit theory (Polaschek et al., 2009).  
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Belief systems supportive of violence may be formed through 
misinterpretations of conflictual social interactions that are then used in future 
situations (Beck, 1999). When an individual negatively perceives another’s 
intentionality (perhaps guided by the hostile attribution bias), they have a tendency 
to protect and control their threatened or hurt self-image with violence. Beck 
identified seven rigid schemas held by violent offenders toward authorities, partners, 
outsiders and others; including: (a) ‘I need to fight back’; (b) ‘physical force gets 
respect’; (c) ‘nobody can be trusted’; and (d) ‘if you don’t get even, people will walk 
over you’. These beliefs may be viewed as separate schema, or as beliefs contained 
within a single ‘hostile world’ schema (Mann & Beech, 2003). Other schema related 
to violence include believing in violence as a way of preserving an honourable self-
image (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996), protecting themselves or their 
gang members from perceived threats (honour crimes) or protecting other less 
capable individuals (vigilante crimes) (Lopez & Emmer, 2002). 
Toch (1992) identified a typology of violent offenders differentiated on the 
basis of approaches to interpersonal situations that promoted violence. Two broad 
approaches were identified that made violence more likely: self-preserving 
strategies, concerned with consolidating and increasing social status for self- or 
others’ appraisal (types included rep-defending, norm-enforcing, self-image 
defending, self-image promoting, self-defending and pressure-removing), and 
approaches that dehumanise others, with little importance placed on others’ rights 
and needs compared to getting one’s own needs met (types included bullying, 
exploitation, self-indulging or catharting). 
Polaschek and colleagues (Polaschek et al., 2009; Polaschek & Donovan, 
2006) identified four violence-related implicit theories in investigating the offence 
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accounts from predominantly Maori and Pacific Island male violent prisoners. The 
‘beat or be beaten’ implicit theory referred to the need to act violently to achieve or 
maintain agency, status and autonomy in a violent world. The theory was associated 
with a prevailingly hostile view of others and enjoyed widespread support. Two 
subtypes of ‘beat or be beaten’ were identified: ‘self-enhancement’ (proactively 
seeking out opportunities for violence as a way of enhancing status) and ‘self-
preservation’ (closely linked to the hostile attribution bias: resentful, mistrustful of 
others and ‘forced’ into violence by others’ intent to prey on them). The ‘I am the 
law’ implicit theory referred to a belief of moral superiority and being entitled or 
obliged to use violence to attack, harm or discipline others for the protection of 
family, friends or social order. These implicit theories were underpinned by an 
assumption of the normalisation of violence as a helpful, acceptable and effective 
problem-solving strategy to either enhance or retain status or achieve a positive 
outcome for his social group, with little or no lasting negative consequences. Finally, 
the ‘I get out of control’ implicit theory referred to a belief in being unable to self-
regulate their own behaviour without assistance (sometimes attributing this to 
uncontrollable anger or rage, substance use or life stressors).  
Similarities are evident in the implicit theories identified by Polaschek et al. 
(2009) and earlier research with seriously violent men. The ‘beat or be beaten: self-
preservation’ implicit theory, seemingly associated with a hostile attribution bias, 
appeared similar to Toch’s (1992) ‘self-defending’ or ‘self-image defending’ and to 
Lopez and Emmer’s (2002) ‘honour crime’ type of defending or protecting one’s 
own image. ‘Beat or be beaten: self-enhancement’ was similar to Toch’s (1992) 
‘self-image promoting’ strategy for violence. The ‘I am the law’ theory bore 
similarity to Lopez and Emmer’s (2002) ‘honour crime’ type of defending the image 
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and reputation of a gang, and Nisbett’s (1993) identification of the belief that a man 
has the right to take the law into his own hands to protect himself, his property and 
family. The ‘I get out of control’ implicit theory seemed more related to an 
individual’s observation of their experience of deficits in self-regulation, rather than 
a belief about relationships and self-image. Polaschek et al. (2009) considered that 
this may stem from actual difficulties in self-regulation rather than an excuse for 
violence, and suggested an association with the lack of control and impulsivity 
identified in unregulated individuals (e.g., Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, & Silva, 
1995; Henry, Caspi, Moffitt, & Silva, 1996). 
The use of schemas and biased processing may lead to a range of cognitive 
distortions used to justify and rationalise aggressive and violent behaviour. Cognitive 
distortions are consciously accessed beliefs that result from distorted processing of 
social information at a pre-conscious level (Guyll & Madon, 2003) and provide 
frameworks used by offenders to neutralise, minimise and justify maladaptive 
behaviours before, during and after offending (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996). The idea of 
cognitive distortions providing rationalisations of offending behaviour stemmed 
from Freud’s (1946) theories of defence mechanisms including projection and 
reaction formation. Ward (2000) posited that cognitive distortions emerge from 
causal theories organised as maladaptive implicit theories of victims, offences and 
the world. The offender interprets and explains the victim’s actions, desires and 
beliefs through mental representations contained in these theories, thereby justifying 
and maintaining future offending behaviour. Offenders use cognitive distortions to 
protect their self-image after antisocial behaviour, by alleviating negative feelings 
about themselves and their behaviours and justifying their offending (Bandura, 1991; 
Sykes & Matza, 1957; Ward, 2000). 
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Sykes and Matza (1957) recognised in their extensive research with general 
offenders that the vast majority saw themselves as conventional rather than as 
antisocial and sought to justify, neutralise and rationalise their actions. Five types of 
cognitive distortions were identified: (a) denial of responsibility (‘it was an 
accident’); (b) denial of injury (‘no one got hurt’); (c) denial of victim (‘the victim 
was asking for it’); (d) condemning the condemners (‘society is the real culprit’); and 
(e) appealing to higher loyalties (‘I couldn’t let my mates down’). The cognitive 
distortions most commonly found in recent literature include denial of accusation, 
denial of blame, justification, minimisation, mislabelling, external blame attribution, 
‘self-serving’ thinking, rationalisation and immediate gratification (Barriga, 
Hawkins, & Camelia, 2008; Barriga et al., 2000; Ward, 2000). However, research 
has not yet clearly separated the types of cognitions that occur before, during and 
after the offence (e.g., the thinking errors that contribute to the initiation of the 
offence and those that later justify the behaviour). 
Cognitive distortions have been separated into two categories: primary self-
serving and secondary (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga et al., 2000; Gibbs, 2003; 
Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995). Primary cognitive distortions (self-centred 
attitudes, thoughts and beliefs) manifest as beliefs in one’s own views, needs and 
expectations to the extent that others’ views are inconsequential or disregarded (e.g., 
one can do whatever they want, as they are above the law). Secondary cognitive 
distortions support primary distortions by rationalising and justifying offending 
behaviour (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995), and include blaming (e.g., 
attributing blame to external sources such as other people, provocation or 
intoxication), minimising (e.g., viewing violent behaviour as not harmful, and 
possibly commendable), mislabelling (e.g., using dehumanising labels for others) 
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and assuming the worst (e.g., attributing hostile intent to others or holding a 
pessimistic view of a situation or ability to change).  
Most literature on cognitive distortions and offending comes from sexual 
offending research, although a few studies have examined the distorted perceptions 
and cognitions of violent offenders specifically (e.g., Dodge et al., 1990b; Hollin & 
Howells, 1989). Chereji, Pintea, and David (2012) found a large weighted average 
effect size (.82) for the relationship between cognitive distortions and violence in a 
meta-analysis of 14 studies of violent and non-violent prisoners. Self-report or 
behavioural ratings (in the form of a violent index offence, condemnation, prior 
violent convictions or staff rating of violence) had no significant influence on this 
relationship. In a comparison of violent offenders, child molesters and rapists, Milner 
and Webster (2005) found significant differences in the prevalence and types of 
distortions (schemas) used. The distortion most prevalent in the violent offenders 
was ‘grievance/revenge’; in contrast, ‘sense of worthlessness’ was most prevalent for 
child molesters. The ‘grievance/revenge’ distortion was also used to a much lesser 
extent by the sexual offenders; this distortion may therefore contribute to violent 
offending particularly.  
Novaco and Welsh (1989) examined cognitive distortions typical of violent 
males in violent interactions. They suggested that pre-existing schemas affect the 
labelling of an emotional state; cognitive processing associated with violent 
behaviour may affect that labelling during the processes of encoding, interpreting 
and cognitively representing internal and external cues. The distortions may include 
a tendency to see aggression, hostility and provocation everywhere; increased 
exposure to aggression leading to more readily perceiving aggression; successful 
problem-solving with anger and violence leading to the increased likelihood of using 
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violence in future problem-solving; a tendency to perceive one’s own behaviour as 
situationally determined, while attributing others’ behaviour to their personality 
(e.g., natural aggressiveness); deficiencies in the ability to adopt alternative roles; a 
tendency to be sure that violence is the ‘normal way’ to act in specific situations; and 
a tendency to maintain a belief in the first impressions of another’s intentions, even 
in the face of contrary evidence (maximised by high arousal). 
 
Criminal thinking styles and the PICTS. 
The widest exploration of offender cognitive distortions was undertaken by 
Walters (1995, 1996, 2005a, 2006a; Walters & DeLisi, 2013; Walters, Frederick, & 
Schlauch, 2007) throughout the development and revision of the Psychological 
Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS) measure. Few psychometric 
instruments are specifically designed to measure criminal attitudes, beliefs or 
cognitions. The PICTS, one of the few empirically validated tools available, is 
designed to measure criminal thought processes thought to promote and maintain a 
criminal lifestyle. The 80-item self-report questionnaire asks respondents to reflect 
upon and describe their own thinking style as a means of assessing information 
processing characteristics (Collie et al., 2007), measuring distortions such as 
entitlement, rationalisation.  
The PICTS is underpinned by Walters’ (1990) criminal lifestyle model and 
the earlier theoretical work of Yochelson and Samenow (1976), who identified 52 
thinking errors thought to characterise the thinking of the criminal personality. 
Walters (1990) proposed that criminal lifestyle was formed through the interaction 
between offender and environment: individuals decide whether to offend, with 
external conditions constraining these decisions. Positive outcomes reinforce 
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behaviour, and with repetition the choice becomes entrenched. Walters viewed 
criminal lifestyle not as a momentary lapse in judgement, but as an enduring 
collection of four primary behavioural characteristics: irresponsibility, self-
indulgence, interpersonal intrusion and social-rule breaking. Walters (1995) argued 
that these characteristics are influenced by three interdependent dynamic factors: 
conditions (the predisposing factors that may lead to criminality), choices (that direct 
behavioural responses) and cognitions (that maintain the criminal lifestyle).  
Walters (1990) identified eight common and interrelated thinking styles 
denoting the lifestyle criminal: Mollification (externalising blame for offending), 
Cutoff (low tolerance for frustration, ability to rapidly eliminate anxiety or guilt), 
Entitlement (belief of privilege or status), Power Orientation (controlling others and 
surroundings with aggressive displays), Sentimentality (self-centred atonement, 
despite past criminality), Super-optimism (lack of consequential thinking or 
overestimate of the ability to avoid negative consequences), Cognitive Indolence 
(poor reasoning or a tendency to take short-cuts in thinking), and Discontinuity (loss 
of direction toward goal attainment). 
Using factor analysis, Walters (1995) identified four factors thought to reflect 
behavioural characteristics of a criminal lifestyle: avoidance of harm 
(irresponsibility), denial of harm (self-indulgence), interpersonal hostility 
(interpersonal intrusiveness) and self-deception (social rule-breaking). Egan, 
McMurran, Richardson, and Blair (2000) criticised Walters’ finding for the large 
amount of shared variance in the study, and proposed instead that two aspects of 
criminal thinking were measured by the PICTS: lack of thoughtfulness (cognitive 
indolence about offending and others’ feelings), and wilful criminality (active 
justifications of offending). These factors bore similarity to a two-factor model 
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identified in research on social processing deficits in psychopaths (Pardini et al., 
2003). ‘Lack of thoughtfulness’ appeared similar to the callous/unemotional traits 
associated with deficits in cognitive and emotional empathy deficits, and ‘wilful 
criminality’ bore similarity to the ‘impulsivity/conduct’ factor reflecting behavioural 
dysregulation, disinhibition and attention deficits (Chambers, Eccleston, Day, Ward, 
& Howells, 2008; Egan et al., 2000; Pardini et al., 2003).  
Walters (2005a) subsequently proposed a four-factor model with two major 
factors (Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking) and two minor factors 
(Interpersonal Hostility and Denial of Harm). The Reactive Criminal Thinking scale 
was constructed to measure the impulsivity, reaction to environmental cues and 
avoidance of thinking about negative aspects of crime thought to embody the ‘lack 
of thoughtfulness’ factor. The Proactive Criminal Thinking scale was developed to 
measure the instrumentality thought to drive the ‘wilful criminality’ factor, 
associated with a sense of privilege, attributions of blame, and perceptions of oneself 
as a victim and ‘nice guy’ (despite criminal actions). Table 2 provides on outline of 
the behavioural, affective and cognitive features of Walters’ proactive and reactive 
criminal predation.  
The original four-factor structure was also retained, comprising Problem 
Avoidance (reflecting a tendency to use crime and substance use to run from 
problems), Infrequency (extreme hostility toward others), Self-Assertion / Deception 
(tendency to assert one’s will over the environment to achieve one’s own objectives, 
regardless of the impact on others or how unrealistic the goals are) and Denial of 
Harm (rationalisation and minimisation of harm done to others from own 
involvement in crime) (Walters, 2010). Chambers et al. (2008) suggests that Walters’ 
(1995, 2010) denial of harm factor bears similarity to Barriga and Gibbs’ (1996)  
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Table 2  
Behavioural, Affective and Cognitive Features of Proactive and Reactive Criminal 
Predation (Walters, 2005) 
Feature Proactive Reactive 
Behavioural Planned / premeditated 
Scheming / cold-blooded 
Calculated / manipulative 
Spontaneous / impulsive 
Emotional / hot-headed 
Changeable / capricious 
Affective Anticipation (of positive 
outcomes) 
Anger (at perceived injustice) 
Cognitive Attitude of privilege 
Rationalisation 
Loss of focus 
Weak personal control 
 
minimising and mislabelling distortions, with both referring to an offender’s denial 
that their actions are injurious to others. The interpersonal hostility factor (Walters, 
2010) and assuming the worst distortion (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996) both outline the 
attribution of hostile intentions to others (perhaps reflecting frequent use of the 
hostile attribution bias). Barriga and Gibbs’ (1996) self-centred primary distortions 
seem similar to Walters’ (2010) self-deception factor, reflecting thoughts that one’s 
actions are correct regardless of others’ thoughts and feelings. While Chambers et al. 
(2008) suggested that Walters’ (2010) problem avoidance factor appeared most 
closely related to the self-centred primary cognitive distortion (Barriga & Gibbs, 
1996), it seems plausible that this factor may relate to the distortion of blaming 
others, in that avoiding problems through substance use is then associated with 
blaming subsequent offending behaviour on the substance use. 
Research indicates that the PICTS has good reliability and validity with male 
and female offenders (Walters, 1995; Walters & Elliott, 1999; Walters, Elliott, & 
Miscoll, 1998; Walters et al., 2007; Walters & Mandell, 2007) and is capable of 
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clearly differentiating offenders based on their risk level (Palmer & Hollin, 2003; 
Walters, 1995). Maximum security American prisoners significantly differed from 
medium and minimum security groups on all PICTS scales in Walters’ (1995) study. 
Palmer and Hollin (2003) found that minimum, medium and high risk male English 
prisoners scored significantly differently on seven of the eight thinking style scales; 
all except the Sentimentality scale. PICTS scales have also been associated with 
several offence history variables (e.g., age at first offence, number of previous 
convictions, extent and length of offending history) (Palmer & Hollin, 2003; 
Walters, 1995), providing further emerging evidence linking cognitive factors to 
offending chronicity and severity. In a sample of maximum security American 
prisoners, the Reactive Criminal Thinking scale, but not the Proactive Criminal 
Thinking scale, predicted subsequent total, aggressive and non-aggressive 
disciplinary infractions (Walters, 2005b, 2006c, 2007b). There has been limited 
research to date examining the Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales 
specifically with violent offenders. 
Walters (2009a) suggested that different patterns of criminal thinking (e.g., 
proactive or reactive) result in different program outcomes. Cognitive behavioural 
program evaluations from the United States and Canada found significant reductions 
in the all PICTS scores, particularly the Cutoff, Cognitive Indolence, Discontinuity 
and Current Criminal Thinking Style scales (Walters, Trgovac, Rychlec, DiFazio, & 
Olson, 2002). In contrast, an English evaluation found the greatest reduction in 
Cognitive Indolence scale scores, with not all thinking style scale scores changing 
between pre- and post-program assessment (Blud, Travers, Nugent, & Thornton, 
2003). It is unclear whether offender subtypes (particularly violent offenders) may be 
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identified that demonstrate different patterns of criminal thinking and differential 
program outcomes. 
 
Conclusion  
Research on violent offender cognitive processing generally shows that 
violent offenders perceive threat and hostility more readily than less violent 
individuals. However, there has been limited research into other forms of cognitive 
processing, particularly regarding the patterns of criminal thinking styles used by 
violent offenders specifically. It is likely that certain cognitions predispose an 
individual towards violence, and certain cognitions are reinforced by violence and 
aggression, maintaining a cycle of violent behaviour. While research has compared 
violent offenders’ cognitive distortions with those of sexual offenders, no research to 
date has determined whether there are groups within the violent offender population 
which differ according to the cognitive distortions that they use to justify or 
neutralise their violent offending behaviour. Table 3 outlines the factors or primary 
categories of distortions identified in various studies of general and violent offenders 
using general and violence-specific measures of offence-related cognitions. The 
question remains whether clear patterns of thinking styles (or distortions) can be 
ascertained for subtypes of violent offenders, and whether these patterns are linked 
to particular offence types. 
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Chapter 7. Patterns of Anger and Criminal Thinking 
Significant individual differences exist in how anger and criminal thinking 
influence violent offending. Anger experience, expression and control and the 
patterns of cognitive distortions used to initiate and maintain offending and alleviate 
uncomfortable feelings in response to offending have the potential to differ between 
subtypes of violent offenders. The relationship between crime-supporting cognitions 
and anger is somewhat unclear; these cognitions may mediate the relationship 
between overcontrolled or undercontrolled anger and violence, and may initiate 
violent offending to achieve goals in the absence of anger (i.e., instrumental 
violence). Can individual differences in cognitive processes of criminal thinking and 
the role of overcontrolled or undercontrolled anger with instrumental or reactive 
violence be used to identify clinically meaningful subtypes of violent offenders for 
treatment purposes? Does consideration of criminal thinking patterns add value to 
the overcontrolled/undercontrolled typology or the instrumental/reactive dichotomy 
in identifying treatment needs? This section will briefly discuss contemporary 
research of the interaction between cognition and anger before considering possible 
associations between anger overcontrol and undercontrol, instrumental and reactive 
violence and criminal thinking styles.  
 
Interactions between Affect (Anger), Cognition (Criminal Thinking) and 
Violence 
Across many paradigms, emotional processes and cognitive processes, 
content and structures are considered inextricably linked in a cyclical, reciprocal 
relationship (Frijda, 1993; Lewis, 1995; Novaco, 1978; Teasdale, 1983). Cognitions 
lead to emotions and emotions affect subsequent cognitions. Emotions, including 
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anger, prime some cognitive components (Tiedens, 2001). Anger influences 
attention, perception, depth and direction of information processing, interpretation of 
social stimuli, evaluation, attribution, risk perception, risk preference, judgement and 
decision-making processes and outcomes (Cohen, Eckhardt, & Schagat, 1998; 
Dodge, 1991; Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens, & Shonk, 2010; Smith & Waterman, 2003; 
Tiedens, 2001; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). Anger is also an emotional 
consequence of cognitive processing, and violence and aggression comprise 
behavioural consequences. The likelihood of each consequence is influenced by the 
cognitions that are held and activated in a situation, including schemas, scripts, 
implicit theories and cognitive distortions that may support instrumental or reactive 
aggression and violence (Beck, 1999; Chereji et al., 2012; DiGiuseppe, Eckhardt, 
Tafrate, & Robin, 1994; Ellis, 1994; Novaco, 2007). 
Considerable research supports the link between cognitions and emotion-
related aggression (reactive aggression). Hostile attribution biases, antisocial beliefs 
(e.g., distrust of authority figures, greater tolerance of deviant acts; perceptions of the 
world as hostile and unsafe, endorsement of aggressive solutions, identification with 
delinquent peers), social problem solving deficits and social cognitive learning 
cognitions (including self-efficacy, outcome expectations and outcome values), 
cognitive distortions, threat perception (e.g., threat to self-image, social status or 
property), and irrational beliefs or attributions about others’ intentions have all been 
associated with reactive and proactive physical, verbal and indirect aggression and 
violence (Andrews & Bonta, 1994; Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1989; Crick & Dodge, 
1994, 1996; DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2007; Dodge et al., 1990b; Farrington, 1990; 
Fives, Kong, Fuller, & DiGiuseppe, 2011; Granic & Butler, 1998; Polaschek et al., 
2009; Steinberg & Dodge, 1983; Webster-Stratton & Lindsay, 1999). The 
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relationship seems present from childhood. Intentions toward aggression mediate 
aggressive behaviour (Welsh & Gordon, 1991), with thinking process a more 
important mediator than anger.  
Research examining the role of anger in affecting attention and information 
processing has focused on state and trait anger and hostility. Hostile thinking is 
considered one of the main cognitive mechanisms in violence (Baker et al., 2008; 
Dodge & Crick, 1990; Dodge et al., 1990b; Firestone, Nunes, Moulden, Broom, & 
Bradford, 2005; James & Seager, 2006; Nasby et al., 1980; Seager, 2005; Simourd & 
Mamuza, 2000; Stanford et al., 2003; Tiedens, 2001). State anger arousal motivates 
interpretations of anger and hostility in others (Schiffenbauer, 1974; compare with 
Carlson, Felleman, & Masters, 1983), and heightens the significance an individual 
ascribes to an event (Schultz et al., 2010). Angry and agitated individuals tend to 
search for causality and blameworthiness, and attribute more negative intent to 
others’ behaviour (Eckhardt & Jamison, 2002; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; 
Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Mayer & Hanson, 1995). State anger influences 
decision-making, motivating a reduced focus on the risk of negative outcomes and 
greater focus on expectations of positive outcomes (Keltner et al., 1993; Lermise & 
Dodge, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Anger appears to ‘prime’ harm-related 
emotion schemas (Keltner et al., 1993). Individuals with high trait anger use the 
hostile attribution bias more commonly (see, e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; 
Berkowitz, 1993; Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001; Lim, Day, & Casey, 2011) and 
have an increased propensity to respond aggressively following hostile appraisals 
(Bettencourt et al., 2006). Hostile interpretations are, however, stronger predictors of 
reactive aggression and aggression expectancy than trait anger (Lim et al., 2011), 
perhaps because anger does not always lead to aggression.  
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The relationship between hostile attribution bias and violence was discussed 
in detail above. Some researchers found no difference in violent and non-violent 
offenders’ use of the hostile attribution bias (e.g., Copello & Tata, 1990); others have 
found that violent offenders had higher levels of trait anger, interpretation of more 
hostile intent and increased levels of aggressive expectancy following interpersonal 
provocation (Lim et al., 2011). While the direction of the relationship between trait 
anger and the hostile attribution bias is unclear, the association between biased 
interpretations of social information and individual differences in aggressive 
outcomes does appear directly linked to individual differences in anger (Cohen et al., 
1998; Tiedens, 2001).  
Cognitive distortions involved in anger and violence are generated by 
narrow, automatic thinking. Research into specific cognitive distortions indicates 
that anger induction may lead to irrational or distorted thoughts such as 
catastrophising, overgeneralisation and dichotomous thinking (Eckhardt, Barbour, & 
Davison, 1998; Eckhardt & Jamison, 2002; Zillmann, 1994). Cognitive distortions 
allow offenders to use their anger to justify their behaviour, and avoid the experience 
of negative emotions (e.g., anger) (e.g., Barriga et al., 2000; Walters, 1995, 2009b; 
Ward, 2000; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Anger can be generated and 
maintained through irrational or dysfunctional beliefs (Ellis, 1994), cognitive 
appraisals of unfairness, attributions of blame, cynicism, mistrust of others, 
antisocial beliefs and beliefs that justice does not prevail (Averill, 1983; Ford, 1991; 
Frijda, 1993; Granic & Butler, 1998; Hazaleus & Deffenbacher, 1985; Lopez & 
Thurman, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988; Yuen & Kuiper, 1991).  
Aggression is seen as the end product of a sequence of cognitive-affective 
processes (Berkowitz, 1990, 1993; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004): aversive 
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events produce negative affect, which automatically stimulates thoughts, memories, 
motor reactions and physiological responses associated with the fight-or-flight 
response. Fight associations lead to rudimentary feelings of anger; flight associations 
lead to fear. Individual reactions to aggress or flee depend on personal attributes 
(e.g., genetic predisposition, prior learning and conditioning) and recognition of 
situational factors that inhibit or promote aggression. Higher-order cognitive 
processing then leads to an aggressive behavioural response. This explanation seems 
particularly suited to explaining hostile aggression, although the priming and 
spreading activation processes are relevant to other types of aggression (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002). Hostile aggression is elicited by the aversiveness of a provoking 
event rather than the cognitive appraisal of the event: cognitions make the event 
more aversive (Berkowitz, 1993). 
Individuals high in trait anger, hostility or aggression demonstrate 
information processing biases in the attentional and interpretation stages (see Guyll 
& Madon, 2004; Orobio de Castro, Slot, Bosch, Koops, & Veerman, 2003; Schultz 
et al., 2010; Tiedens, 2001), demonstrated by a tendency to orient to angry faces and 
anger-oriented information (Parrott, Zeichner, & Evces, 2005; Putman, Hermans, & 
van Honk, 2004; van Honk et al., 2003; van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, vann de Hout, & 
Stam, 2001), less accurately recognising and more frequently attributing anger or 
hostility to facial expressions, or negativity to event explanations (Arsenio, 
Cooperman, & Lover, 2000; Epps & Kendall, 1995; Schultz, Izard, & Bear, 2004; 
Wenzel & Lystad, 2005). This may indicate a desire to detect anger and threat 
quickly to maintain dominance within their environment (van Honk et al., 2003), or 
reflect a tendency to expect that others will have similar feelings and motivations 
(Wingrove & Bond, 2005).  
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Individual differences are apparent in the strength and consistency of 
influence of state anger over attention and information processing (Schultz et al., 
2010). State anger motivates attention and information processing to facilitate the 
rapid removal of threats or obstacles (Bodenhausen, 1993; Lerner et al., 1998; 
Schultz et al., 2010; Tiedens, 2001; Zillmann, 1994) with narrower cognitive 
processing of perception and interpretation. Individuals high in trait anger tend to use 
anger- and threat-related schemas when state anger is high (Schultz et al., 2010). 
Attributions influence anger arousal and aggression (Quigley & Tedeschi, 
1996; Tiedens, 2001); attribution theorists argue that causal attributions about 
responsibility determine feelings (e.g., anger) that guide subsequent behaviour (e.g., 
aggression) (Matthews & Norris, 2002). Triggering events precipitate cognitive and 
physiological processes that the individual labels as ‘anger’, and this is a stage in 
which cognitive processing biases may impact. The progression from anger to 
violence appears to depend largely upon the disinhibition of internal control; pro-
violent or pro-criminal cognitive processes may contribute to this disinhibition. 
Some information processing biases appear more relevant to anger, aggression and 
violent behaviour than others (e.g., attentional cueing, attribution error) (Hazaleus & 
Deffenbacher, 1985; Novaco & Welsh, 1989). Information specifically relevant to 
the attribution of responsibility, such as intentionality, avoidability and motive, 
serves to arouse or reduce anger and retaliatory aggression (Ferguson & Rule, 1983).  
Anger (and other negative affective) arousal may lead to the experience of 
diminished cognitive control over behaviour, disengaging from the ‘self-system’ 
(e.g., less integrated and meaningful self-awareness, diminished guilt, increased 
focus on immediate concerns) (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994) and 
increasing the likelihood of antisocial or aggressive behaviour in the event of 
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negative affective arousal (Day, 2009).An extreme affective state may override 
relatively appropriate cognitive processes and beliefs with erroneous, mood-
congruent but simplistic inferences about another’s underlying intentions, beliefs and 
desires that allow abusive, disinhibited behaviour (Polaschek & Ward, 2002). Gross 
(1998, 2001; Gross & John, 2003) differentiated between self-control processes used 
before the emotion is fully developed (e.g., situation modification, attentional 
deployment, reappraisal) and those operating after the emotion arises (e.g., response 
suppression). Strategies used in later processing stages require considerable mental 
effort and are therefore less effective with more intense emotional states (e.g., 
suppression lessens the open display of emotion, but often fails to decrease the 
experience of the affective state, and may impair memory for the emotion-producing 
occurrence). Strategies that operate relatively early require less mental effort, and are 
relatively unaffected by emotion intensity.  
The above indicates the significant impact of anger on cognitive processing. 
Anger and cognition are also associated in violent offending through rumination. 
Rumination reflects a specific style of anger expression: an inward, suppressive style 
in which the anger-provoking incident is suppressed and subsequently thought about, 
prolonging the anger experience and increasing the tendency to dwell on previous 
anger experiences (Linden et al., 2003; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Four factors of 
rumination have been identified: angry afterthoughts, angry memories, revenge 
fantasies and understanding of causes (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). While 
‘understanding of causes’ may be somewhat functional in helping to isolate why a 
stimulus led to anger (Chambers, 2010), ‘fantasies of revenge’ appear highly 
dysfunctional, directly associated with an inability to forgive the antagonist, long-
held grievances and outward anger expression (Barber, Maltby, & Macaskill, 2005; 
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Linden et al., 2003). The Mollification criminal thinking style may be associated 
with rumination in the focus on blaming others, and Proactive Criminal Thinking 
may be evident in instrumental planning to express anger and use crime to remove 
the subject of rumination (rather than reacting and expressing anger immediately).  
Models of anger tend to emphasise the role of cognitive processes (see, e.g., 
Novaco, 1975). How, then, might criminal thinking styles impact on these cognitive 
processes? The Mollification thinking style, in which blame is externalised, may 
prompt an individual to blame another individual for blocking them from goal 
attainment or provoking them, eliciting feelings of frustration and anger. Cutoff 
seems related to anger in that it represents rapid elimination of deterrents to crime: 
perhaps if an individual experiences uncomfortable feelings (e.g., anxiety or guilt) 
they may deter from offending, they may rapidly replace these feelings with the 
more comfortable emotion of anger. Entitlement and Power Orientation thinking 
may similarly prompt anger if an individual perceives that someone or something is 
standing in the way of them receiving the privilege or status to which they believe 
they are entitled, or not doing what the individual expects from them or refusing to 
be controlled by the individual. Of course, Entitlement and Power Orientation 
criminal thinking may contribute to the maintenance of violent offending in the 
absence of anger. Sentimentality (or self-centred atonement) may reflect to an extent 
the thinking described in Polaschek et al.’s (2009) ‘I am the law’ implicit theory, or 
the ‘honour crime’ type described by Lopez and Emmer (2002), with a belief that 
they are doing something nice for others, to feel better about themselves; anger may 
stem from the belief that others have been wronged. Cognitive Indolence may 
prompt anger in that the poor reasoning or short-cuts in thinking may include 
cognitive biases such as the hostile attribution bias. The Superoptimism and 
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Discontinuity thinking styles seem less likely to contribute to anger: Discontinuity 
relates to a loss of direction toward goal attainment, or distraction from a goal, rather 
than being blocked from attaining that goal, and Superoptimism reflects a lack of 
consequential thinking and the belief that the individual can avoid the negative 
consequences typically associated with a criminal lifestyle. 
Anger may be elicited by a variety of criminal thinking styles, and may 
impact on the criminal thinking that leads to initiation and maintenance of criminal 
behaviour, particularly violent offending. Research comparing differences in anger 
and cognitive processes of subtypes of violent offenders has been limited, but will 
now be reviewed.  
 
Anger and Cognitive Processing Differences in Violent Offender Subtypes 
Instrumental and reactive violence. 
The reactive / instrumental dichotomy of violence and aggression also clearly 
delineates the role of anger in some violent offending. Anger generally forms a 
significant part of affect-driven, highly-aroused reactive violence. The role of anger 
in instrumental violence is not as definite: anger is not necessarily involved in 
premeditated, non-affect-driven instrumental violence, although this type of violence 
may still occur in the context of anger. Some researchers argue that instrumental and 
reactive violence is affected by levels of behavioural inhibition, drawing on 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) suggestion that antisocial behaviour results from 
low self-control (impulsivity, risk seeking, present orientation, temper and 
carelessness) in interaction with criminal opportunity. In the presence of weak 
behavioural inhibition, lower levels of anger are needed for an individual to engage 
in instrumental aggression and violence to take control of a situation that is causing 
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anger, conduct a tactical appraisal and determine whether to use the threat of force to 
subdue perceived opponents (Driscoll et al., 2006). For individuals with stronger 
behavioural inhibition, higher levels of anger are needed to cross a higher threshold 
before engaging in reactive violence to express anger. Driscoll et al. (2006) suggest 
that individuals engaging in reactive (or expressive) violence have higher levels of 
emotional arousal and less ability to monitor and control their behaviour, triggering a 
loss of self-control with the aim of discharging anger (although not necessarily with 
the intent to harm a target).  
 
Overcontrolled and undercontrolled offenders. 
Primary psychopath-type offenders’ cognitions appear related to instrumental 
offending (Lykken, 1995) or planned violence. Cognitive distortions used seem to 
include justifications associated with wilful criminality (Egan et al., 2000) and self-
regulation standards appear to adapt to include deviant beliefs (Chambers et al., 
2009). Offending by primary psychopaths appears to be against victims that are well-
known, allowing the offender to justify and plan their offence against the victim 
(Chambers, 2010). Their victim group appears somewhat similar to the controlled-
type offender (Blackburn, 1971). Chambers et al. (2009) found that primary 
psychopath-type individuals used distortions or justifications including victim 
blaming, demonising the victim or ‘mislabelling’ (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga et 
al., 2000; Gibbs, 2003; Gibbs et al., 1995), allowing the individual to view their 
behaviour as punishing a ‘bad person’. This may have been due to an inflated self-
image or a judgement of the justice system as inadequate, alleviating the perceived 
risks of violent offending – this appears similar to the ‘I am the law’ or ‘honour 
crime’ type thinking described above (Lopez & Emmer, 2002; Polaschek et al., 
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2009). Active justifications appear well-developed in primary psychopath-type, 
persistent, offenders (Chambers et al., 2009) and assist them to engage particularly in 
planned violence. Proactive criminal thinking may be more prevalent in the 
instrumental offending of primary psychopath-type individuals, and corresponds 
with positive outcome expectancies for crime, but not with hostile attribution bias 
(Walters, 2007a). Proactive criminal thinking correlates significantly with prior 
arrests for ‘instrumental’ crimes (e.g., burglary and robbery), but not with ‘reactive’ 
crimes (e.g., assault and domestic violence) (Walters et al., 2007). With regard to the 
role of anger, primary psychopath-type offenders have deficits in anger control, 
excessively controlling their anger. 
Secondary psychopath-type offenders appear to use cognitions reflective of a 
lack of thoughtfulness (Egan et al., 2000), comprising cognitive indolence about 
offending and the feelings of others. Their impulsive violence is reflective of 
reactive / expressive offending (Lykken, 1995), with victims tending to be strangers 
or acquaintances (Blackburn, 1971) giving little opportunity for planning or repeat 
offending (Chambers, 2010). Deficits in anger control, with insufficient control, are 
thought to play a role in the violent offending of secondary psychopaths. Reactive 
criminal thinking may be more evident in the reactive offending by secondary 
psychopath-type individuals (Walters, 2007a). Reactive criminal thinking correlates 
with hostile attribution bias, but not positive outcome expectancies for crime 
(Walters, 2007a), and correlates with prior arrests for ‘reactive’ crimes (e.g., assault 
and domestic violence) but not ‘instrumental’ crimes (e.g., burglary and robbery) 
(Walters et al., 2007). However, in a qualitative study of differences in thought 
processes of the four offender types, Chambers et al. (2009) found that 
undercontrolled offenders generally appeared pleased with the outcomes of their 
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violent behaviour, using distortions to justify their offending), apart from one 
secondary psychopath-type who seemed to be trying to desist from crime, but 
behaved impulsively in a stressful situation. 
Inhibited-type offenders, who are usually peaceful, but commit reactive 
violence, tend to be unhappy with their behaviour and do not use distortions to 
justify their offending (Chambers et al., 2009). The rumination of inhibited 
individuals appears more consistent with the angry memories rumination style 
(Sukhodolsky et al., 2001), in which blame is internalised rather than directed at the 
antagonist (Barber et al., 2005). High levels of rumination increase cognitive load to 
the extent that judgement becomes impaired, resulting in inappropriate levels of 
violence at the next provocation (Davey et al., 2005). Chambers et al. (2009) found 
that inhibited individuals committed reactive violence without conscious planning, 
instead placing themselves in a situation with their antagonist that degenerated due to 
the individual’s emotional state. The violent offence seemed to signify a culmination 
of internalised anger contributing to a depressive state and that eventually resulted in 
a highly impulsive and destructive state. The inhibited individual then felt 
dissatisfied with their violence (consistent with their non-violent morals) as they felt 
out of control during the offence (Chambers et al., 2009). Deficits in anger 
expression are thought to be associated with offending by inhibited individuals. 
Controlled-type offenders seem to consider violence against their personal 
morals, however in Chambers et al.’s (2009) study, they appeared satisfied with the 
outcome of their violence; their justifications indicated how their control relating to a 
non-violent philosophy may have been breached. As with primary psychopaths, 
Chambers and colleagues found that controlled individuals used distortions or 
justifications including victim blaming, demonising the victim or ‘mislabelling’ 
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(Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995). However, the unusual breach of control 
appeared to reflect rumination focused on punishing a single victim for committing a 
transgression that the individual could not cope with (Chambers et al., 2009), with a 
cognitive rehearsal of violent revenge (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) that allowed 
violence against that victim while maintaining non-violent morals toward others 
(Chambers et al., 2009). This group had a lengthier period of rumination than 
primary psychopath offenders; the length of rumination was proportional to the 
perceived cost of behaving violently (Chambers et al., 2009) and appeared consistent 
with McGurk’s (1978) finding of the role of long-term thought processes in 
offending by controlled individuals. Mental rehearsal of the violent punishment 
prepared the controlled offender to commit the violent offence in a strategic manner, 
consistent with this group reporting the highest level of planning in their offending 
(Chambers et al., 2009); the primary psychopath type likely did not require this 
prolonged period of rumination as violence was a more familiar problem-solving 
tool for them (Chambers et al., 2009). Mollification, Entitlement and Proactive 
criminal thinking styles may be more prevalent in this subtype. Conforming / 
controlled violent offenders are thought to have deficits in anger experience that 
contribute to their violent offending. 
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Chapter 8. Study Rationale and Research Questions 
This review of the published literature shows that only limited attention has 
been paid to the identification of subgroups of violent offenders, despite the obvious 
implications that this has for intervention. It is suggested that a potentially useful 
method of classifying subtypes of violent offender is on the basis of their criminal 
thinking styles and anger. Given the ‘one size fits all’ approach to violent offender 
treatment, it is important to consider whether rehabilitation programs are addressing 
the treatment needs of all violent offenders, or whether these needs may be better 
met by providing different violent offender subtypes with programs more 
appropriately tailored to differing treatment needs. The primary rationale for the 
studies in this thesis is therefore to establish whether subtypes of violent offenders 
can be identified, and whether these subtypes perform differently in treatment.  
Previous research into the patterns of anger of violent offenders has led to the 
identification of several different offender types. These have included those who 
overcontrol or undercontrol their anger, or those for whom violence is an angry 
response to provocation or an instrumental, goal-driven act motivated by other 
emotional experiences (e.g., desire for money). While the relationship of anger and 
violent offending has been well-researched, there have been very few previous 
attempts to compare program efficacy for offenders who have problematic over- or 
undercontrol of their anger.  
Studies investigating the cognitive processes of violent offenders have been 
less conclusive. Whilst it has been generally shown that violent offenders perceive 
threat and hostility more readily than less violent individuals, there has been limited 
investigation into other forms of cognitive processing specific to violent offenders, 
most notably patterns of criminal thinking. Given that cycles of violent behaviour are 
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likely maintained by cognitions that predispose an individual toward violence and by 
cognitions that are reinforced by violence and aggression, it is likely that violent 
offenders utilise different patterns of criminal thinking styles to justify their 
antisocial behaviour. Cognitive distortions and emotional dysregulation comprise 
two significant risk factors that appear to be targeted in multi-modal programs. 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The research questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: a) whether violent 
offenders can be meaningfully categorised into subtypes on the basis of their patterns 
of anger and criminal thinking styles, and b) whether these subtypes perform 
differently in violent offender treatment.  
It is hypothesised that the following subtypes of violent offenders will be 
identified on the basis of their patterns of anger and criminal thinking styles. The 
hypothesised types are: 
1. Instrumental, with strong cognitive distortions to justify offending, and 
normal levels of anger regulation; 
2. Reactive/undercontrolled anger, with more strongly held beliefs 
supportive of a criminal lifestyle, as the group makes no attempt to 
control their anger, and likely to be assessed as at high risk of violent re-
offending; 
3. Reactive/overcontrolled/inhibited anger, rumination about provocation 
that may affect judgement, and weaker criminal beliefs due to a strongly 
held belief in the importance of inhibiting responses; 
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4. Reactive/overcontrolled/conforming, likely to hold weaker criminal 
beliefs associated with a belief in the importance of inhibiting responses, 
and likely to be assessed as at low risk of violent re-offending. 
It is hypothesised that the subtypes will differ in the extent of changes in 
anger and criminal thinking effected by the violent offender treatment program, 
although no predictions are made about the direction of these differences. It is also 
hypothesised that the groups will differ regarding pre-program re-offending risk 
levels and post-program changes in risk rating. The second type is expected to 
demonstrate the highest risk of re-offending pre-program and the greatest reduction 
in risk post-program.  
 
Contribution and Implications 
The identification of subtypes of violent offenders has a number of 
implications for psychological practice. By recognising the heterogeneity in 
treatment needs related to anger and criminal thinking, programs may be better 
tailored to the criminogenic needs of violent offenders. This will help to improve 
program selection, reduce the delivery of content that may be irrelevant to some 
offenders and increase the delivery of content more relevant to specific offender 
types, and, ultimately, improve program effectiveness.  
 

 
111 

Chapter 9. Identifying Subtypes of Violent Offender 
Aim  
The aim of this study is to determine whether subgroups of violent offenders 
can be identified on the basis of their patterns of anger and criminal thinking. 
 
Method 
Participants. 
Data from 379 male offenders serving custodial sentences at Marngoneet 
Correctional Centre, a medium-security treatment prison in Victoria, Australia, 
collected between April 2006 and January 2011, were used in this study. Offenders 
had at least one violent index or prior conviction, and had been assessed for 
suitability to participate in a group-based violent offender treatment program. After 
data cleaning and screening procedures (described below), the final sample 
comprised 305 male violent offenders13.  
At the time of pre-program assessment, participants were aged between 18 
and 59 years old (M = 31.76 years, SD = 8.19; n = 305). The sample included a 
higher proportion of Indigenous offenders (7.5%) than the state-wide imprisonment 
rate of Indigenous adult males (6.2% in 2010; Corrections Victoria, 2010), although 
both rates far exceed the percentage of Victorian Indigenous residents (0.7%; ABS, 
2012). Offenders’ cultural backgrounds are reported in Table 4. Over half of the 
sample reported that they were single (58.9%, n = 270), with at least one child (61%, 
n = 236). Compared with a survey of all adult male prisoners in Victoria at 30 June 
 
13
 The violent offender treatment program is not intended for family violence-
oriented offenders. Offenders with convictions for family violence were generally 
removed from the current sample during the screening and assessment process, 
however those remaining may have had unadjudicated or historical family violence 
offences. 
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2010 (Corrections Victoria, 2010), the current sample held higher levels of education 
attainment, with a greater proportion completing secondary, tertiary, trade or 
technical qualifications (13.8% v 5.4%), and a higher rate of pre-imprisonment 
employment (40.7% v 21.3%). Additional sample demographics, including 
education level, marital and parental status, can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Table 4  
Offender-Identified Cultural Background as a Percentage of the Sample of 305 Male 
Participants 
Variable Sample 
Ethnicity:  
Australian 62.3 
Indigenous Australian 7.5 
Pacific Islander 2.3 
New Zealander / Maori 3.0 
European 6.6 
Asian 3.6 
Middle Eastern 2.6 
Other 4.3 
Unknown 7.9 
 
The proportion of violent and serious violent index and prior offences are 
reported in Table 5. For the purposes of this study, an offence was classified as 
violent or serious violent if it was listed in Clauses 1 or 2 of Schedule 1 of the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). Of the 305 offenders, 73.4% had committed violent 
index offences, 25.9% of which were serious violent offences. The index offence 
charge was not provided for 4.6% of the sample. The most prevalent index offences 
were armed robbery or attempted armed robbery (23.6%), intentionally causing 
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serious injury (17%), recklessly causing serious injury (8.9%), aggravated burglary 
(8.5%), murder or attempted murder(6.6%), manslaughter (4.3%), burglary (3.6%), 
intentionally cause injury (3.2%), robbery (2.6%), recklessly cause injury (2%), 
making threats to kill (1.6%), false imprisonment (1%) and kidnapping (1%).  
 
Table 5  
Violent and Serious Violenta Index and Prior Offences as a Percentage of the Sample 
Variable Sample 
Index offence(s)  
Violent 73.4 
Serious violent 25.9 
Unknown 4.6 
Prior offence(s)  
Violent 63.9 
Serious violent 11.8 
Unknown 5.6 
aClassified according to Clauses 1 and 2, Schedule 1, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 
 
Prior offending characteristics are provided in Table 6. Most offenders 
(87.2%) had prior convictions, with an average 2.7 prior offences (SD = 1.51). Many 
(63.9%) had committed at least one violent prior offence, including 11.8% who had 
committed serious violent prior offences. Prior offending history was unavailable for 
5.6% of the sample, and 7.2% had no prior offences. Offenders had served an 
average 4 prior prison sentences (SD = 3.79; n = 250) and 1.9 community orders (SD 
= 2.73; n = 215)14. Prior offending and sentencing statistics were considered to be  
 
14
 The average number of prior sentences exceeds the average number of prior 
offences. This appears an artefact of the poor quality dataset with missing data, 
including underreporting of prior offences, resulting in a substantial underestimate of 
prior convictions. 
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Table 6  
Prior Offending Characteristics as a Percentage of the Sample 
Variable n M SD 
Number of prior offences 288 2.7 1.5 
Number of prior prison sentences 251 4.0 3.8 
Number of prior community orders 215 1.9 2.7 
Number of prior breaches 219 1.7 2.1 
Note. Demographic information was missing for several cases; the sample size for 
each characteristic is provided.  
 
underestimates as data was unavailable for offences committed outside of Victoria. 
Offence types were classified using the ANZSOC (ABS; 2011a) and NOI 
(ABS; 2009) frameworks. The proportion of offences in each division is presented in 
Table 7. As expected, the majority of index and prior offences were located in the 
first six divisions; as detailed previously, these divisions relate to culpable acts that 
result in harm against a specific person (ABS; 2011a). 
Violent re-offending risk was assessed using the Violence Risk Scale (VRS; 
(VRS; Wong & Gordon, 2006). This measure is described below. Of the 305 violent 
offenders, the greatest proportion were assessed as being at moderate risk of future 
violent re-offending (50.8%); 25.2% were at high risk, and 8.2% at low risk. VRS 
scores were unknown for 15.7% of the sample. The primary problem areas or 
treatment targets identified by the VRS for the 305 violent offenders are reported in 
Figure 5. These were calculated by determining the percentage of violent offenders 
for whom each dynamic factor was rated 2 or 3 out of 3.  
Overall, emotional control was assessed as a treatment target related to 
violence for 88% of the sample. Clinicians considered this risk factor a treatment 
target for individuals displaying angry reactions or emotional outbursts resulting in  
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Table 7  
Most Serious Index and Prior Offences, Categorised Using the ANZSOC and NOI 
Classification System, as a Percentage of the Sample 
Division Index offences Prior offences 
01 Homicide and related offences 12.8 6.9 
02 Acts intended to cause injury 23.3 37.0 
03 Sexual assault and related offences 0.3 0.7 
04 Dangerous or negligent acts endangering 
persons 
13.1 3.3 
05 Abduction, harassment and other offences 
against the person 
2.6 2.0 
06 Robbery, extortion and related offences 26.2 18.7 
07 Unlawful entry with intent/burglary, break and 
enter 
12.1 11.8 
08 Theft and related offences 2.6 4.9 
09 Fraud, deception and related offences 0.0 0.0 
10 Illicit drug offences 0.3 0.7 
11 Prohibited and regulated weapons and 
explosives offences 
0.3 0.3 
12 Property damage and environmental pollution 0.7 0.3 
13 Public order offences 0.0 0.0 
14 Traffic and vehicle regulatory offences 0.0 0.0 
15 Offences against government procedures, 
government security and government operations 
0.3 0.0 
16 Miscellaneous offences 0.3 0.7 
No offences 0.0 7.2 
Unknown 4.9 5.6 
Total 99.8a 100.1a 
aTotals do not add to 100% due to rounding. 
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significant physical or psychological harm to others or property destruction, or for 
individuals who tended to ‘bottle-up’ feelings or act passively until they ‘exploded’ 
later (Wong & Gordon, 2000). Rigid or stereotypical thinking patterns or cognitive 
distortions excusing, justifying, rationalising, blaming or minimising of offences 
were considered problematic for 72% of the sample. Criminal attitudes facilitating 
the use of violence were considered treatment needs for 71.3%. 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of violent offenders for whom VRS dynamic risk factor were 
considered treatment targets.  
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Measures. 
Anger.  
Trait anger, anger expression and anger control were measured using the 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999), a 57-item 
self-report measure. The STAXI-2 consists of the State Anger scale and subscales 
(Feeling Angry, Feeling Like Expressing Anger Verbally and Feeling Like 
Expressing Anger Physically), Trait Anger scale and subscales (Angry Temperament 
and Angry Reaction), anger expression scales (Anger Expression-In, Anger 
Expression-Out) and anger control scales (Anger Control-In and Anger Control-
Out). STAXI-2 items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale, from 1 (‘almost never’) to 
4 (‘almost always’); higher scores indicate higher levels of trait anger, expression or 
control that may impair optimal functioning. Raw scores are converted to T-scores 
using gender and age-specific norms. 
The state anger scale and subscales measure an individual’s current anger 
levels; these were not utilised in the current study, as state anger at the time of 
assessment would have been affected by situational factors (e.g., current prison 
experiences) rather than factors present at the time of the violent offence. Trait anger 
scales assess the frequency of angry feelings over time, with items including “I am a 
hot-headed person” (Angry Temperament) and “It makes me furious when I am 
criticised in front of others” (Angry Reaction). The Anger Expression-Out (AX-O) 
scale measures the frequency that anger is expressed outwardly through physically or 
verbally aggressive behaviour (e.g., “I strike out at whatever infuriates me”). Anger 
Expression-In (AX-I) assesses the frequency of anger suppression (e.g., “I’m 
irritated a great deal more than people are aware of”). Anger Control-Out (AC-O) 
measures the frequency of attempts to control outward expression of anger (e.g., “I 
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can stop myself from losing my temper”). Finally, Anger Control-In (AC-I) assesses 
the frequency of an individual’s attempts to control angry feelings by actively 
calming themselves (e.g., “I take a deep breath and relax”). 
The STAXI-2 is based upon a solid conceptual model of anger and has strong 
psychometric properties across a wide range of normative groups (Eckhardt, 
Norlander, & Deffenbacher, 2004). Spielberger (1999) reported internal consistency 
Cronbach alpha coefficients ranging from 0.73 to 0.95 for the STAXI-2 scales. The 
STAXI-2 has been validated in an Australian forensic sample (Dear, Watt, & 
Dockerill, 2003).  
 
Criminal thinking styles.  
Criminal thinking style patterns were measured using the PICTS (Walters, 
2010), an 80-item self-report measure designed to assess thinking styles 
hypothesised to support and maintain a criminal lifestyle. PICTS items assume 
involvement in criminality and/or the criminal justice system. The measure 
comprises multiple scales, including General Criminal Thinking, composite scales 
(Proactive Criminal Thinking and Reactive Criminal Thinking), general content 
scales (Current Criminal Thinking and Historical Criminal Thinking), validity scales 
(Confusion-Revised and Defensiveness-Revised), factor scales (Denial of Harm, 
Infrequency, Problem Avoidance and Self-Assertion/Deception), the Fear-of-Change 
scale and eight thinking style scales (Cognitive Indolence (Ci), Cutoff (Co), 
Discontinuity (Ds), Entitlement (En), Mollification (Mo), Power Orientation (Po), 
Sentimentality (Sn) and Superoptimism (So)).  
Each thinking style scale contains 8 items that are rated on a 4-point Likert 
scale from 1 (disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Higher scale scores indicate the 
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presence of each thinking style, except for the reverse-scored Defensiveness-Revised 
scale. Scores are converted to T-scores using gender-specific norms. Example items 
include: “I believe that I am a special person and that my situation deserves special 
consideration” (Entitlement), “Why should I be made to appear worthless in front of 
my friends and family when it is so easy to take from others?” (Power Orientation), 
“I have trouble controlling my angry feelings” (Cutoff), and “I tend to put off until 
tomorrow what should have been done today” (Cognitive Indolence). When 
interpreting thinking style scores, Walters (2010) recommends identifying the three 
highest thinking style scale scores and determining a differentiated profile of 
thinking styles most likely to influence actions and decisions. 
Norms were generated from 450 minimum, medium and maximum security 
male American federal prisoners for all scales (Walters, 1995), with the exception of 
the Fear-of-Change scale that was normed on 100 medium security American federal 
prisoners (Walters, 1995, 2002a, 2002b; Walters & Elliott, 1999; Walters et al., 
1998; Walters & Mandell, 2007). Validation studies indicate good reliability and 
validity of the PICTS for male and female offenders (Walters, 1995; Walters & 
Elliott, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). Walters (2010) reported internal consistency 
Cronbach alpha coefficients ranging from .55 (Sentimentality) to .79 (Discontinuity) 
for the eight thinking style scales, and scores of .93, .83 and .91 for the General, 
Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales respectively. Test-retest reliability 
of the General, Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales has been well-
documented with general offenders, with statistics ranging from .81 to .93, .78 to .96 
and .70 to .88 respectively(Walters, 2002b, 2006b, 2006c; Walters & Mandell, 2007; 
Walters et al., 2002). Administration set appears to have a modest effect on overall 
PICTS score elevations: T-scores on each thinking style scale were approximately 5 
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points higher when a group of inmates completed the measure as part of 
commencing a treatment program than when they had earlier completed the measure 
as part of a routine intake procedure (Walters, 2006b; Walters et al., 2007). Overall 
patterns of scale elevations did not vary across administrations. 
The factor structure of the PICTS has been the subject of debate. Walters 
(1995) initially identified four factors underlying criminal thinking (problem 
avoidance, infrequency, self-assertion and denial of harm) using the PICTS. This 
finding was later validated in a study of 227 female inmates (Walters et al., 1998). In 
contrast, Egan et al. (2000) argued the presence of two factors: lack of 
thoughtfulness (cognitive indolence regarding offending and others’ feelings) and 
wilful criminality (active justifications of offending). Palmer and Hollin (2003) 
identified a single general factor, but could not validate these findings in a young 
adult male English offender sample (Palmer & Hollin, 2004). Confirmatory factor 
analysis of PICTS profiles demonstrated support for the original 4-factor (problem 
avoidance, infrequency, self-assertion, denial of harm) and 8-factor (thinking style) 
models (Walters, 2005a). Walters also constructed two composite factors: 1) 
Reactive Criminal Thinking, to measure impulsivity and reaction to environmental 
cues, embodying Egan et al.’s (2000) lack of thoughtfulness factor; and 2) Proactive 
Criminal Thinking, measuring the instrumentality Egan and colleagues identified as 
wilful criminality. Most researchers currently believe that the PICTS structure 
consists of two major factors (Problem Avoidance/Lack of Thoughtfulness and Self-
Assertion/Deception/Wilful Criminality) and two minor factors (a response style 
factor and Denial of Harm) (Walters, 2010). 
The four factor scales were not utilised in this study, due to high correlations 
with other scales and limited evidence to suggest that these scales would add 
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additional information (Walters, 2010). Additionally, the Historical Criminal 
Thinking scale was not used, as the scale measures past identification with a criminal 
belief system (Walters, 2010) that, therefore, cannot be altered with treatment. The 
Current Criminal Thinking (denoting current identification with a criminal belief 
system) and Fear-Of-Change (FOC) scales (measuring apprehension regarding 
change and the degree to which that fear impacts on effective intervention) were 
used as pre-program indicators of treatment needs in the current study. The PICTS 
validity scales were also used, as outlined below.  
 
Violence risk.  
The Violence Risk Scale (VRS; Wong & Gordon, 2000, 2006) was used to 
assess each individual’s risk of violent re-offending (and therefore their suitability 
for the moderate or high intensity violence intervention program) and to examine 
between-cluster differences. The VRS consists of 26 items rated by clinicians on a 4-
point Likert scale from 0 to 3 using information gained from a semi-structured 
interview and file review. A 0-rating indicates that the clinician believes the factor 
has no relationship with the offender’s violence, a 3-rating indicates that the clinician 
believes that the factor has a consistent and significant relationship with the 
offender’s violence. There are six static variables (Current age; Age of first violent 
conviction; Number of juvenile convictions; Violence throughout the lifespan; Prior 
release failures/escapes; Stability of family upbringing) and 20 dynamic variables 
(Violent lifestyle; Criminal personality; Criminal attitude; Work ethic; Criminal 
peers; Interpersonal aggression; Emotional regulation/control; Violence during 
institutionalisation; Weapon use; Insight into violence; Mental illness; Substance 
abuse; Stability of relationships; Community support; Released to high-risk 
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situations; Violence cycle; Impulsivity; Cognitive distortion; Compliance with 
supervision; Security level of releasing institution).  
The total VRS score (the sum of static and dynamic variable ratings) 
indicates the level of violence risk; a higher score indicates greater risk of violence 
and a greater number of problem areas linked to violence (Wong & Gordon, 2006). 
Total VRS scores range from 0 to 78; scores from 0 to 35 indicate low risk of future 
violence, from 36 to 50 indicate moderate risk, and from 51 to 78 indicate high risk. 
Dynamic risk factors rated 2 or 3 are considered problem areas closely linked to 
violence that require treatment (criminogenic needs) (Wong & Gordon, 2006). The 
offender’s Stage of Change (pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, 
maintenance) is rated for each treatment target at initial assessment, and is used post-
treatment to determine response to treatment and reduction in violence risk.  
The VRS risk factors are derived primarily from general personality, 
cognitive and social-learning theories (see Lewis, Olver, & Wong, 2013; Wong & 
Gordon, 2000; also Andrews & Bonta, 2006). The measure is used in many 
correctional services and has been validated on a wide range of populations 
internationally, including adult male offenders, medium-security forensic psychiatry 
patients, high-risk and personality-disordered offenders (Dolan & Fullam, 2007; 
Lewis et al., 2013; Wong & Gordon, 2000, 2006; Wong & Parhar, 2011; Wong et 
al., 2005).The measure has acceptable internal consistency, although Cronbach alpha 
coefficients were somewhat lower in the current study than those reported by Wong 
and Gordon (2006) for the static (.59 v .69), dynamic (.77 v .94) and total VRS (.79 
v .93) scales. Research indicates high interrater reliability (with interclass 
correlations from .80 to over .90) and reasonable concurrent validity (see, e.g., Dolan 
& Fullam, 2007; Lewis et al., 2013; Wong & Gordon, 2006; Wong & Parhar, 2011). 
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Socially desirable responding. 
Two measures of response bias were utilised: the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale – Short Form (MC-C; Reynolds, 1982), a measure of socially 
desirable responding, and the PICTS Confusion-revised and Defensiveness-revised 
validity scales (Walters, 2010), indicators of defensive or overly positive responding.  
The MC-C is a 13-item alternate version of the 33-item Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (MC; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) that was developed to 
measure an individual’s tendency to distort self-presentation toward a socially 
desirable bias. The MC-C uses a forced choice true-false format, and scores range 
from 0 (low social desirability) to 13 (high social desirability). Research indicates 
that the MC-C has acceptable to good psychometric properties, including internal 
consistency scores from .62 to .76 (Ballard, 1992; Loo & Thorpe, 2000; Reynolds, 
1982; Zook & Sipps, 1985) and 6-week test-retest correlations of .74 (Zook & Sipps, 
1985). Andrews and Meyer (2003) have developed forensic norms for the MC-C. 
The PICTS validity scales provide an indication of the presence of ‘fake bad’ 
and ‘fake good’ (defensive, impression management) responding by individuals in 
the sample. On the Confusion-revised scale, T-scores between 65 and 80 indicate 
moderate exaggeration of psychological problems, and scores between 81 and 100 
indicate either a ‘fake bad’ response style, reading or language difficulties or 
haphazard responding (Walters, 2010). While some researchers remove cases with 
scores over 80 and these scores are considered invalid for clinical interpretation, 
Walters (2010) suggests that scores between 81 and 100 may still be valid for 
research purposes. Scores over 100 are considered invalid even for research 
purposes. In the current study, scores between 81 and 100 on the Confusion-revised 
scale were deemed valid and retained, primarily because two of the nine items 
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contributing to this scale score were expected to skew positively given the nature of 
the sample (“Nobody tells me what to do and if they try I will respond with 
intimidation, threats or I might even get physically aggressive”; and “I have trouble 
controlling my angry feelings”) and removal of these cases was considered likely to 
result in an unrepresentative violent offender sample. Cases with scale scores over 
100 were removed.  
Walters (2010) suggests that scores between 55 and 65 on the Defensiveness-
revised scale may indicate potentially moderately defensive responding, or may 
reflect ego strength. Walters further indicates that scores over 65 reflect an extremely 
defensive response style and desire to impression manage that invalidates the profile 
for clinical interpretation, but makes no mention of validity for research. Cases with 
scores in this range were therefore retained. Uncertainty surrounds the underlying 
mechanisms of impression management and defensive responding, and evidence is 
inconclusive for the assumption that high impression management scores indicate 
underreporting of psychopathology or antisocial behaviour by offenders in 
correctional settings (see Appendix E for further information). Data collection often 
occurred at a time of high anxiety and concern that responses could impact on 
decisions including prison release or further treatment recommendations. 
 
Procedure. 
Ethics approval was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee of 
Deakin University and the Department of Justice Ethics Committee. During 
screening assessments with Corrections Victoria prison-based clinical staff, 
participants gave informed consent for data collection for research purposes and 
were advised that all demographic and psychometric data would be de-identified. 
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Corrections Victoria prison-based clinical staff administered the VRS 
interview protocol during the individual assessment of an offender’s suitability to 
participate in the violence intervention program. The same staff then administered a 
test battery (including the STAXI-2, PICTS and MC-C) to individuals found suitable 
for a Moderate or High Intensity Violence Intervention Program prior to program 
commencement, and scored each measure. This test battery included a measure of 
treatment readiness (the Client Evaluation of Self and Treatment [CEST]; Joe, 
Broome, Rowan-Szal, & Simpson, 2002; see also Garner, Knight, Flynn, Morey, & 
Simpson, 2007), however scores from this measure were not available for the current 
study. 
Test scores, demographic characteristics (including age, ethnicity, education, 
employment, marital and parental status) and offending information (including index 
and prior convictions, prior prison sentences and previous compliance with 
community orders) were provided in a de-identified SPSS file. Extensive cleaning of 
the dataset was undertaken due to significant limitations in the data, including 
missing values and incorrectly coded variables. 
 
Data cleaning and screening. 
Seventy-four cases were removed from the original dataset due to missing 
demographic information (index and prior offences) and scores on at least two of the 
three primary measures15. Seven cases in the original sample of 379 had index or 
prior sexual offences. Four cases were deleted due to missing data; the remaining 
three cases were retained for analysis, despite an acknowledgement that previous 
 
15
 These cases may have been those offenders who were assessed as unsuitable for a 
program, based on VRS score, and therefore did not participate in further 
assessment. 
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research has identified unique criminogenic needs of sexual offenders (see Wong, 
Olver, & Stockdale, 2009). Case 1 had an index sexual offence of sexual penetration 
of a child under 16 years, and several prior violent offences, including making 
threats to kill. Case 2 had an index violent offence of murder, and a prior sexual 
offence of aggravated rape. Case 3 had an index violent offence of armed robbery, 
and several prior offences, including attempted rape. The rationale for retaining these 
cases was that the violent offences were serious and current.  
Prior to analysis, data was screened for accuracy of entry, missing values, 
distribution of variables, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and assumptions of 
normality. Where it was clear that data entry errors had been made (with values 
outside test score ranges), these scores were deleted and treated as missing values 
(with the exception of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale – Short Form). 
Several outliers were detected. These were not removed or rescaled: the scores were 
within the possible and expected range for a prison population and considered 
representative of the sample. Furthermore, the mean and the 5% trimmed mean on 
each variable were similar and therefore the cases were retained (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
As noted above, missing values were problematic in this dataset: all STAXI-
2 variables were missing for 17 cases, all PICTS scores for 1 case and all VRS 
variables for 48 cases. In total, 18 cases were excluded from cluster analysis due to 
missing STAXI-2 (n = 1) or PICTS (n = 17) scores, leaving a cluster analysis sample 
of 287 cases. Several other cases were missing scores on at least one scale on a 
measure. For the single case missing several STAXI-2 variables and the single case 
missing several PICTS variables, an expectation maximisation approach was used to 
replace the missing values. Descriptive analyses conducted before and after the 
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missing value replacement procedures indicated minimal differences in means or 
standard deviations as a result of the inputted values. Finally, 40 cases were missing 
scores for at least one VRS variable. Prorated static, dynamic and total VRS scores 
were calculated for these cases using the formula provided in the VRS manual 
(Wong & Gordon, 2000).  
Assumptions of normality were examined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic and indicated a significant result (< .05) on all STAXI-2, PICTS, MC-C and 
VRS items except for the PICTS Reactive Criminal Thinking scale and the total 
VRS score. Further analysis of scatterplots, histograms, skewness and kurtosis 
confirmed that the Reactive Criminal Thinking and total VRS scores were normally 
distributed. The MC-C scores were negatively skewed, and all others were positively 
skewed. This deviation from normality was considered acceptable given the violent 
offender sample, as Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) indicate that such violations are 
common in prison populations and that skewness and kurtosis do not make a 
substantive difference in analysis with reasonably large samples (over 200).  
Raw STAXI-2 and PICTS scores were standardised to improve comparability 
and interpretation using the PICTS gender-specific norms (Walters, 2010) and the 
STAXI-2 gender- and age-specific norms in the STAXI-2 manual (Spielberger, 
1999). Collinearity between variables was examined with Spearman’s rho and 
Cohen’s (1988) guidelines were used to interpret the size of relationships between 
variables. Assumptions of multicollinearity between several of the variables were 
met. Correlations are presented in Appendix D.  
The final stage of the data screening process involved checking the social 
desirability scores for the PICTS and MC-C. Data from the MC-C could not be used 
to identify social desirable responding due to errors in data entry resulting in 
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unreliable data (for further information, please see Appendix E). Examination of 
PICTS validity scales indicated that on the Df-r scale, 47 cases (15.5%) scored 
between 55 and 65 and 6 (2%) scored over 65. On the Cf-r scale, 63 (20.8%) scored 
between 65 and 80, and 9 (3%) scored between 81 and 100. There were no scores 
over 100 on the Cf-r. Therefore, all cases were retained. 
 
Results 
Several sets of results are presented in this section. Firstly, descriptive 
statistics relating to anger and criminal thinking styles for the 305 violent offenders 
are presented, followed by the cluster analysis process and outcomes. 
 
Level of need for treatment. 
Mean pre-program STAXI-2 T-scores on trait anger, anger expression and 
anger control scales were calculated (presented in Table 8) and compared to general 
population norms16. The violent offender sample scored significantly lower on Trait 
Anger (t(939 = 2.02, p < .05), Angry Reaction (t(945) = 7.6, p < .05), Anger Control-
Out (t(953) = 2.72, p < .05) and Anger Control-In (t(945) = 1.68, p < .05), and 
significantly higher on the overall Anger Expression Index (t(907) = 2.24, p < .05). 
Average T-scores for all STAXI-2 scales were below the level at which follow-up 
treatment is recommended (t = 65) (Spielberger, 1999). 
 
 
16
 The STAXI-2 general population norms are based on scores from 1,644 ‘normal 
adults’ (977 females, 667 males), including managerial, technical and clerical 
personnel, participants in stress management programs, health care managers and 
professionals, insurance company employees, and undergraduate and graduate 
students. Prison inmate norms were available for the original STAXI (Spielberger, 
1988), however are not available for the updated STAXI-2 (Spielberger, 1999).  
129 

Table 8  
Mean STAXI-2 Pre-program T-Scores for the 288 Violent Offenders for Whom 
Scores Were Available 
STAXI-2 scale M SD T-score range 
Trait Anger 49.3 12.07 32-80 
Angry Temperament 49.8 11.42 38-80 
Angry Reaction 43.5 9.79 28-78 
Anger Expression-Out 50.7 11.35 26-80 
Anger Expression-In 50.8 11.06 28-80 
Anger Control-Out 45.9 10.89 20-68 
Anger Control-In 47.8 10.19 22-66 
Anger Expression Index 53.0 11.33 24-80 
 
Mean pre-program PICTS T-scores were also calculated (see Table 9) and 
compared to offenders generally. The violent offender group held a moderate level 
of beliefs supportive of a criminal lifestyle (indicated by the General Criminal 
Thinking scale score). Overall, the group demonstrated some signs of hostile, 
impetuous and emotional criminality, engaging in impulsive, disorganised, outer-
directed, non-deliberate criminal actions (indicated by Proactive and Reactive 
Criminal Thinking scale scores), although the difference between these scores was 
insufficient to infer a trend. Average criminal thinking style scores ranged from 47.4 
(Sentimentality) to 56.8 (Cutoff), reflecting the absence of a distinct pattern of 
criminal thinking across the sample, and all at levels that were not excessive relative 
to other offenders. However, the wide ranges of T-scores on each scale demonstrated 
notable variability in responses across the group. The mean Fear of Change score for  
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Table 9  
Mean PICTS Pre-program T-Scores for the 304 Violent Offenders for Whom Scores 
Were Available 
PICTS Scales M SD T-score range 
General Criminal Thinking 52.99 10.27 33-82 
Proactive Criminal Thinking 52.88 10.53 38-87 
Reactive Criminal Thinking 56.26 10.23 39-86 
Confusion-Revised 56.43 11.28 43-95 
Defensiveness-Revised 44.72 10.22 19-76 
Mollification 49.35 9.88 38-80 
Cutoff 56.84 10.33 40-86 
Entitlement 51.83 10.26 38-87 
Power Orientation  51.50 11.16 39-92 
Sentimentality  47.38 9.13 26-75 
Superoptimism 50.46 10.05 34-79 
Cognitive Indolence 53.70 9.35 36-80 
Discontinuity 55.27 10.53 38-82 
Current Criminal Thinking 55.13 10.51 39-84 
Fear of Change 53.65 12.08 36-88 
 
the group was in the average range17. The Current Criminal Thinking scale score also 
fell in the average range (T score < 60), indicating that current belief systems 
consistent with a criminal lifestyle were weak, absent or hidden (Walters, 2010). 
 
  
 
17
 Low scores (T-score < 40) may suggest a general lack of emotional insight, while 
high scores (T-score  60) reflect concern or apprehension about the prospect of 
behavioural change (Walters, 2010). 
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Identifying subtypes of offender. 
Cluster analysis was used to determine whether subtypes of violent offenders 
demonstrated significantly different patterns of anger type and criminal thinking 
styles. The cluster analysis sample consisted of 287 cases. 
The clustering procedure and decision-making process is outlined in full in 
Appendix F. Briefly, given the exploratory nature of this study, a range of variable 
sets were utilised and a hierarchical clustering procedure was initially undertaken to 
identify the number of clusters suggested by the data. Hierarchical clustering 
agglomeration coefficients suggested the possibility of 2-5 clusters. k-means 
clustering was then used to determine the most meaningful and parsimonious 
solution. For each k and each variable set, five sets of random initial runs were 
conducted. Cluster solution stability was indicated by minimal variability in the sum 
of squared distances or cluster membership across each of the five solutions for each 
k, and further clarified with clustering procedure outcomes for each k value on half 
of the sample, randomly selected. Finally, two-step clustering was undertaken to 
validate the clustering solutions. For each k-solution, after selecting the optimal 
cluster solution, cluster composition and the significance of variables in 
distinguishing clusters was examined. Between-group multivariate analyses of 
variance (MANOVA) were conducted with clustering variables as criterion variables 
and cluster membership as the between-group variable. Separate post-hoc one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted using the clustering variables. 
Significance of MANOVA and ANOVA F-tests was expected, given that cluster 
analysis is used to maximise between-cluster differences. 
Several variable sets were analysed to select the most parsimonious and 
clinically meaningful method of identifying violent offenders for rehabilitation 
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programmes. The clustering process began broadly with the General Criminal 
Thinking and Anger Expression Index and gradually became more inclusive, using 
the eight STAXI-2 and eight criminal thinking styles variables to capture meaningful 
cluster differences allowing violent offender subtypes to be identified and classified 
with variables relevant for treatment. The process was then broadened again (using 
the Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, 
Anger Control-Out and eight thinking styles scales) to simplify variables required for 
clustering and reduce multicollinearity. While the clustering analysis processes were 
also undertaken only with anger scales and only with criminal thinking style scales, 
these solutions did not capture the full pattern of interaction explained by using 
anger and thinking style scales to analyse subtypes of violent offenders.  
Selection of the optimal cluster solution involved examination of the 
different cluster solutions looking at internal criteria, including appropriateness of 
cluster size and distribution of scale variables within clusters. The optimal clustering 
solution chosen utilised the five STAXI-2 variables of Trait Anger, Anger 
Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In and Anger Control-Out and 
the eight criminal thinking styles. This was considered the simplest solution that 
provided meaningful information on between-group differences to identify treatment 
targets. In deciding between the 3-cluster and 4-cluster solution for this variable set, 
two-step clustering analyses was undertaken. Results from the two-step analysis 
confirmed that a 3-cluster solution provided the best fit for this group of violent 
offenders. The resulting profile types are described using the clustering variables, 
risk rating, demographic information and the Fear of Change and Current Criminal 
Thinking scales. 
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Cluster descriptions. 
The three clusters consisted of 129, 100 and 58 cases respectively and 
differed significantly on all anger and criminal thinking style measures (p < .05). 
Table 10 provides the mean STAXI-2 and PICTS scale scores for the groups. 
Demographic and offending characteristics for each cluster are provided in Appendix 
G, including ethnicity, education, employment status, marital and parental status, the 
proportion of violent and seriously violent index and prior offences and ANZSOC 
classifications of the most serious index and prior offences. 
 
Between-cluster differences. 
Clusters were compared on demographic factors to ascertain any clear trends 
differentiating the groups. No significant differences were found for offender age, 
marital status, parental status, violent or seriously violent index or prior offences, 
number of prior offences or number of prior community orders. Due to the small 
number of cases in each category, between-cluster differences could not be assessed 
for education attainment, ethnicity, or index or prior offending, although trends 
suggested that Cluster 2 offenders committed a greater proportion of reckless or 
negligent acts, while Cluster 3 had a higher proportion of robbery offences and a 
lower proportion of homicide-related offences (including murder and manslaughter). 
Cluster 3 offenders had served significantly more prison sentences, Ȥ2(2, n = 234) = 
7.52, p < .05. A significantly greater proportion of Cluster 2 offenders engaged in 
employment prior to incarceration, Ȥ2(2, n = 231) = 6.41, p < .05. 
The clusters differed significantly with regard to the proportion of low, 
moderate and high risk offenders, Ȥ2(4, n = 242) = 17.54, p < .01. Cluster 3 had a  
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Table 10  
Mean STAXI-2 and PICTS T-Scores for the Three Clusters 
Measure Cluster 1 
(n = 129) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 100) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 58) 
 M SD M SD M SD 
STAXI-2        
Trait Anger 50.87 9.23 39.34b 5.26 62.93a 11.11 
Angry Temperament 51.01 9.25 41.62 6.20 61.55a 11.57 
Angry Reaction 44.87 8.50 36.54b 6.12 52.79 8.82 
Anger Expression-Out 51.39 8.84 43.40 8.31 61.69a 11.57 
Anger Expression-In  53.42  8.23 43.84  10.61 57.21a 11.13 
Anger Control-Out  43.78  9.00 53.68  9.03 37.10b 8.84 
Anger Control-In  45.69  8.87 54.16  9.30 41.55b 8.64 
Anger Expression Index 56.07  7.83 42.96  7.90 63.76a 9.14 
PICTS        
General Criminal Thinking 54.26d  5.30 43.22  4.89 67.26c 6.88 
Proactive Criminal Thinking 53.45 7.43 44.42  5.14 66.48c 8.17 
Reactive Criminal Thinking  58.74d 6.62 46.75  5.94 66.98c 7.73 
Confusion-revised 57.20 8.92 48.05  6.18 68.47  9.90 
Defensiveness-revised 42.58 7.93 52.92  7.85 35.66  7.99 
Mollification 50.36 7.86 42.49  5.07 59.91  10.49 
Cutoff 59.26 5.97 47.14  6.32 68.17c 7.62 
Entitlement 52.01 7.64 44.40  5.46 64.47c 9.04 
Power Orientation 50.32 6.70 43.78  5.62 67.22c 10.80 
Sentimentality 48.08  8.39 42.82  7.76 53.91  8.80 
Superoptimism 50.01  7.70 43.72  5.26 63.59c 8.68 
Cognitive Indolence 55.88  6.99 45.78  6.48 62.55c 7.57 
Discontinuity 57.36  8.84 47.04  6.80 64.55c 9.16 
Current Criminal Thinking 57.74  7.35 45.51  5.80 65.72c 8.55 
Fear of Change 55.35  10.89 46.24  8.70 63.02c 11.15 
Note. All STAXI-2 scale T-scores below 65. aSTAXI-2 percentile score in high 
range (75th percentile or higher); bSTAXI-2 percentile score in low range (25th 
percentile or lower). cPICTS score in high range; dPICTS score in moderate range, 
indicating problematic use of this distortion. 
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significantly greater proportion of high risk offenders than Clusters 1 or 2. The 
proportion of low, moderate and high risk offenders is outlined in Table 11.  
 
Table 11  
Proportion of Low, Moderate and High Risk Offenders in Each Cluster 
VRS Risk Rating Cluster 1 
(n = 129) 
% 
Cluster 2 
(n = 100) 
% 
Cluster 3 
(n = 58) 
% 
Low Risk 9.3 11.0 0.0 
Moderate Risk 55.8 49.0 41.4 
High Risk 22.5 19.0 44.8 
Missing VRS score 12.4 21.0 13.8 
 
VRS dynamic risk factors were considered treatment targets for a greater 
proportion of Cluster 3 offenders, while Cluster 2 had the lowest proportions, as 
shown in Figure 6. Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to 
determine whether treatment targets different significantly between clusters. While 
the clusters differed significantly on several self-report STAXI-2 and PICTS scale 
scores, this was not reflected in the clinician-assessed VRS dynamic risk factors of 
emotional control and cognitive distortions. The proportion of offenders for whom 
these risk factors were considered treatment targets was not significantly different 
between clusters. Criminal attitudes were considered a treatment target for a 
significantly higher proportion of Cluster 3 violent offenders, Ȥ2(2, n= 240) = 6.22, p 
< .05. For further information, please see Appendix H.  
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Figure 6. Percentage of violent offenders in each cluster for whom VRS dynamic 
risk factors were considered treatment targets. 
 
Discussion 
It was hypothesised that clinically meaningful subtypes of violent offender 
would be evident, differing with respect to treatment needs of anger experience, 
expression and control and the use of criminal thinking to justify offending. Four 
subtypes were hypothesised: (a) instrumental, with strong cognitive distortions and 
normal levels of anger regulation; (b) an undercontrolled type, with reactive 
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violence, strongly held beliefs supportive of a criminal lifestyle, low anger control, 
and likely high risk of violent re-offending; (c) an overcontrolled inhibited type, with 
reactive violence, rumination about provocation that likely colours judgements, and 
fewer criminal beliefs due to a strongly held belief in the importance of inhibiting 
responses; and (d) an overcontrolled conforming-type, with reactive violence, 
weaker criminal beliefs, and likely low risk of violent re-offending. 
The hypothesis was partially met: distinct subtypes were identified on the 
basis of their anger and criminal thinking. The most parsimonious solution that 
provided the best fit for the current violent offender sample was a three-cluster 
solution, identified using the Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-
Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Control-Out and eight Thinking Style scale variables. 
This three cluster solution appeared similar to the three-cluster solutions identified in 
research using personality measures (e.g., using the OH scale), with non-disordered 
samples. The labels of “regulated”, “overregulated” and “unregulated” were chosen 
for the three groups in an attempt to create a distinction from, and avoid confusion 
with, previously identified typologies (e.g., overcontrolled / undercontrolled), as the 
current typologies were based on motivation for violent offending rather than a 
reaction to anger. 
 
Cluster descriptions. 
Cluster 1: “Regulated”. 
Violent offenders in Cluster 1 (n = 129), labelled “regulated”, had average 
scores on all scales, with scores falling between those of the other clusters. All 
STAXI-2 anger scale scores were in the normal range, indicating that these offenders 
described themselves as being unlikely to experience, express and control anger in 
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ways that interfered with optimal functioning. Offenders in this group were more 
prone to experience, outwardly express or suppress their anger and less likely to 
monitor or prevent the outward expression of their anger or attempt to calm down or 
reduce their anger than those in Cluster 2. 
The moderately elevated General Criminal Thinking score indicated that this 
group of violent offenders held belief systems supportive of a criminal lifestyle, and 
showed a trend towards employing Reactive Criminal Thinking that was impulsive, 
disorganised and outer-directed criminal thinking. The group did not appear to 
overtly express thoughts of a proactive or planned criminal nature; rather, the group 
consisted of violent offenders who were hostile, impetuous and emotional, with 
criminal activities related to reactions to situations rather than planning or 
forethought. Furthermore, the group often viewed others with suspicion, and may 
have frequently misinterpreted others’ intentions hostile. A differentiated three-scale 
profile was evident (Cutoff, Discontinuity and Cognitive Indolence), indicating the 
thinking styles most likely to influence Cluster 1 offenders’ actions and decisions. 
The Cutoff scale reflects impulsivity and the tendency to dismiss (or use 
substances to eliminate) common deterrents to crime. The Discontinuity scale 
measures the propensity to lose sight of goals and be easily side-tracked by 
situational events, and is associated with being fragmented, flighty and 
unpredictable. The Cognitive Indolence scale assesses a tendency to take short cuts 
and seek easy solutions to problems, invariably resulting in trouble from those to 
whom the offender is accountable (e.g., parent, spouse, supervisor), and may reflect 
laziness, irresponsibility and a lack of motivation. 
  
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Cluster 2: “Overregulated”. 
Violent offenders in Cluster 2 (n = 100), labelled “overregulated”, had the 
lowest levels of trait anger and anger expression and the highest levels of anger 
control. Trait Anger and Angry Reaction scale scores were in the low range, 
indicating that this group reported generally experiencing relatively little anger. The 
group expressed their anger the least often and work hardest to control their anger by 
preventing the outward expression of anger, or attempting to calm down. While still 
in the normal range, anger control scores were at the upper end of the range, 
indicating a trend toward issues with overcontrol that may result in passivity, 
depression, withdrawal and a lack of awareness of assertive communication. 
Violent offenders in this group had the lowest PICTS scale scores. The 
General Criminal Thinking scale score indicated that any criminal belief system was 
weak, absent or hidden. The group did not appear to overtly express thoughts of a 
proactive or planned criminal nature or exhibit cognitive features associated with 
reactive or impulsive criminality. There was no trend toward either Proactive or 
Reactive Criminal Thinking. The thinking style profile was undifferentiated, with all 
T-scores below 50.  
 
Cluster 3: “Unregulated”. 
Violent offenders in Cluster 3 (n = 58), labelled “unregulated”, had the 
highest levels of trait anger and anger expression and the lowest levels of anger 
control. Trait Anger, Angry Temperament, Anger-Expression-Out, Anger 
Expression-In and Anger Expression Index scale scores were in the high range, 
indicating that these offenders likely experienced and expressed angry feelings in a 
way that interfered with optimal functioning. Anger may have caused difficulty in 
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interpersonal relationships and contributed to the development of medical conditions 
such as high blood pressure or coronary artery disease (Spielberger, 1999). The 
group reported experiencing anger frequently and intensely, were quick-tempered, 
impulsive and lacked anger control, but were not necessarily vicious or vindictive in 
attacking others. They frequently expressed anger through verbally or physically 
aggressive behaviour directed at others or at objects, with little provocation. The 
group had the lowest levels of energy expended in attempting to control their anger, 
however did suppress their intense anger in some situations. 
This group had the highest PICTS scale scores. A current belief system 
supportive of a criminal lifestyle was evident in the moderately high elevation of the 
General and Current Criminal Thinking scales. No trend toward Proactive or 
Reactive Criminal Thinking was evident. The group reported high levels of Proactive 
Criminal Thinking that suggested their thinking was devious, calculating and 
scheming, with goal-directed criminal activity and positive outcome expectancies for 
crime (e.g., money, power or status). The group also reported high levels of Reactive 
Criminal Thinking score, indicating they were generally higher in impulsivity, 
reactivity and lack of restraint than Cluster 1 violent offenders. 
Notably, six of the eight thinking style scores were in the high range at levels 
warranting treatment. A four-scale differentiated profile (Cutoff, Power Orientation, 
Discontinuity and Entitlement) was evident. Cutoff and Discontinuity scale scores 
(described above) were higher than for Cluster 1. The Power Orientation scale 
measures a desire for power and control, and the Entitlement scale reflects a sense of 
ownership, privilege and uniqueness that gives permission to violate the laws and 
rights of others. This group demonstrated the greatest concern or apprehension 
regarding the prospect of behavioural change.  
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Conclusion 
The identification of three subtypes of violent offenders recognises the 
heterogeneity present in the violent offender population. It suggests that anger and 
criminal thinking may not be treatment needs for all violent offenders, and therefore 
that rehabilitation programs may inappropriately target these needs in some violent 
offenders. It is important to examine differences in violent re-offending risk, given 
that this is often a key determinant in whether a violent offender is deemed suitable 
for a violence intervention program. The high risk group had the highest levels of 
anger experience and expression, lowest levels of anger control, and the highest and 
strongest criminal thinking style scores; however, none of these variables were at 
levels considered to warrant treatment according to the authors of the measures 
(Spielberger, 1999; Walters, 1995). Comparisons between clusters revealed that the 
‘unregulated’ group had a significantly greater proportion of high risk offenders, the 
‘regulated’ group had a significantly greater proportion of moderate risk offenders 
and the ‘overregulated’ group demonstrated a trend toward a more low risk 
offenders. 
 
Limitations. 
There are several limitations associated with this study. Firstly, the measures 
of anger and criminal thinking were self-report, and therefore responses may have 
been distorted or affected by comprehension, insight, psychological defensiveness, 
impression management, deception, motivation and the ability to self-reflect and 
report on internal experiences (e.g., Collie et al., 2007). The measure of criminal 
thinking pertained to offending generally; perhaps it would be more appropriate to 
use a violence-specific cognitive measurement (e.g., Maudsley Violence 
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Questionnaire [MVQ; Walker, 2005] or Firestone Assessment of Violent Thoughts 
[FAVT, Doucette-Gates et al., 1999]) to capture the violence cognitions that may 
distinguish subtypes (for further description of these tools, see Appendix I). 
Secondly, the dataset used in the study was problematic, with poorly entered data 
and a number of missing variables, which likely impacted on the quality of the data 
used to identify groups. Thirdly, while a therapist-rated risk assessment tool was 
used, assessments were at times conducted by inexperienced clinicians, and interrater 
reliability could not be determined. The use of clinical judgement and override 
appeared reasonably prevalent, and assessment of risk may have been affected in 
part by factors including availability of the next program, time remaining to an 
offender’s earliest estimated date of release and Adult Parole Board requirements. 
Additionally, the use of the VRS as a risk assessment tool to highlight treatment 
needs results in limited consideration of treatment needs outside of those factors 
measured by the VRS. 
Fourth, multicollinearity was an issue in the variables used to identify 
clusters, and these clustering variables were then used to analyse findings. While the 
variables were ecologically relevant, they were also invariably related (e.g., 
cognition and emotion). Fifth, with regard to ecological validity, while the data came 
from a real treatment environment in prison, the offenders were asked to reflect on 
their criminal thinking styles and anger – this did not measure these factors directly 
as they occurred during the offending episode. Finally, the findings are not 
generalisable. Results are from a single violent offender sample in a medium security 
therapeutic community, a specific cohort of violent offenders specifically selected 
for assessment and treatment in a therapeutic prison. The therapeutic community 
environment likely affects the violent offenders in this sample, with strict caveats on 
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behaviour and possible removal of many offenders who lack motivation or have 
significant difficulty controlling their impulsivity. Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
these differences are arbitrary, not discrete, and raises the question of whether neat 
categories can be imposed on the violent offender population, or whether boundaries 
for classification are always going to be somewhat fuzzy, affected by the research 
samples and psychometric measures used. 
In conclusion, three violent offender types were identified with different 
treatment needs pertaining to anger and criminal thinking styles. Anger and criminal 
thinking do not appear to be criminogenic for all violent offenders, with group scores 
below the levels at which treatment is recommended; however, clear clusters can be 
identified based on their levels of anger and their use of criminal thinking to justify 
their offending.  
 
 
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Chapter 10. Treatment Outcome Study 
Aims and Hypotheses 
This study aims to examine the extent of change in anger, criminal thinking 
and re-offending risk demonstrated by a group of violent offenders following the 
completion of a violence intervention program, and determine whether this differs 
across the subtypes of violent offenders identified in Study 1. The study also aims to 
examine whether these changes affect recidivism rates at two-year follow-up. 
It is hypothesised that the violent offender sample will demonstrate change in 
levels of anger experience, expression and control, patterns of criminal thinking and 
assessed risk of recidivism following program completion, although the extent of 
this change is uncertain. It is further hypothesised that the three subtypes will differ 
in the extent of changes in anger, criminal thinking and violence recidivism risk 
effected by the violent offender treatment program, although no predictions are made 
about the direction of these differences. With regard to rates of re-offending, it is 
hypothesised that the overall sample will have lower rates of violent re-offending 
than the recidivism rates seen in Victoria, and that the clusters will differ with 
respect to recidivism rates, although the extent of this difference is uncertain. 
 
Method 
Participants. 
The dataset used in Study 1 was also used in this study and is described in the 
previous chapter. The dataset contained psychometric measures collected from 
participants following completion of a group-based moderate or high intensity 
violent offender program. The majority of cases from Study 1 either did not 
complete a program, were found unsuitable for a program, or post-program 
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psychometric data was unavailable. After data cleaning procedures, the longitudinal 
sample used in the current study comprised 131 participants (43.1% of the 305 cases 
used in Study 1).  
At the time of post-program assessment, participants were aged between 19 
and 55 years old (M = 32.48 years; SD = 7.54; n = 131). Over 8% of the violent 
offenders who completed a program were Indigenous, a rate that exceeds the 
proportion of Indigenous offenders in Study 1 (7.5%) and the state-wide Indigenous 
adult male imprisonment rate (6.2% in 2010; Corrections Victoria, 2010). Offenders’ 
cultural backgrounds are reported in Table 12. Compared with the overall sample, 
the violent offenders who completed a violence intervention program had higher 
levels of education attainment, with a greater proportion completing secondary, 
tertiary, trade or technical qualifications (17.5% v 13.8%) and a higher rate of pre-
imprisonment employment (43.5% v 40.7%). Most of the sample reported being 
  
Table 12  
Offender-Identified Cultural Background as a Percentage of the 131 Male 
Participants who Completed a Violence Intervention Program 
Ethnicity Treatment completion group 
Australian 62.6 
Indigenous Australian 8.4 
Pacific Islander 2.3 
New Zealander / Maori 2.3 
European 3.1 
Asian 6.9 
Middle Eastern 1.5 
Other 7.6 
Unknown 5.3 
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single (54.3%, n = 116) with at least one child (60.9%, n = 110). Further 
demographic information, including education level, marital and parental status, is 
reported in Appendix I for the longitudinal sample and for the MIVIP and HIVIP 
treatment completer groups.  
The majority of the sample (74.8%) completed the moderate intensity 
program (MIVIP) while the remainder completed the high intensity program 
(HIVIP). These programs are described below. The MIVIP completion group were 
aged 19 to 52 years (M = 32.3 years, SD = 7.0; n = 98) at post-program assessment 
and the HIVIP completion group were aged between 20 and 55 years (M = 33.1 
years; SD = 9.0; n = 33) at pre-program assessment. A greater proportion of 
Indigenous Australian and Pacific Islander males completed the HIVIP (15.2% and 
6.1% respectively) than the MIVIP (6.1% and 1% respectively); the reverse trend 
was seen in participants of European and Asian descent. The HIVIP completers had 
higher levels of education attainment and higher rates of unemployment prior to 
incarceration than the MIVIP completers. 
Using the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) criteria to classify offences, 72.5% of 
the 131 cases had committed violent index offences, 26.7% of which were serious 
violent offences. The most prevalent index offences were armed robbery or 
attempted armed robbery (22.1%), intentionally causing serious injury (19.1%), 
aggravated burglary (11.5%), recklessly causing serious injury (7.6%), murder or 
attempted murder(5.3%), manslaughter (3.8%), cause serious injury (3.1%), robbery 
(3.1%), intentionally cause injury (2.3%), make threat to kill (2.3%) and reckless 
cause injury (2.3%), burglary (1.5%) and kidnapping (1.5%). The index offence 
charge was unavailable for 6.1% of the sample. 
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Most offenders (85.5%) had prior convictions, with an average 2.7 prior 
offences (SD = 1.5). Many (64.9%) had committed at least one violent prior offence, 
including 16% who had committed serious violent prior offences. Prior offending 
history was unavailable for 8.4%, and 6.1% had no prior offences. Offenders had 
served on average 4.3 prior prison sentences (SD = 4.02; n = 111) and 1.8 
community orders (SD = 2.61; n = 98). Both the MIVIP and HIVIP groups had 
completed similar numbers of prior prison and community sentences (see Appendix 
I). Prior offending and sentencing statistics were again considered underestimates, as 
data was limited to offending within Victoria and prior offending was underreported 
in data collection. Current and prior offending characteristics are provided in 
Appendix I, including the proportion of offenders in the longitudinal sample and the 
MIVIP and HIVIP treatment completer groups with violent and serious violent index 
and prior offences and the average number of prior offences, breaches, prior prison 
sentences and community orders served.  
Offence types were classified using the ANZSOC (ABS, 2011a) and NOI 
(ABS, 2009) frameworks. The proportion of offences in each division for the overall 
sample is reported in Table 13. The majority of index and prior offences were 
located in the first six divisions, relating to culpable acts resulting in harm against a 
specific person (ABS, 2011a). The ANZSOC classifications for the most serious 
index and prior offences for the MIVIP and HIVIP treatment completers is provided 
in Appendix I.  
Violent re-offending risk was assessed using the VRS (Wong & Gordon, 
2006). At pre-program assessment, the greatest proportion of the treatment completer 
sample had been assessed as being at moderate risk of violent re-offending (see  
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Table 13  
Most Serious Index and Prior Offences, Categorised Using the NOI and ANZSOC 
Classification Systems, as a Percentage of the 131 Treatment Completers 
Division Treatment completers 
 Index Prior 
01 Homicide and related offences 11.5 9.2 
02 Acts intended to cause injury 26.0 37.4 
03 Sexual assault and related offences 0.0 0.8 
04 Dangerous or negligent acts endangering persons 12.2 2.3 
05 Abduction, harassment and other offences against the 
person 
1.5 1.5 
06 Robbery, extortion and related offences 25.2 16.8 
07 Unlawful entry with intent/burglary, break and enter 13.0 12.2 
08 Theft and related offences 1.5 3.1 
09 Fraud, deception and related offences 0.0 0.0 
10 Illicit drug offences 0.8 1.5 
11 Prohibited and regulated weapons and explosives 
offences 
0.8 0.0 
12 Property damage and environmental pollution 0.8 0.0 
13 Public order offences 0.0 0.0 
14 Traffic and vehicle regulatory offences 0.0 0.0 
15 Offences against government procedures, government 
security and government operations 
0.0 0.0 
16 Miscellaneous offences 0.0 0.8 
No offences 0.0 6.1 
Unknown 6.9 8.4 
Totala 100.2 100.1 
aTotals do not add to 100% due to rounding. 

Table 14). As expected, a higher proportion of high risk offenders completed the 
HIVIP and a greater proportion of moderate risk offenders completed the MIVIP – 
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the level of assessed risk forms the basis for determining the intensity of the program 
that the offender is recommended for. 
 
Table 14  
Percentage of Offenders in Each Violent Recidivism Risk Category at Pre-program 
Assessment for the Treatment Completer Group and Separated by Program Type 
Violence Risk Scale 
(VRS) rating 
Treatment 
completers 
(n = 131) 
MIVIP Treatment 
completers 
(n = 98) 
HIVIP Treatment 
completers 
(n = 33) 
High risk 19.1 5.1 60.6 
Moderate risk 71.8 83.7 36.4 
Low risk 6.9 9.2 0.0 
Unknown 2.3 2.0 3.0 
 
Limitations in the dataset affected the calculation of the average interval 
between pre-program and post-program testing. Data was missing or clearly 
incorrectly entered (with post-testing dates preceding pre-testing dates) for a 
significant number of cases, and this restricted the sample available for the treatment 
outcome study. For example, post-program test scores were available for only 168 of 
the 305 cases in Study 1; of these, 16.7% did not have completion dates recorded for 
pre-program or post-program assessments, and 4.2% had input errors, with data 
suggesting that post-program testing occurred before pre-program testing. Removal 
of these cases resulted in a total final sample of 131 cases in the current study, with 
an average interval between pre-program and post-program assessment of 232.2 days 
(SD = 157.64, n = 103). This average interval was substantially longer than program 
duration as pre-program scoring of the VRS was often completed several months 
prior program commencement. 
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Measures. 
Psychometric measures. 
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999), 
Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS; Walters, 2010) and 
Violence Risk Scale (VRS; Wong & Gordon, 2006) were used in Study 2. These 
measures were described in Study 1.  
The STAXI-2 and PICTS were used to investigate levels of trait anger, anger 
expression, anger control and patterns of criminal thinking styles prior to and post-
program. The VRS was used to assess pre-program violent re-offending risk and 
post-program response to treatment for all identified treatment targets. Socially 
desirable responding was assessed using the PICTS Confusion-revised and 
Defensiveness-revised scales18. The PICTS Fear-of-Change (FOC) scale was used to 
determine offenders’ levels of concern or apprehension about the prospect of 
behavioural change prior to and following program completion, to assess whether 
levels of fear changed and whether FOC scale responses were associated with the 
extent of change on other scales. 
 
Recidivism. 
Every effort was made to obtain data from Corrections Victoria pertaining to 
subsequent re-offending by prisoners in the sample. Unfortunately, the extraction of 
recidivism data for this cohort required resources that Corrections Victoria could not 
provide to the project and the information could not be obtained from other sources. 
 
18
 As with Study 1, data was collected using the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale – Short Form (MC-C; Reynolds, 1982), however due to data 
collection errors, this measure could not be used as an indicator of impression 
management or socially desirable responding (see Appendix E). 
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Re-offending data were therefore not available, preventing the examination of the 
effects on recidivism of any change in the use of criminal thinking or the experience, 
expression or control of anger. That is, the influence of program completion and 
addressing of treatment needs on rates of re-offending, a key component of any 
program evaluation, could not be ascertained.  
 
Violence Intervention Program (VIP). 
The violence intervention program completed by offenders in the current 
sample is delivered at the Marngoneet Correctional Centre, a medium-security 
therapeutic prison in Victoria in which all prisoners participate as members of the 
neighbourhood community. The 394-bed facility is arranged in four neighbourhoods, 
each with a targeted clinical purpose: violence, drug and alcohol abuse, employment 
and parenting, and sexual offending (and protection). Offenders transferring to 
Marngoneet Correctional Centre must have a minimum of 6 months left to serve, be 
assessed as moderate to high risk of general re-offending and have a medium or 
minimum security classification.  
Participants are initially screened with a Victorian Intervention Screening 
Assessment Tool (VISAT; Ross, Pollard, Van den Bossche, Thomas, & Brown, 
2005) Risk/Need Assessment completed by assessment officers after being 
sentenced and imprisoned to identify areas that may require further assessment. After 
reception into the violence neighbourhood, participants are assessed with a clinician-
administered risk/need analysis if their VISAT violence module score is one or 
greater. If the clinical analysis outcome indicates suitability for offence-specific 
treatment, participants are then assessed for violence intervention program 
eligibility. Program criteria include a history of violent offending (at least two 
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current or prior violent convictions), assessment of moderate to high violent 
recidivism risk (assessed using the VRS) and treatment readiness (assessed by 
clinical judgement of issues including mental health, intellectual capacity and group 
dynamics). Prior to undertaking the violence intervention program, participants 
complete a 6-session module aimed at increasing treatment readiness and motivation, 
exploring ambivalence to change, increasing self-efficacy, encouraging preparation 
for change and increasing familiarity with group process.  
Two versions of the violence intervention program are delivered at 
Marngoneet Correctional Centre: the 180-hour, 6-month high intensity program 
(HIVIP) delivered three times per week, and the 120-hour, 4-month moderate 
intensity program (MIVIP) delivered twice a week. Typically, scores on the VRS 
determine the program intensity that an offender receives: scores between 35 and 50 
facilitate a referral to the moderate intensity program, and scores of 51 and above 
result in referral to the high intensity program. Clinical override can be used if an 
offender’s risk score appears inconsistent with their presentation, offending history 
and treatment needs. The program is multi-modal, incorporating cognitive 
behavioural treatment and anger management. Based on the multifactorial Social 
Learning Theory and Social Cognitive Theory, the program incorporates personal 
attributes, situational factor, cognitions and emotions and adopts best practice 
principles. The program aims to reduce violent re-offending risk by increasing self-
awareness and self-management, improving conflict resolution and problem solving 
skills, and better regulating affective responses and behavioural outcomes.  
The HIVIP and MIVIP incorporate the same seven core modules: 
1. Introduction, including group forming, defining violence, introducing the 
cognitive behavioural model and core beliefs;  
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2. Life Pathways, including significant life events, core beliefs and 
decision-making processes;  
3. Offence Process, including violent offending patterns, offence 
similarities and differences, offending-related thoughts, feelings, beliefs 
and behaviours;  
4. Prosocial Thinking, incorporating intensive cognitive-behavioural 
treatment addressing thinking errors, cognitive distortions and schemas; 
5. Managing Emotions (HIVIP) or Anger and Violence (MIVIP), 
incorporating recognition, control and management strategies for 
emotions, including anger; 
6. Victim Awareness, addressing personal experiences of victimisation, 
empathy, and recognising impacts of violence; and 
7. Self-Management, including identifying risk factors and strategies, social 
supports and goal setting. 
Several supplementary modules were also delivered to offenders in the 
current sample as adjunct to the moderate and high intensity program addressing 
particular areas of treatment need: Interpersonal Relationships, Masculinity and 
Violence, and Substance Use and Violence. The violence programs incorporate 
psychometric measures administered prior to and following program completion. 
After finishing the program, most participants are transferred to other prisons prior to 
release on parole. 
 
Procedure. 
The procedure for ethics approval, data collection and data provision to 
researchers was outlined previously in Study 1. A test battery including the STAXI-2 
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and PICTS were administered by Corrections Victoria prison-based clinical staff on 
the final day of group-based programs to offenders who completed the moderate or 
high intensity violence intervention program at the treatment prison. Corrections 
Victoria clinical staff then scored each measure and completed the stage of change 
component of the VRS interview protocol following program completion. Data were 
provided to researchers in a de-identified SPSS file. Extensive cleaning of the dataset 
was undertaken by the researchers due to significant limitations in the data, including 
missing values and incorrectly coded variables. 
 
Data screening and cleaning. 
Missing data was a significant issue in this study. Of the 305 cases used in 
Study 1, 194 (63.6%) completed a violence intervention program. Several cases 
(12.8%) did not complete a program (perhaps due to unsuitability for a group-based 
program or because of time constraints before their Earliest Estimated Date of 
release [EED]), and information pertaining to program completion was unavailable 
for 23.6%. Post-program psychometric data was available for only 132 of the cases 
who completed a program. One case was subsequently removed due to invalid 
responding on post-program assessment measures (see below). Removal of this case 
resulted in a final sample of 131 male offenders. Of the three cases with sexual 
offences (see Study 1), one case was utilised in the longitudinal sample: Case 2, with 
an index violent offence of murder and a prior sexual offence of aggravated rape. 
As with Study 1, data were screened prior to analysis for accuracy of entry, 
missing values, distribution of variables, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and 
assumptions of normality. Where it was clear that data entry errors had been made, 
with values outside test score ranges, these scores were deleted and treated as 
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missing values (with the exception of the MC-C scale). Several outliers were 
detected. These were not removed or rescaled as the scores were within the possible 
and expected range for a prison population and considered representative of the 
sample. Furthermore, given the similarity between the mean and the 5% trimmed 
mean on each variable, the cases were retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
As noted earlier, missing values were problematic in this dataset, including 
for post-program psychometric measures: all STAXI-2 variables were missing for 31 
cases, all PICTS scores for 32 case and all VRS stage of change variables for 19 
cases. No case was missing values on more than one measure. No missing value 
replacement methods were used for the STAXI-2 or PICTS missing values. Given 
the small sample size and the significant number of cases with missing values on a 
single measure, replacing values was considered likely to impact on the accuracy of 
the representation of responses. Finally, for the 61 cases missing at least one VRS 
variable, post-program VRS scores on these variables were calculated by subtracting 
the Stage of Change score from the pre-program VRS score, following the process of 
calculating post-program VRS scores outlined by Wong and Gordon (2006). 
Assumptions of normality were examined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic and indicated a significant result (< .05) on all STAXI-2, PICTS, MC-C and 
VRS items except for the STAXI-2 Anger Control-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger 
Expression Index scales, PICTS Cutoff and Defensiveness scales and the total VRS 
score. Further analysis of scatterplots, histograms, skewness and kurtosis confirmed 
that the Anger Control-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Expression Index, Cutoff, 
Defensiveness and total VRS score scales were normally distributed. All other scores 
were positively skewed. This deviation from normality was considered acceptable 
given the violent offender sample, as Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) indicate that such 
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violations are common in prison populations, however the small sample size 
increases the vulnerability of analyses to violations of the normality assumption. 
Raw PICTS and STAXI-2 scores were standardised to assist with comparability and 
interpretation using the PICTS gender-specific norms (Walters, 2010) and STAXI-2 
gender- and age-specific norms (Spielberger, 1999).  
 
Socially desirable responding. 
As noted in Study 1, data from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale – Short Form could not be used due to errors in data entry that resulted in 
unreliable data. Several PICTS validity scales were also examined. Inspection of the 
data revealed that no participant failed to answer more than five of the PICTS items. 
On the Df-r scale, 14 cases (10.7%) scored between 55 and 65 and 1 (0.8%) scored 
over 65. On the Cf-r scale, 8 cases (6.1%) scored between 65 and 80 and 2 cases 
(1.5%) scored between 81 and 100. One case scored over 100 on the Cf-r; this case 
was removed as responding was invalid for research purposes (Walters, 2010). These 
findings suggest that respondents may have engaged in less impression management 
in post-program responding. No significant differences in impression management or 
‘faking bad’ were found between offenders assessed as being at low, moderate or 
high risk of re-offending post-program.  
 
Results 
Several sets of results are presented in this section. Firstly, changes in pre- 
and post-program anger, thinking style and violence recidivism risk scores of the 131 
violent offenders are examined. Differences in post-program measures between the 
clusters identified in Study 1 are examined, followed by an analysis of changes from 
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pre-program to post-program within and between changes. Program effects for the 
MIVIP and HIVIP are also presented, to identify whether any differential effects 
observed across clusters are artefacts of program intensity. 
 
Group analyses: Pre- and post-program comparisons. 
Pre- and post-program average STAXI-2, PICTS and VRS scores were 
compared for the 131 treatment completers group to examine post-program change. 
 
Changes in anger and criminal thinking. 
Mean STAXI-2 post-program scale scores were in the normal range for the 
group on all scales except for the Angry Reaction scale score, which fell in the low 
range. Average pre-program and post-program STAXI-2 scale scores were 
significantly different (p < .05) on all scales, with the exception of Anger Control-
Out (p > .05). Paired-sample tests and effect sizes are reported in Table 15. Post-
program scores were significantly lower than pre-program scores on Trait Anger, 
Angry Temperament, Angry Reaction, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Expression In 
and Anger Expression Index, with small to moderate effect sizes. Anger Control-In 
was significantly higher following program completion, with a small effect size.  
All post-program PICTS scale scores were in the average range, suggesting 
that any criminal belief system held by the overall violent offender treatment 
completer group was weak, absent or hidden. In comparing PICTS scores from pre-
program and post-program assessment, the 131 violent offenders who completed 
treatment scored significantly lower on all of the eight criminal thinking styles, 
General Criminal Thinking, Proactive Criminal Thinking, Reactive Criminal  
 

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Thinking, Current Criminal Thinking and Fear of Change scales (p < .05), with small 
to medium effect sizes. Effect sizes are outlined in Table 15. 
 
Change in violence risk. 
Comparison of pre- and post-program VRS scores for the 131 cases indicated 
significant change (Ȥ2(4,112) = 45.32, p < .01) in the proportion of offenders at each 
risk level. VRS scores were unavailable for 2.3% of cases pre-program and 14.5% 
post-program. The proportion of low risk offenders increased from 6.9% pre-
program to 15.3% post-program, while the proportion of high risk offenders 
remained constant (19.1%). The proportion of moderate risk offenders reduced from 
71.8% pre-program to 51.1% post-program. Regarding individual-level risk 
assessment change, of the seven cases assessed as being at low risk pre-program, 
five remained low risk; the risk assessment of two indicated increased risk 
(moderate) post-program. Eighty-five cases were assessed pre-program as being at 
moderate risk; post-program, 60 remained at moderate risk, 10 were low risk and 11 
were high risk. Finally, of the 20 cases assessed as being at high risk of violent re-
offending pre-program, 14 remained high risk post-program, 5 were moderate risk 
and 1 was assessed as being at low risk. 
The violent offenders demonstrated change in several of the treatment targets 
associated with violence following program completion (see Figure 7). Pre-program 
values were calculated by determining the proportion of the sample with ratings of 2 
or 3 on each dynamic risk factor. Post-program scores of 2 and above remained 
treatment targets; scores below two indicated that the risk factor no longer warranted 
treatment. As the figure demonstrates, the proportion of violent offenders requiring 
treatment for each dynamic risk factor generally reduced from pre-program to post-  
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Figure 7. Percentage of violent offenders for whom VRS dynamic risk factors were 
considered treatment targets (rated 2 or 3) prior to and following the VIP. 
 
program. Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the same for each of the HIVIP and MIVIP 
treatment completer groups.  
As Figures 7, 8 and 9 demonstrate, change was observed in the percentage of 
violent offenders assessed as having treatment targets of violent lifestyle, criminal 
attitudes, criminal personality, interpersonal aggression, emotional control, weapon 
use, substance abuse, stability of relationships, community support, release to high 
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Figure 8. Percentage of the violent offenders whom completed the HIVIP for whom 
VRS dynamic risk factors were rated 2 or 3 pre-program and post-program. 
 
risk situations, violence cycle, impulsivity, compliance with community supervision 
and security level of anticipated release institution. The dramatic change in the latter 
treatment target likely reflects the clinician-anticipated move of many treatment 
completers to minimum security facilities following program completion, to assist 
with re-integration processes.  
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Figure 9. Percentage of the violent offenders whom completed the MIVIP for whom 
VRS dynamic risk factors were rated 2 or 3 pre-program and post-program. 
 
Within-cluster comparisons: Pre- and post-program. 
The characteristics of the cases in each cluster who completed a violence 
intervention program are outlined in Appendix J, including the most serious offence 
type19. Mean pre- and post-program STAXI-2 and PICTS scores for each cluster are 
 
19
 Categorised using the ANZSOC (ABS, 2011a) and NOI (ABS, 2009) 
classification systems. 
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provided in Table 16. Average pre-program and post-program scores were compared 
within each cluster using paired-samples t-tests. These are presented in Table 17. 
 
Cluster 1: “Regulated”. 
In Cluster 1, paired-samples t-tests indicated that post-program scores were 
significantly lower than pre-program scores on the Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In 
and Anger Expression Index scales and significantly higher on the Anger Control-
Out and Anger Control-In scales (p < .05), with moderate to large effect sizes (eta 
squared = .10 to .28). There were no significant differences on the Angry 
Temperament, Angry Reaction and Anger Expression-Out scales between pre- and 
post-program testing. All anger scale scores remained in the normal range.  
Post-program, criminal thinking style scale scores for violent offenders in 
Cluster 1 were all in the average range, suggesting that any criminal belief system 
held by offenders in this cluster was absent, weak or hidden, and that offenders in 
this cluster did not overtly express proactive criminal thoughts or engage in 
impulsive criminality. Post-program scores were significantly lower than pre-
program scores on the General Criminal Thinking, Proactive Criminal Thinking, 
Reactive Criminal Thinking, Mollification, Cutoff, Sentimentality, Cognitive 
Indolence, Discontinuity, Current Criminal Thinking and Fear of Change scales (p < 
.05), with moderate to large effect sizes (eta squared = .12 to .36). There were no 
significant differences on the Entitlement, Power Orientation or Superoptimism 
thinking style scales between pre- and post-program testing. While the three-scale 
elevation observed in the pre-program scores (Cutoff, Discontinuity and Cognitive 
Indolence) was visible in the pattern of post-program scores, this could not be 
interpreted as scores were below the level recommended for profile interpretation. 
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Cluster 2: “Overregulated”. 
Paired samples t-tests indicated that two scales were significantly lower 
following program completion: the Anger Control-Out scale, t(26) = 2.93, p < .01, 
with a large effect size (eta squared = .25), and the Power Orientation thinking style 
scale, t(27) = 2.17, p < .05, with a large effect size (eta squared = .15). There were 
no significant differences between pre- and post-program testing on any other anger 
or criminal thinking style scale. Trait Anger and Angry Reaction scores remained in 
the low range, indicating that the violent offenders in this cluster experience 
relatively little anger generally. All other anger scale scores remained in the normal 
range, and all criminal thinking style scales were in the average range.  
 
Cluster 3: “Unregulated”. 
Cluster 3 violent offenders demonstrated the greatest reduction in anger and 
thinking style scale scores. Paired sample t-tests indicated that Cluster 3 pre-program 
and post-program scores were significantly different (p < .05) on all anger scales 
with the exception of Anger Expression-In (p > .05), with large effect sizes (eta 
squared = .21 to .37). The Anger Control-In and Anger Control-Out scales were 
significantly higher post-program, while all other scales (except Anger Expression-
In) were significantly lower following program completion. Scores on the STAXI-2 
obtained following program completion were all in the normal range.  
Post-program scores were significantly lower (p < .05) on all PICTS scales, 
with the exception of the Superoptimism scale which was not significantly different 
between pre- and post-program testing (p = .05). The effect size for each of the 
significant PICTS scale differences was large (eta squared = .18 to .54). While the 
General Criminal Thinking, Proactive Criminal Thinking and Reactive Criminal  
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Thinking scales remained moderately elevated, the elevations were less than pre-
program. Following program completion, only the Superoptimism thinking style 
remained in the high range, with the seven other thinking style scales in the average 
range. Notably, the Superoptimism scale was not in the original 4-scale 
differentiated elevation pre-program. The post-program thinking style profile was 
undifferentiated. 
 
Between-cluster comparisons: Post-program scores and pre- and post-
program changes. 
Post-program anger and criminal thinking measure scores were compared 
across the three clusters using multivariate analyses of variance to determine whether 
the significant differences seen pre-program remained at post-program assessment. 
Tests of between-subject effects were significant (p < .05) for all thinking style 
variables and anger variables, with the exception of the anger control variables 
(Anger Control-In and Anger Control-Out). Closer inspection revealed that Clusters 
2 and 3 had significantly different (p < .05) post-program scores on the Trait Anger, 
Angry Temperament, Angry Reaction, Anger Expression-Out and Anger Expression 
Index scales, while Clusters 1 and 2 differed (p < .05) on the Anger Expression-In 
scale. There were no other significant between-cluster differences on anger scales. 
The three clusters were significantly different (p < .05) on all thinking style variables 
with the exception of Clusters 1 and 3 on the Sentimentality, Discontinuity, Current 
Criminal Thinking and Fear of Change scales and Clusters 1 and 2 on 
Sentimentality, Superoptimism and Fear of Change scales. Notably, Clusters 2 and 3 
had significantly different scores on all variables.  
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Mixed between-within subjects analyses of variance were then conducted to 
determine whether the treatment completer group and the three clusters demonstrated 
similar or differing levels of change on the anger and criminal thinking style 
variables following completion of a VIP. There were significant interactions between 
cluster membership and each of the anger variables (with the exception of Anger 
Expression-In) and PICTS variables (with the exception of Sentimentality, 
Superoptimism and Fear of Change). There were moderate to large main effects for 
all STAXI-2 and PICTS variables (except Anger Control-Out). The main effect 
comparing the three clusters was significant on all variables, suggesting the three 
clusters had significantly different amounts of change between pre-program and 
post-program assessment on all PICTS and STAXI-2 variables. Table 19 provides 
the F statistics for the interaction effects, main effects and between-subjects effects. 
The proportion of offenders who completed the MIVIP and the HIVIP were 
compared between the groups to examine whether differences in outcomes may have 
been a reflection of treatment intensity (see Table 18). Clusters differed significantly 
 
Table 18  
Percentage of Offenders in Each Cluster (Identified in Study 1) Who Subsequently 
Completed a Moderate or High Intensity Violence Intervention Program 
Program Intensity Cluster 1 
(n = 129) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 100) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 58) 
Moderate intensity VIP  46.5 43.0 34.5 
High intensity VIP  21.7 15.0 25.9 
No program completed  7.0 17.0 17.2 
Treatment completion uncertaina 24.8 25.0 22.4 
aIncludes those who were found unsuitable for a program, did not complete a 
program that they began, did not have post-program psychometric measures 
recorded or did not have program completion information recorded. 
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in the intensity of the program completed, Ȥ2(4, n = 217) = 9.48, p < .05. More 
Cluster 1 and 2 offenders completed the MIVIP and more Cluster 3 offenders 
completed the HIVIP. 
There was no significant interaction between cluster membership and VRS 
risk rating after program completion (Ȥ2 (4, n = 106) = 2.92, p = .57) (see Table 20). 
The proportion of high risk offenders in Cluster 3 was lower after program 
completion. 
 
Table 20  
Percentage of Offenders in Each Violence Recidivism Risk Category By Cluster at 
Pre-program and Post-program Assessment 
VRS Risk Rating Cluster 1 
(n = 59) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 41) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 24) 
 Pre-
program 
Post-
program 
Pre-
program 
Post-
program 
Pre-
program 
Post-
program 
Low Risk 8.5 16.9 7.3 19.5 0.0 4.2 
Moderate Risk 76.3 52.5 75.6 51.2 58.3 50.0 
High Risk 15.3 18.6 12.2 14.6 37.5 20.8 
Missing VRS score 0.0 11.9 4.9 14.6 4.2 25.0 
 
The proportion of violent offenders in each cluster for whom VRS risk 
factors remained treatment targets post-program is depicted in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. Percentage of violent offenders in each cluster with VRS dynamic risk 
factor ratings of 2 or 3 pre-program (top graph) and post-program (bottom graph). 
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Discussion 
It was hypothesised that the violent offender sample would demonstrate 
change in levels of anger experience, expression and control, patterns of criminal 
thinking and assessed risk of violence recidivism following the completion of a 
violence intervention program, although the extent of change was not predicted. This 
hypothesis was supported. After completing the MIVIP or HIVIP, the violent 
offender sample reported a reduction in the frequency of self-reported anger 
experience and expression, and an increase in the frequency of attempts to control 
angry feelings through actively calming themselves. There was no significant change 
in the frequency of attempts to control outward anger expression. The sample 
demonstrated a reduction in the strength or presence of a belief system supportive of 
a criminal lifestyle and in the use of all eight criminal thinking styles thought to 
support and maintain a criminal lifestyle. The group also appeared to demonstrate a 
significant reduction in assessed risk of violent re-offending, with an increase in the 
number of low risk offenders in the sample and a reduction in the number of 
moderate risk offenders. However, when examined more closely, several offenders 
initially assessed as being at low risk were subsequently considered at moderate risk 
(2 of 7 cases), and several initially considered moderate risk were later assessed as 
being at high risk of re-offending (11 of 85 cases). This may reflect an increase in 
risk of violent recidivism as a result of treatment. A more likely explanation, 
however, may be that these offenders minimised their level of risk in pre-program 
assessment but were unable to sustain this ‘fake good’ presentation for the duration 
of the program, with disclosures during program providing facilitators with 
information to re-score the dynamic risk factors more accurately. 
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It was then hypothesised that the three violent offender subtypes identified in 
Study 1 would demonstrate differential change in anger, criminal thinking and 
violence risk following the completion of a violence intervention program, although 
no predictions were made about the direction of these differences. This hypothesis 
was met. Cluster 1 (‘regulated’) violent offenders demonstrated significantly lower 
scores on most anger experience and expression scales, significant improvement on 
both anger control scales and a significant reduction in the strength or presence of 
most criminal thinking styles after completing a violence intervention program. 
Cluster 2 (‘overregulated’) violent offenders demonstrated significant reductions in 
the frequency of attempts to control outward anger expression and in the use of the 
Power Orientation thinking style (controlling people and situations with aggressive 
displays); no other changes were observed in this cluster.  
Cluster 3 (‘unregulated’) violent offenders demonstrated the greatest change 
in anger and thinking style scale scores, with significant reductions on all anger 
experience and expression scales (apart from Anger Expression-In, measuring 
frequency of anger suppression), significant increases in anger control scales, and 
significant reductions in the use of all criminal thinking styles (except for 
Superoptimism, signifying a lack of consequential thinking or overestimating the 
ability to avoid negative consequences). Differences between pre- and post-program 
scores on anger and criminal thinking styles measures were significantly different 
between the three clusters (apart from the Anger Expression-In and Sentimentality 
scales). The unregulated group demonstrated the greatest amount of change between 
pre- and post-program assessment, while the overregulated group demonstrated the 
least amount of change. 
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Finally, it was hypothesised that the overall sample would demonstrate lower 
re-offending rates at 2-year follow-up than the rates of re-offending in Victoria 
generally, and that the groups would differ with regard to the extent of change in re-
offending rates. This hypothesis could not be tested as re-offending data could not be 
obtained. 
These findings suggest that different types of violent offenders gained 
differential benefit from the completion of the multi-modal violence intervention 
program. The unregulated group appeared to gain the most benefit from treatment, at 
least in demonstrating the most change in problematic criminal thinking styles and 
anger, although this may have signified regression toward average scores – the group 
with the highest scores had the most room to change. The regulated group also 
appeared to gain some benefit in reducing the strength of criminal thinking and 
improving management of anger. The overregulated group, however, appeared to 
gain minimal benefit from completing the program, with few changes in anger or 
criminal thinking.  
There are several possible explanations for these findings. The most obvious 
explanation for this is that the overregulated group did not experience difficulties in 
these areas prior to the program, and therefore (as would be expected), there was 
limited change effected by a program that attempted to address these issues. What is 
somewhat concerning, however, is that cases in this group had higher scores on 
measures of strength of distortions and anger experience and reported making fewer 
attempts to control anger expression. While these findings were not statistically 
significant (perhaps due to the small sample size), the effect size was moderate to 
large on several scales. This may therefore reflect a deterioration in these treatment 
needs following program completion. Alternatively, it may reflect an increase in 
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insight and awareness of the presence of anger or criminal thinking or the 
recognition of problems associated with overcontrolled anger that was not present 
prior to program completion, or an increased willingness to be honest about their 
experience and subsequent learning of strategies to manage these issues. Similarly, 
the regulated and unregulated groups may have had more insight initially into their 
issues with criminal thinking and anger experience, expression and control.  
Alternatively, given that the program contained elements aimed at addressing 
treatment needs evident in the regulated and unregulated groups prior to the 
program, these two groups may have engaged more with program content, and 
therefore obtained greater benefit than the overregulated group. Based on the 
availability of post-program scores for the three groups, the overregulated group may 
have had the greatest attrition rate from the program, although definitive conclusions 
regarding attrition rates cannot be drawn. Levels of motivation and willingness to 
participate in a program may have been enhanced in the unregulated and regulated 
groups by stronger beliefs about Adult Parole Board expectations regarding program 
completion, given the higher proportion of violent and serious violent offences in 
these groups.  
The proportion of violent and serious violent20 offences in the overregulated 
group was higher than may have been expected given the group’s low levels of anger 
and criminal thinking. This rate appeared somewhat consistent with previous 
findings regarding levels of serious violent offending by overcontrolled groups (e.g., 
D'Silva & Duggan, 2010; Verona & Carbonell, 2000), although in contrast to these 
studies, the overregulated group had the lowest levels of violent and serious violent 
offending when compared to the unregulated and regulated groups. 
 
20
 Categorised according to Schedules 1 and 2 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 
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Other potential explanations for the finding of differential programs 
outcomes include the nature of the therapeutic relationship between program 
facilitators and prisoners. Program facilitators may have focused more on 
unregulated offenders, seeing these prisoners as more challenging and potentially 
more rewarding to work with. Ruptures in the therapeutic alliance may be more 
common with those offenders with more problematic anger experience and control 
and greater use of criminal thinking, with repairs resulting in a stronger therapeutic 
relationship. Additionally, the programs are delivered within a treatment community; 
changes seen in anger and criminal thinking may in part be the result of modelling 
learning observed through interactions with prosocial members of the therapeutic 
community. Finally, program dosage, at 120 hours for moderate risk and 180 hours 
for high risk, may be below the dosage recommended for moderate and high risk 
offenders according to best practice principles (see, for example, Bourgon & 
Armstrong, 2005; Sperber, Latessa, & Makarios, 2013)21. 
 
Limitations. 
One of the main limitations in this study was the inability to obtain 
recidivism data to provide a longitudinal picture of the outcomes of changes effected 
by the program. While this issue is not uncommon, the absence of recidivism data (a 
key outcome indicator) significantly hindered the extent of evaluation of treatment 
outcomes. It was expected that the recidivism data would be released by Corrections 
 
21
 Bourgon and Armstrong (2005), for example, found in a sample of inmates 
receiving treatment that moderate risk offenders with 3 or less criminogenic needs 
benefited from 100 hours of treatment; high risk offenders with 3 or less 
criminogenic needs and moderate risk offenders with multiple needs required 200 
hours of treatment to reduce recidivism, and high risk offenders with a number of 
criminogenic needs required more than 300 hours of treatment to reduce recidivism. 
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Victoria following approval of the research protocol. As noted earlier, however, 
Corrections Victoria could not provide sufficient resources to extract the data, and 
their support was required to obtain the information. Change in psychometric 
measures should not be relied on to determine whether an offender has been 
successfully treated; rather, behavioural outcomes should also be examined. 
However, no other behavioural measures (e.g., institutional misconduct, participation 
in program) were available for use in this research. 
Another key limitation to this study is the lack of a comparison control 
group; it was unclear whether the offenders who did not have post-program measures 
available were unsuitable for the program or withdrew during the program. Thus the 
change observed in the three clusters could not be compared with other offenders 
who did not complete a violence intervention program. Other notable limitations 
include the poor quality of the data obtained, with a number of incorrect or missing 
values and missing demographic and offending information that required extensive 
cleaning. This directly affected the size of the sample that could be used for post-
program and limited the ability to draw inferences regarding attrition rates and 
reasons for program non-completion (e.g., being unsuitable or withdrawing from the 
program). 
As with Study 1, this study was limited by possible distorted responding on 
self-report measures that may have been affected by comprehension, insight, 
psychological defensiveness, impression management, deception, motivation and the 
ability to self-reflect and report on internal experiences (e.g., Collie et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, as with Study 1, the measure of criminal thinking may have been more 
relevant had it been a violence-specific cognitive measurement tool (e.g., MVQ 
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[Walker, 2005] or FAVT [Doucette-Gates et al., 1999]) , rather than a measure of 
criminal thinking generally.  
The absence of a measure of reliable change presents another limitation in 
assessing the extent of meaningful change made by participants. Changes in 
psychometric scores do not necessarily result in changes in recidivism rates and the 
predictive value of psychometrics on recidivism outcome currently has limited 
support in the literature, although given the practical difficulties in conducting 
rigorous program evaluation with recidivism data, this remains a topic of research 
(e.g., Beech, Erikson, Friendship, & Ditchfield, 2001; Beech & Ford, 2006; 
Friendship, Falshaw, & Beech, 2003; Marques, Wiederanders, Day, Nelson, & Van 
Ommeren, 2005; Wakeling, Beech, & Freemantle, 2013). Furthermore, measurement 
error may affect raw score comparisons. Some methods have tried to account for 
this. Measures of Clinically Significant Change (see, for example, Kazdin, 2003) or 
the Reliable Change Index aid in calculating whether change observed across 
treatment is meaningful. Calculation of reliable change is not possible with the VRS 
because necessary psychometric properties are unavailable, and therefore the use of a 
measure of Clinically Significant Change or the Reliable Change Index method is 
recommended to alleviate this issue in future studies. 
As noted in Study 1, the quality and accuracy of the therapist-rated risk 
assessment tool (VRS) administered at pre-program assessment may have been 
affected by factors including the offenders’ impression management and deception 
and the experience and training of the assessor. Post-program VRS assessments are 
administered by program facilitators, and may also be affected by positive or 
negative bias in a number of ways as the clinicians who conducted the VRS are not 
blind to program status. Program facilitators may have a (possibly subconscious) 
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desire to demonstrate greater program efficacy as a positive reflection of their 
capabilities and competencies in program delivery skills, for personal gain (e.g., if 
pay increases are linked with performance), or to portray more positive change and 
reduction in risk for an offender than may be the case as a result of a relationship or 
attachment developed with the offender over the course of the program or 
manipulation or deception by the client. Facilitators may also believe that the basis 
of the program is highly effective, and therefore (consciously or unconsciously) 
attempt to reflect that. In contrast, however, facilitators may hold a negative view of 
the program (perhaps because it is does not fit with their ideal therapeutic mode), 
and therefore hold the belief that the program is not as effective, potentially biasing 
scoring of post-program measures used in part to evaluate change effected by the 
program. Finally, facilitators may have formed negative views of an offender or 
experienced transference or counter transference that results in bias or judgement 
when re-assessing the offender. Training and quality assurance measures are 
essential to overcome these potential issues and ensure adherence to best practice 
principles. Neutral evaluation of post-program violence risk using the VRS may also 
result in different risk ratings. Interrater reliability for the measure at pre- and post-
program assessment could not be calculated from the information provided in the 
dataset, and the number of clinicians who conducted the VRS was unavailable. 
Finally, the results of this study should not be generalised to other violent 
offender populations. The findings are based on a single violent offender sample in a 
medium security treatment community that comprises a specific cohort of violent 
offenders specifically selected for this prison. The strict restrictions on behaviour at 
this prison may exclude offenders who lack motivation, have significant difficulty 
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controlling their impulsivity, or are classified as requiring incarceration in a 
maximum security location.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is evidence that the three violent offender types 
identified in Study 1 demonstrated different levels of change on measures of anger, 
criminal thinking and violence recidivism risk following the completion of a 
moderate or high intensity violence intervention program. The implications of these 
findings are discussed further in the following chapter. 

 
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Chapter 11. Discussion and Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to investigate whether violent offenders could be 
categorised in clinically meaningful ways based on patterns of criminal thinking and 
anger experience, expression and control, to improve treatment of violent offending. 
The high recidivism rates of violent offenders22 highlight the need for treatment of 
violent offending behaviour. Violent offender treatment programs aim to change 
individual characteristics that are associated with an increased risk of violent re-
offending. While an extensive body of research has demonstrated the need to target 
criminogenic needs in treatment, relatively little is known about the specific needs of 
subgroups of violent offenders. 
The primary aim of this thesis was to examine the proposition that violent 
offenders are a heterogeneous group and that violent offender treatment programs 
are more effective for certain subgroups of offenders than for others. Whilst a 
plethora of risk factors (and treatment needs) associated with violent offending have 
been identified in research, the current studies focused on examining anger 
experience, expression and control and criminal thinking patterns. These factors are 
often assumed to be criminogenic for all violent offenders, despite evidence that 
individuals may commit violence in the presence or absence of anger and differences 
in the strength of cognitions that initiate and maintain the offending behaviour. This 
thesis thus sought to examine whether subtypes of violent offenders could be 
identified based on these varying patterns of anger and cognition and whether these 
subtypes obtained differential benefits from a violent offender treatment program, to 
assist better tailoring of violent offender treatment programs to the needs of specific 
violent offender types to enhance program efficacy and improve program outcomes.  
 
22
 Outlined on page 3. 
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These aims were examined with a sample of adult male violent offenders 
from a medium-security treatment prison who were assessed using measures of 
violence risk, anger and criminal thinking prior to and following completion of a 
violence intervention program. Cluster analysis was used to identify the subtypes of 
violent offenders which, it was hypothesised, would differ with regard to assessed 
violent re-offending risk and treatment performance. Previous typologies have often 
been based on offender behaviour or demographic characteristics, however these 
distinctions have not proved clinically useful. The typologies in this study were 
instead based on psychological variables (offender cognitions and affect). 
 
Findings 
Examination of anger and criminal thinking styles of the overall sample 
appeared to mask within-group differences in treatment needs. Levels of anger 
experience, expression and control in the group were below those at which treatment 
is recommended (Spielberger, 1999). This group were less likely to perceive a range 
of situations as annoying and frustration and felt angry less frequently than the 
general population; when angry, however, they were more likely to express their 
anger and make less effort to control their anger. The use of criminal thinking to 
initiate and maintain offending behaviour in the sample was similar to that of 
offenders generally, with no clear pattern of criminal thinking used by all violent 
offenders. The spread of anger and criminal thinking scores observed across the 
group, however, suggested that considerable heterogeneity existed. Cluster analysis 
revealed the presence of subgroups within the sample with meaningful differences in 
anger experience, expression and control and patterns of criminal thinking.  
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Cluster analysis of anger and criminal thinking scores, measured using the 
STAXI-2 (Spielberger, 1999) and the PICTS (Walters, 2010), revealed that a three-
cluster solution provided the most parsimonious solution with the best fit for this 
dataset. These groups differed significantly on these self-report anger and criminal 
thinking measures, indicating that these areas should not necessarily be treatment 
targets for all of the violent offenders in the sample23. The three subtypes identified 
were labelled the regulated, overregulated and unregulated types. The unregulated 
type appears somewhat similar to the hypothesised reactive-undercontrolled subtype, 
while the overregulated type appears to reflect the instrumental or reactive-
overcontrolled subtypes hypothesised. 
The regulated type had ‘normal’ anger expression, experience and control, at 
levels not warranting treatment (according to Spielberger’s [1999] recommendation), 
and held moderately strong beliefs supportive of a criminal lifestyle. These offenders 
demonstrated a trend toward reactive, impulsive offending and were hostile, 
impetuous and emotional. Their violent offending appeared to be a situational 
reaction, rather than involving planning or forethought, and their criminal thinking 
profile appeared to reflect impulsivity, a tendency to dismiss or eliminate common 
deterrents to crime (e.g., with substance use), a propensity to lose sight of goals, a 
tendency to be easily side-tracked by situational events, fragmented, flighty and 
unpredictable, and a tendency to take short cuts or seek easy solutions to problems, 
perhaps reflecting laziness, irresponsibility or a lack of motivation. The regulated 
type group had a significantly greater proportion of moderate risk offenders.  
 
23
 The groups did not differ significantly on the relevant clinician-rated VRS factors 
of emotional control and cognitive distortions. This may be because, if present, these 
factors were not considered to relate directly to violence, and therefore were not 
rated as treatment targets by clinicians; alternatively, perhaps the factors were not 
present (or minimised) during the assessment due to impression management.  
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The overregulated type offenders were less prone to anger experience, 
suppression or expression than the other two types. The group had low levels of 
anger experience, at levels warranting further treatment, and a trend toward 
overcontrolled anger. The overregulated offenders were more likely than the 
regulated type to monitor or prevent the outward expression of anger, and were more 
likely to try to calm themselves. Belief systems supportive of a criminal lifestyle 
were weakest (or absent) in this type, and there was no evidence of a trend toward 
reactive or proactive criminal thinking. The group showed a trend toward more 
negligent or reckless acts of violence, and a significantly greater proportion of the 
group were assessed as being at moderate risk of future violent offending. A 
significantly greater number of the group were employed prior to incarceration than 
either the regulated or unregulated type. The overregulated group had a higher 
percentage of violent and serious violent offences24 than may be expected given their 
lower levels of anger dysregulation and weaker crime-supporting cognitions. While 
this was somewhat consistent with previous findings of levels of serious violent 
offending in overcontrolled groups (D'Silva & Duggan, 2010; Verona & Carbonell, 
2000), the current group had lower rates of serious violent offending than in these 
earlier studies. 
The unregulated type had the highest levels of anger experience and anger 
expression of the three types, at levels that interfered with optimal functioning in 
areas including interpersonal relationships and health problems. This group had 
frequent and intense anger experiences, were quick-tempered and impulsive and 
required little provocation to react angrily, but were not necessarily vindictive or 
vicious in attacking others. The unregulated type expended the lowest levels of 
 
24
 Classified according to Clauses 1 and 2 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 
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energy to control their anger, although did suppress their anger in some situations. 
Criminal attitudes that initiated and maintained offending were significantly more 
entrenched in the unregulated type, with high levels of proactive, planned, devious, 
calculating, scheming and goal-directed criminal activity and positive outcome 
expectancies for crime, as well as high levels of reactive criminal thinking. The 
group were more reactive and impulsive and less restrained than the regulated or 
overregulated types. While many criminal thinking scales were at levels warranting 
treatment, the overall criminal thinking profile reflected a tendency to dismiss or 
eliminate common deterrents to crime (e.g., with substance use), a propensity to lose 
sight of goals and be easily side-tracked by situational events and a tendency to be 
fragmented, flighty and unpredictable, as well as a desire for power and control and a 
sense of ownership, privilege or uniqueness that gives permission to violate the laws 
and rights of others. This type demonstrated the greatest apprehension regarding the 
prospect of behavioural change. The unregulated type had served significantly more 
prior prison sentences, and had a trend toward more robbery offences (‘instrumental 
offences’) and less homicide offences. Furthermore, a significantly greater 
proportion of the group were high risk. This may partially explain why a smaller 
proportion of the overall sample comprised the unregulated type offenders: perhaps 
given the presentation and behaviour of this type of offender, most may be 
incarcerated at maximum security facilities rather than the medium security facility 
from which this data was collected. 
Post-program analysis revealed that the overall sample demonstrated 
significant change on several anger and criminal thinking scales: the group 
demonstrated a reduction in the frequency of their anger experience and expression, 
an increase in the frequency of their attempts to control their angry feelings through 
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actively calming themselves, and a reduction in the strength of their criminal belief 
systems and each of the eight criminal thinking style scales. There was no significant 
change in the frequency of their attempts to control outward anger expression. When 
examined at a subtype level, however, the clusters differed significantly in the extent 
of change in anger and criminal thinking effected by the program. The regulated type 
demonstrated significant change on a number of anger and criminal thinking scales: 
following program completion, the group were significantly lower on most anger 
experience and anger expression scales, significantly higher on both anger control 
scales and demonstrated a significant reduction in the strength of most criminal 
thinking scales. The overregulated type demonstrated significant change on only two 
of the scales used in the study (the Anger Expression-Out and Power Orientation 
scales), reflecting significant reductions in the frequency of attempts to control 
outward anger expression and in the use of power orientation thinking (supportive of 
controlling people and situations with aggressive displays).  
Finally, the unregulated type demonstrated significant change on nearly all 
scales used in the study, demonstrating the greatest change in anger and criminal 
thinking across the three types. The unregulated type demonstrated significant 
reductions on all anger experience and expression scales (with the exception of 
Anger Expression-In, indicating no significant change in the frequency of anger 
suppression), significant increases in the level of anger control, and significant 
reductions in the strength of a criminal belief system and use of all criminal thinking 
styles (with the exception of Superoptimism, signifying no change in the lack of 
consequential thinking or overestimating one’s ability to avoid negative 
consequences). The levels of change were significantly different across each of the 
three types on all scales (except for Anger Expression-In and Sentimentality scales). 
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It is difficult to compare the groups found in the current studies with those 
identified in previous research, as different variables have been used to define groups 
(for example, traits compared with offending behaviour). Although it cannot be 
assumed that the same groups are referred to, given the use of different 
methodologies, there appears to be some overlap between the typologies. The 
regulated group appears to reflect somewhat the overcontrolled subtypes identified in 
previous research. In comparison to the overcontrolled subtypes, the regulated type 
appeared to have a similarly relatively normal personality profile (Blackburn, 1986), 
and were less impulsive, tense, hostile and apprehensive and expressed less 
aggression and hostility outward than the unregulated group. However, these 
characteristics appeared stronger than usually seen in overcontrolled offenders (du 
Toit & Duckitt, 1990; Henderson, 1982, 1983a, 1983b; Hershorn & Rosenbaum, 
1991; Lane & Kling, 1979; Lane & Spruill, 1980; Quinsey et al., 1983; White, 1975; 
White et al., 1973) and the regulated group appeared to have less avoidance, denial 
or repression of anger than overcontrolled offenders (Blackburn, 1986). The 
moderately strong beliefs supportive of a criminal lifestyle in the regulated group, 
particularly in the lack of thoughtfulness and  trend toward more reactive criminal 
thinking, also seem inconsistent with the more instrumental justifications, wilful 
criminality, rumination and cognitive rehearsal of violent revenge thought to provide 
support for violence by the overcontrolled-controlled type (see Chambers et al., 
2009; also Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Thus this regulated group may reflect a 
‘normal’ group of violent offenders that some researchers argue has not been 
captured by the overcontrolled/undercontrolled typology. The regulated group may 
benefit from violent offender treatment addressing skill development (e.g., patience, 
tolerance), feedback when being discontinuous, training in goal setting, development 
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and reinforcement of critical reasoning skills and perhaps emotional regulation 
strategies to avoid hasty reactions.  
The overregulated type appears most similar to the overcontrolled-inhibited 
type identified in previous research. Weaker criminal thinking and a trend toward 
high levels of anger control in the overregulated type seem consistent with the 
inhibition of anger and few antisocial personality traits seen in the overcontrolled-
inhibited type (Blackburn, 1971). The overcontrolled-inhibited offenders’ typical 
history of strong feelings of anger and difficulty expressing this anger (Blackburn, 
1971) was not seen in the overregulated type. However, the internalising of hostility 
and gradual increase in anger over time culminating in inappropriate violence at 
provocation seen in overcontrolled-inhibited offenders (Chambers, 2010; McGurk, 
1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979) may be akin to the trend by the overregulated type 
toward more reckless or negligent acts of violence. These acts may reflect reactive 
violence, an act committed without considering consequences due to heightened 
emotional arousal built up over time, feeling out of control (Chambers et al., 2009). 
The weaker criminal beliefs in the overregulated type may also reflect similarity in 
the rumination and internalising of blame seen in overcontrolled-inhibited offenders 
who do not tend to use distortions to justify their offending (Barber et al., 2005; 
Chambers et al., 2009). The overregulated group have no clear treatment targets 
relating to anger or criminal thinking, and likely have treatment needs in other areas. 
Given the trend toward overcontrolled anger, however, they may benefit from 
increasing self-awareness of anger, improving communication skills and developing 
strategies to express emotions, as well as treatment addressing internalised hostility, 
to manage depressive tendencies that may lead to impulsive outbursts (Blackburn, 
1986; Davey et al., 2005; Henderson, 1982, 1983a; Hershorn & Rosenbaum, 1991; 
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Lane & Spruill, 1980; Megargee, 1966; Quinsey et al., 1983; Verona & Carbonell, 
2000).  
Finally, the unregulated group appears to comprise both undercontrolled 
types. Anger and criminal thinking observed in this type suggest that these offenders 
may direct anger outward to deal with interpersonal problems, commit instrumental 
violence and focus on positive outcomes of violence, like primary psychopath-type 
offenders (Blackburn, 1986; Chambers, 2010; Pardini et al., 2003). The high reactive 
criminal thinking seen in the unregulated type is suggestive of reactive violence and 
consistent with that of secondary psychopath-type offenders (Pardini et al., 2003), 
although offenders of this type are likely to be uncommon in the current sample 
given they are rarely seen in non-disordered samples (McGurk & McGurk, 1979). 
Levels of psychopathy and mental disorder are commonly used to differentiate 
primary and secondary psychopath offenders; in the current studies, evidence of 
these risk factors is limited to rating of the relevant VRS risk factors of criminal 
personality and mental disorder (Wong & Gordon, 2000). These ratings are mediated 
by clinical perception of the relationship between the risk factor and violence and 
therefore cannot be used to identify which undercontrolled type the unregulated type 
may be more closely related to.  
The strength of criminal thinking styles and higher prevalence of prior 
episodes of incarceration in the unregulated type may reflect the strong antisocial 
tendencies seen in undercontrolled type offenders (McGurk, 1978; Robins et al., 
1996). The particular dominance of the Entitlement and Power Orientation criminal 
thinking appears consistent with the instrumental, active justifications seen in 
primary psychopath-type persistent offenders (Chambers et al., 2009), while the 
dominance of the Cutoff and Discontinuity thinking styles appears consistent with 
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the lack of thoughtfulness seen in secondary psychopath-type offenders (Chambers 
et al., 2009; Egan et al., 2000). This more reactive criminal thinking also correlates 
with a hostile attribution bias (Walters, 2007a); this may reflect the strength of trait 
anger in this unregulated type. The unregulated type would likely benefit from 
treatment assisting with skill development (e.g., patience, tolerance), goal setting, 
developing personal control and self-discipline, challenging entitlement beliefs and 
cognitive distortions justifying the use of instrumental offending, as well as 
treatment addressing low levels of anger control and high levels of anger experience 
and expression, perhaps through inhibiting the acting out of aggressive impulses and 
learning non-aggressive ways to respond to frustration and social situations. Reward-
oriented programs tapping into positive outcome expectancy, motivational 
interviewing to develop discrepancies and resolve ambivalence may be beneficial in 
increasing engagement (Blackburn, 1986; D'Silva & Duggan, 2010; Davey et al., 
2005; Henderson, 1982, 1983b; Hershorn & Rosenbaum, 1991; Lane & Spruill, 
1980; Megargee, 1966; Miller & Rollnick, 2002; Pardini et al., 2003; Quinsey et al., 
1983; Verona & Carbonell, 2000). 
The developmental pathways to aggression and violence are likely to differ 
across the three groups, underpinned by a range of the numerous risk factors that 
contribute to the initiation and maintenance of violent behaviour. The General 
Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall et al., 2011) and Algebra 
of Aggression (Megargee, 2011) contribute to the identification of possible 
developmental pathways through consideration of factors including intrinsic and 
extrinsic instigation (e.g., affect, goal-directed), factors that promote or foster 
aggressive responses (e.g., aggressive behavioural scripts, role modelling) and those 
that counteract this response (e.g., normative beliefs), and the strength of the 
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aggressive habit (e.g., drawing on previous experiences, developed cognitive 
networks promoting aggression). These factors may then help to identify more 
appropriate treatment targets for each group. 
The regulated group, for example, may have greater intrinsic instigation 
(‘angry aggression’) fostered by situational factors with a reasonably strong habit 
strength fostering aggressive responses, although further clarification of the role of 
other determinants of violence in this group is needed. With regard to the role of 
anger and criminal thinking, the group bears similarity to Megargee’s (2011) 
normally socialised individual raised in a culture that condones or promotes violence 
and the paradoxically over-controlled assaultive individual whose instigation to 
aggression accumulates over time. Explained with the General Aggression Model, 
violence and aggression committed by offenders in this group may result from more 
frequent accumulation of affect (including frustration) that biases appraisal and 
decision processes toward violent and aggressive responses, or alternatively through 
competition between normative beliefs and aggressive behavioural scripts. 
Treatment targets may therefore include reducing intrinsic instigation (e.g., reducing 
frustration), improving non-violent mechanisms to deal with frustration, promotion 
of normative beliefs and re-structuring of aggressive behavioural scripts. 
Examining characteristics of the overregulated group through the prism of the 
Algebra of Aggression appears to suggest that aggression may be primarily 
intrinsically instigated, with low extrinsic instigation, low habit strength and 
numerous factors that generally inhibit aggressive responses. It seems likely that 
violence and aggression have low reaction potential in this group, however this 
increases in certain conditions and interactions. The overregulated group may have 
stronger normative beliefs regulating aggression, however the level of accumulated 
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affect (e.g., frustration) may affect the appraisal and decision process, culminating in 
impulsive action aimed at expressing that affect through violence. This group may 
represent Megargee’s (2011) paradoxically over-controlled assaultive individual 
whose instigation to aggression accumulates over time, or the ordinary individual 
subjected to extreme provocation, frustration, threat or situation. The overregulated 
type may benefit from treatment aimed at addressing mechanisms to dissipate 
negative feelings (e.g., frustration) to reduce the summation of intrinsic instigation.  
Finally, the unregulated group seems likely to have high intrinsic and 
extrinsic (goal-directed) instigation to aggression, with strong habit strength and 
fewer factors inhibiting aggressive responses. Violence and aggression are likely to 
have positive reaction potential, seemingly offering the most satisfaction at the least 
cost. The unregulated group may have more extensive and developed cognitive 
networks linked to aggression resulting from a series of experiences that prepare the 
individual to behave aggressively in different situations. Social learning may be 
more entrenched in this group, and person inputs and appraisal and decision 
processes more strongly directed toward violence and aggression. The unregulated 
group appear similar to Megargee’s (2011) undercontrolled or poorly socialised 
individual whom lacks normal inhibitions against aggressive behaviour, and to the 
instrumentally aggressive individual who uses violence to accomplish extrinsic goals 
or for whom aggression is an occupational requirement. The unregulated group may 
therefore benefit from treatment promoting internal inhibitions and creating external 
inhibitions, encouraging response competition for other non-violent or aggressive 
responses, minimising reinforcement of inappropriate aggressive behaviours to 
reduce the habit strength of aggression, and encouraging the discovery of non-violent 
strategies to accomplish goals.  
197 


The overarching aims of the thesis were met. Violent offenders were 
categorised meaningfully into subtypes based on their patterns of anger and criminal 
thinking, and these subtypes performed differently in a violent offender treatment 
program. The patterns of criminal thinking and anger of these subtypes are outlined 
in Table 21.  
 
Table 21  
Key Characteristics Differentiating the Regulated, Overregulated and Unregulated 
Subtypes of Violent Offenders 
 Regulated Overregulated Unregulated 
Anger 
experience, 
expression and 
control 
Moderate anger 
experience, 
expression and 
control 
Low anger 
experience and 
expression,  
high anger control 
High anger 
experience and 
expression,  
low anger control 
    
Dominant 
criminal thinking 
patterns 
Impulsivity and 
distractedness  
Few attitudes 
supportive of 
criminal lifestyle 
Power, entitlement, 
and impulsivity 
 
The effects of the changes on violence recidivism could not be measured as 
recidivism data could not be obtained, however effects on assessment of violence 
recidivism risk demonstrated that overall, the group demonstrated a significant 
reduction in the risk of re-offending, with a greater number of low risk offenders and 
fewer moderate risk offenders following program completion. However, when 
examined more closely, several of the low and moderate risk offenders were 
assessed post-program as being at increased risk of offending. Within each of the 
types, at post-program assessment the regulated and overregulated groups had a 
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greater proportion of high risk and low risk offenders and a lower proportion of 
moderate risk offenders, while in the unregulated group, the proportion of moderate 
and high risk offenders reduced and the proportion of low risk offenders increased. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the finding of three distinct 
subtypes of violent offenders (rather than the four hypothesised) who obtained 
differential outcomes in self-report measures of anger and criminal thinking and 
changes in assessed risk of re-offending following completion of a violence 
intervention program. The finding of three subtypes, rather than the four 
hypothesised, that do not clearly map onto the previously identified 
overcontrolled/undercontrolled typology may reflect the nature of the sample as a 
non-disordered sample of sentenced violent offenders in a medium security location. 
Much of the previous research identifying subtypes utilised samples from psychiatric 
hospitals, homicide offenders from maximum security locations or general offenders 
(e.g., Blackburn, 1971; McGurk, 1978; McGurk & McGurk, 1979; Megargee, 1966). 
Similarly, the findings may reflect varied study methodology examining alternative 
offender characteristics: previous studies have tended to examine and categorise 
offenders utilising more temporally stable characteristics of personality, including 
overcontrolled hostility (e.g., Henderson, 1982; Megargee, 1979), or behavioural 
offending characteristics (e.g., whether the offender had committed single or 
multiple acts of violence; D'Silva & Duggan, 2010). The current study, in contrast, 
utilised measures of perhaps more changeable, dynamic factors of anger experience, 
expression and control and criminal thinking. Furthermore, the finding of three 
subtypes may be due to overlap between the previously hypothesised subtypes on 
factors relating to anger and criminal thinking. Trait anger may contribute to 
personality and hostility control, and these personality factors may contribute to the 
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internalising or externalising of anger expression and control; nonetheless, the 
constructs differ and therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that the typologies diverge. 
The differing degrees of change on self-report measures of anger and 
criminal thinking following completion of the program may be, as noted earlier, that 
these factors were not problematic for the overregulated type at pre-program 
assessment; therefore, limited changed would have been effected by a program that 
attempted to address these issues. Alternatively, the differences may reflect different 
levels of insight between the three types at pre- and post-program assessment, or 
varied levels of motivation and engagement in the program. The factors affecting 
responding on self-report measures may have contributed to findings, as discussed 
earlier. The finding of greater changes between pre- and post-program assessment in 
the overregulated group and, to a lesser degree the regulated group, may also reflect 
regression toward the mean, rather than actual change in these factors (see Morton & 
Torgerson, 2005). Similarly, the observation of greater change in the unregulated 
group may have been a reflection of the greater proportion of high risk offenders in 
this group; high risk offenders had more opportunity to demonstrate changes on a 
greater number of risk factors and subsequent reductions in recidivism risk level than 
those who were already assessed as being at low risk.   
Program and facilitator factors may have affected the observed differential 
outcomes between the three subtypes, including tailoring the program to treatment 
needs (by focusing efforts on targeting other areas of need if anger and criminal 
thinking are not apparent treatment needs pre-program), or the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship (problematic behaviours presented by unregulated offenders 
resulting in greater investment by the facilitator, increased facilitator motivation to 
work with the challenging presentation with the greater prospect of observing 
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change, or strengthening the therapeutic alliance through ruptures and repairs (see 
Kozar & Day, 2012). Other programmatic factors that may explain differences in the 
extent of change in the overall group and between the subtypes include that the 
program may not target the treatment needs that it purports to, or may not target 
these needs at a level sufficient to contribute to offenders making change in these 
areas.  
Non-programmatic factors may also have contributed to the differential 
change seen between subtypes, including that outcomes may have been affected by 
inaccuracy in initial and post-program risk assessment (discussed at length 
previously), variations in the quality of program delivery, staff characteristics 
(training, orientation and skills in areas including the ability to enter high quality 
relationships), offender characteristics (e.g., personality, interpersonal style, 
developmental level), or the interaction of staff and offender characteristics. Changes 
observed post-program may have been the result of modelling in the therapeutic 
community, through observation of interactions with prosocial members of the 
community. The therapeutic environment may have contributed greater benefit for 
the unregulated, and to a lesser extent the regulated, types (see Day & Doyle, 2010).  
 
Implications 
This research attempted to identify which offenders benefit from treatment, 
in line with recommendations from Serin et al. (2013) of the need to identify which 
offenders benefit from treatment, how they assimilate program content into palpable 
gains, and to determine when criminogenic needs have declined enough to justify a 
lower risk classification. The current research goes some way in identifying the types 
of violent offenders who are likely to gain most benefit from existing treatment.  
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This study shows that problems with anger dysregulation and strong 
cognitive distortions are not common to all violent offenders, and therefore may be 
inappropriately targeted for treatment to reduce violent offending. Furthermore, in 
examining subgroups of violent offenders, there appears to be differences between at 
least three groups. The unregulated violent offender has a greater need for treatment 
addressing anger experience, expression and undercontrol and strong beliefs of a 
criminal lifestyle that encourage proactive and reactive offending. The overregulated 
violent offender, however, did not appear to have treatment targets in the areas of 
anger experience and expression, and had weak criminal beliefs; instead, this group 
likely have other violence-related treatment targets that need to be addressed.  
The identification of subtypes of violent offenders has a number of 
implications for psychological practice. By recognising the heterogeneity in 
treatment needs related to anger and criminal thinking, programs may be better 
tailored to the specific criminogenic needs of subtypes of violent offenders. This 
would assist in improving program selection, reducing delivery of content that may 
be irrelevant to some offenders, and increase the delivery of content more relevant to 
specific offender types; ultimately, improving program effectiveness. 
These studies suggest that perhaps a greater range of intensive violent 
offender treatment programs may be required. Rather than concentrating on program 
intensity (duration) of an overall multimodal program, it may, for example, be more 
effective to offer a combination of short, targeted, relevant modules. This could help 
to individualise treatment in a way that maximises treatment outcomes. 
Offering treatment that is not targeted may, paradoxically, lead to an increase 
in risk of recidivism. It could, for example, disrupt the acquisition and maintenance 
of prosocial cognitions through exposure and modelling of antisocial cognitions by 
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other group members; offenders with more prosocial thinking may be manipulated or 
faced with convincing arguments by offenders with more distorted thoughts, and 
learn new ways to justify their offending. Similarly, other group members may 
promote thoughts that current (possibly prosocial) ways of managing anger are 
inappropriate in groups treating undercontrolled anger: the risk of focusing on 
teaching techniques to control anger may negatively impact on those who 
overcontrol or excessively inhibit anger expression. Such observations are 
reminiscent of those of Andrews and Bonta (2010b) and others who have stressed 
the importance of keeping low-risk clients away from higher-risk clients. In the 
context of this thesis, it may be beneficial to keep the overregulated type offenders, 
with weaker criminal thinking, away from the unregulated type, who have much 
stronger crime-supporting cognitions and likely have well-developed arguments 
justifying their use of violence to express anger and obtain gains.  
With regard to program evaluation, it is recommended that psychometric 
measures with good reliability and validity are utilised, including a measure of 
socially desirable responding. It is obviously important that data are entered 
accurately, as inaccurate data and missing values have substantial impact on the 
ability of program evaluators to draw conclusions based on the data.  
 
Future research 
There are several areas for future development and research that would 
extend the findings of this thesis. A key area for further research is to determine 
whether the observed differential change, or absence of change, in the group and 
three subtypes following treatment completion is reflected in changed violent and 
general recidivism rates. Secondly, the incorporation of a control or comparison 
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group is important in identifying the potential impact of other non-programmatic 
factors in effecting change on these factors. Thirdly, it cannot be assumed that these 
findings apply to all violent offenders and these studies require validation and 
replication with other violent offender samples.  
Examining further the treatment needs of the three subtypes would enhance 
understanding of factors that may be better targeted in the violence intervention 
program. Research aimed at developing a better understanding of the effects of 
participation in multiple programs would also be beneficial, identifying whether 
greater benefit is obtained from participating in a single longer, intensive program, or 
multiple shorter, less intensive programs, to address the heterogeneous treatment 
needs of violent offenders. 
Finally, as noted earlier, a significant limitation of this project was the 
reliance on measures used for program evaluation, determined by the corrections 
agency. Future research could incorporate the use of more appropriate measures that 
better capture changes in dynamic risk and treatment performance. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis examines whether clinically meaningful subtypes of 
violent offenders can be identified on the basis of patterns of anger and criminal 
thinking, and whether a violence intervention program was similarly effective for all 
subtypes, or whether the subtypes obtained differential benefit from the program. 
Results of this study suggested a three-group classification system for violent 
offenders. 
Identifying distinct subgroups of violent offenders is an important step 
toward recognising the more specific treatment needs of individuals within this at-
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risk, heterogeneous population. While many violence intervention programs address 
anger management and cognitive distortions, these findings have implications for 
more tailored and accurate assessment and treatment of violent offenders, to reduce 
their risk of re-offending, more appropriately allocate resources to violent offenders 
with specific treatment needs, and enhance community safety.  
 
 
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 Comparison of violence definitions provided in Australian Appendix A.
federal, state and territory legislation 
Table A1  
Violence Definitions Provided in Various Australian Federal, State and Territory 
Legislation 
Legislation Violence 
defined 
Offence-specific violence definitions provided in the 
legislation a 
Crimes Act 1995 
(Commonwealth)   
No None provided 
Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic)  
No None provided. 
Crimes Act 1900 
(ACT)      
No None provided. 
Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW)  
No Public order offences (affray, violent disorder): 
violence refers to any violent conduct towards 
persons or property, not restricted to conduct causing 
or intended to cause injury or damage, and also 
including any other violent conduct 
Criminal Code 
Act (NT)  
No Terrorism acts: violence refers to “violence of a 
kind that causes, or is likely to cause the death of, or 
serious harm to, a person” 
Criminal Code 
Act 1899 (QLD)  
No Threatening violence: threatening violence defined 
as “… with intent to intimidate or annoy any person, 
by words or conduct threaten[ing] to enter or 
damage a dwelling or other premises; or with intent 
to alarm any person, discharg[ing] loaded firearms 
or do[ing] any other act that is likely to cause any 
person in the vicinity to fear bodily harm to any 
person or damage to property”. 
Unlawful stalking: violence is defined as “not 
includ[ing] any force or impact within the limits of 
what is acceptable as incidental to social interaction 
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Legislation Violence 
defined 
Offence-specific violence definitions provided in the 
legislation a 
or to life in the community; and against a person 
includes an act depriving a person of liberty; and 
against property includes an act of damaging, 
destroying, removing, using or interfering with the 
property”. 
Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 
1935 (SA)  
No Public order offences (affray and violent disorder): 
violence refers to any violent conduct towards 
persons or property, not restricted to conduct causing 
or intended to cause injury or damage, and also 
including any other violent conduct  
Criminal Code 
Act 1924 (TAS)  
No None provided. 
Criminal Code 
Act Compilation 
Act 1913 (WA)   
No Threatening violence: threatening violence defined 
as threatening to enter or damage a dwelling with 
intent to intimidate or annoy any person, or 
discharging loaded firearms or commission of any 
other breach of the peace with intent to alarm any 
person in a dwelling. 
aExcludes family violence offences (defined separately in most legislation). 

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 Offence categorisation systems Appendix B.
ANZSOC 
The Australian and New Zealand Standard Offence Classification system 
(ANZSOC; ABS, 2011a) is a uniform statistical framework for classifying criminal 
behaviour that aims to overcome differences in legal definitions across states and 
territories and provide a framework for organising key behavioural characteristics of 
criminal offences. There are 16 divisions within system, as outlined in Table B2. 
 
Table B1  
Australian and New Zealand Standard Offence Classification System (ABS, 2011a) 
Division 
01 Homicide and related offences 
02 Acts intended to cause injury 
03 Sexual assault and related offences 
04 Dangerous or negligent acts endangering persons 
05 Abduction, harassment and other offences against the person 
06 Robbery, extortion and related offences 
07 Unlawful entry with intent/burglary, break and enter 
08 Theft and related offences 
09 Fraud, deception and related offences 
10 Illicit drug offences 
11 Prohibited and regulated weapons and explosives offences 
12 Property damage and environmental pollution 
13 Public order offences 
14 Traffic and vehicle regulatory offences 
15 Offences against government procedures, government security and government 
operations 
16 Miscellaneous offences 
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The first six divisions are particularly relevant as these consider offences 
against the person: all relate to culpable (intentional, negligent or reckless) acts that 
result in harm (physical or non-physical) against a specific person (ABS, 2011a). 
The six divisions are primarily distinguished on the basis of: a) the nature and degree 
of harm, and b) whether the act was intentional or negligent. Generally, the 16 
divisions in the classification system singularly contain only violent or non-violent 
offences. There are two exceptions: Division 06, which includes non-violent 
offences such as extortion or blackmail attempts by letter, and Division 13, which 
includes violent offences such as riot and affray.  
 
NOI 
The National Offence Index (NOI) was developed by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS, 2009) to enable the generation of nationally comparable offence 
information within crime and justice research. The National Offence Index provides 
an ordinal ranking of the offence categories in the Australian Standard Offence 
Classification (ASOC; superseded by the Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Offence Classification [ANZSOC], ABS, 2011a) according to perceived seriousness, 
in order to determine a principal offence. The NOI allows the representation of an 
offender by a single offence in situations where a single incident results in multiple 
offences, or where defendants have multiple charges. For example, if an offender has 
two or more offences within the same incident that may be classified into different 
offence categories of ASOC classification (e.g., 0211 – Serious assault resulting in 
injury and 0621 – Blackmail and extortion), a ‘principal offence’ can be selected to 
represent that offender through the application of the NOI. The NOI is used in this 
thesis to code the most serious offence for participants with multiple offences. 
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 Study 1 Sample Demographics Appendix C.
Table C1  
Demographic Characteristics as a Percentage of the Final Violent Offender Sample 
Variable All offenders  
(n = 305) 
Level of education attained:  
Year 10 or below 62.0 
Year 11 11.1 
Year 12 5.6 
University degree 1.3 
TAFE certificate 3.6 
Apprenticeship 3.3 
Unknown 13.1 
Employed prior to incarceration  
Employed 40.7 
Unemployed 40.7 
Unknown 18.7 
Marital status:  
Single 52.1 
Married 6.9 
Divorced 4.9 
De facto 24.6 
Unknown 11.5 
Parent  
Children 47.2 
No children 30.2 
Unknown 22.6 
  
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 Scale Correlations Appendix D.
The following table provides correlations between the anger and criminal 
thinking style scales.
 
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 Socially Desirable Responding Appendix E.
Self-report measures used with offending populations are often viewed with 
scepticism, as conventional wisdom suggests that offenders cannot be trusted to tell 
the truth, particularly through self-report. The validity of self-report has long been 
questioned within psychology (Cronbach, 1946; Kroner, Mills, & Morgan, 2006), as 
self-report is considered susceptible to biased responding (e.g., socially desirable 
responding or impression management), potentially significantly impacting the 
validity of information obtained through self-report tools. Social desirability is the 
tendency to give overly positive self-descriptions (Paulhus, 2002), attempting to 
appear overly moral, honourable and virtuous, denying common, yet undesirable, 
traits (e.g., anger, shame or jealousy), and/or exaggerating uncommon, yet desirable, 
traits (e.g., never being late) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  
Favourable self-presentation can take many forms, from outright lying to 
“putting one’s best foot forward", being ingratiating with the examiner or showing 
polite manners (Andrews & Meyer, 2003). Impression management, similarly, is a 
goal-directed conscious or unconscious process in which an individual attempts to 
influence the perceptions of others (Schlenker, Britt, & Pennington, 1996). 
Impression management demonstrates temporal stability but is also highly 
responsive to situational factors, and scores therefore need to be interpreted within 
the assessment context (Davis, Thake, & Weekes, 2012). Impression management 
scores tend to be higher in non-anonymous responding situations (Booth-Kewley, 
Edwards, & Rosenfeld, 1992) and when responders know they are being evaluated 
(Lönnqvist, Paunonen, Tuulio-Henriksson, Lönnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2007). 
Many violent offenders may deny significant elements of their crime, justify 
or rationalise their behaviour, deflect culpability or minimise the severity of their 
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actions to avoid or hide the fear, shame and guilt often resulting from their 
offending, or to present a more virtuous picture of themselves to clinical staff or for 
future gains with regard to obtaining parole. Arguments are made for situational 
motives (e.g., trial proceedings, prison placement or parole applications) and 
dispositional characteristics (e.g., manipulative, or psychopathic) as potential reasons 
for reduced validity (Hare, 2003). Research indicates, however, that offender self-
report may yield significant relationships with outcome (Mills & Kroner, 2006) and 
has predictive validity (Mills, Loza, & Kroner, 2003). Various methods have been 
suggested to control for this response bias that may invalidate data, including 
employing indirect methods of information gathering as a method for controlling 
socially desirable responding (Alexander & Beggs, 1986; Arnold & Feldman, 1981) 
or using a statistical method to partial out independent measures of response sets 
from content scores (Messick, 1962), though the latter method may limit the 
measurement of certain personality traits (Paulhus, 1984). Others have suggested 
using scores on measures of socially desirable responding or impression 
management to screen data and remove cases displaying this response bias.  
Recent research, however, has suggested that it may not be prudent to use 
scores on socially desirable or impression management tools in deciding not to 
interpret self-report measures of psychopathology or risk in correctional populations, 
as this may result in an incorrect assumption that those individuals high on 
Impression Management are underreporting their psychopathology or antisocial 
behaviour (Mills & Kroner, 2006). These conclusions stemmed in part from findings 
that the more criminally oriented an offender was, the less likely they were to 
employ impression management (Mills & Kroner, 2005, 2006). Also, those 
individuals scoring high on impression management tended to report fewer antisocial 
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attitudes – these individuals also had lower estimates of their risk of re-offending, 
perhaps reflecting reality(Mills & Kroner, 2005, 2006). These findings contradicted 
the long held view of researchers that more criminally oriented individuals had a 
higher level of impression management, such as Davis et al.’s (2012) finding that 
‘good’ individuals were not making themselves look better with impression 
management; rather, those who had behaved most reprehensibly tried to portray 
themselves as ‘morally decent’.  
The mechanisms underlying the lack of predictive validity of self-report data 
remain unclear. Research has not yet demonstrated whether this is due to social 
desirability in the form of conscious efforts to appear good (see, for review, 
Polaschek, Bell, Calvert, & Takarangi, 2010), though findings suggest that it is 
unlikely that results are due simply to offenders deliberately lying (Gannon, Keown, 
& Polaschek, 2007; Mills & Kroner, 2005, 2006). Therefore, a social desirability 
bias may not undermine the relationship between self-report measures and their 
predictive criteria (Mathie & Wakeling, 2010); rather, the degree and influence of 
socially desirable responding requires further understanding. Some suggest that 
socially desirable responding may be a matter of reduced importance within forensic 
settings (Kroner et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the measurement of socially desirable 
responding and impression management continues to be perceived as an important 
step when utilising self-report tools with an offending population.  
Psychometric measures were therefore used to assess the presence of these 
responses biases in the current sample. Data from the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale – Short Form (MC-C; Reynolds, 1982) could not be used as errors 
in data entry were identified that resulted in unreliable data. Data were initially 
entered on a (2-1, True-False) scale, before the error was identified and subsequent 
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data entered on a (1-0, True-False) basis. The date of identification of this error was 
not available. Data entry appeared inconsistent on a number of data collection dates. 
Rather than score ranges between 0 to 13 (entered on a 1-0 basis) or 13 to 26 
(entered on a 2-1 basis), scores ranged from 8 to 26 on several data collection dates, 
(exceeding either the minimum or maximum score possible on the 13-item measure; 
see Figure F1 for the range of scores input for each data collection date). Other 
researchers suggest that the 33-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was 
actually used (A. Day, personal communication, June 13, 2012); if so, however, a 
greater prevalence of scores over 26 would be expected (over the period of data 
collection, only one 1 case scored above 26). In summary, due to unreliable entry of 
data on this instrument, the MC-C measure of socially desirable responding could 
not be examined and utilised as a screening measure.  
 
Figure E1. Marlowe-Crowne score ranges for each date of pre-program assessment 
data collection. Data collected with the short form (13-item, True/False) has at times 
been entered on 1-0 (True-False) basis, and at other times on 2-1 (True-False) basis. 
Inconsistency is apparent throughout the period of data collection.
0
13
26
3/01/2006 3/01/2008 3/01/2010
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 Cluster analysis Appendix F.
An Explanation of Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis seeks to find groups in data by determining which objects in 
a set are similar The following summary of cluster analysis is adapted from several 
sources, including Gan, Ma, and Wu (2007), Garson (2010), Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw (2005), Romesburg (2004) and Sambandam (2003). Also called 
segmentation analysis or taxonomy analysis, cluster analysis attempts to identify 
homogeneous subgroups of cases in a population, through the establishment of 
groups and the analysis of group membership. Cluster analysis is used when the 
number of groups in a population is unknown, and is implemented by attempting to 
identify a set of groups which minimise within-group variation and maximise 
between-group variation. Three types of cluster analysis are used in this thesis: 
hierarchical clustering, k-means clustering and two-step clustering. 
Hierarchical clustering allows researchers to select a definition of distance, a 
linking method for forming clusters, and then determine how many clusters best suit 
the data. Hierarchical clustering can be agglomerative, in which every single object 
is initially considered a single cluster. The two objects with the lowest distance (or 
highest similarity) are then merged into a cluster, and each subsequent object, 
considered in order of lowest distance to either of the first two objects, is either 
added to existing clusters, used to create new clusters, or combines with other 
clusters to achieve the desired final number of clusters. Alternatively, hierarchical 
clustering can be divisive, starting with all objects in one cluster, then iteratively 
dividing the large clusters into smaller clusters that have the greatest distance 
between them. Hierarchical clustering procedures have several disadvantages: (a) 
298 

objects that have been incorrectly groups at an early stage cannot be reallocated; and 
(b) different similarity or distance measures may lead to different results. 
There are several measures of interobservation distances and intercluster 
similarities and distances to use as criteria when merging nearest clusters into 
broader groups or when considering the relation of a point to a cluster, including 
Euclidean distance, squared Euclidean distance, Pearson correlation or chi-square 
measure. Distance measures how far apart two observations are, with alike cases 
sharing a low distance. Similarity measures how alike two cases are. There are also 
several methods to calculate the distance between two clusters, such as single, 
complete or average linkage, or Ward’s method. In the hierarchical clustering in this 
study, the cluster method was average between-groups linkage, and the distance 
measure was squared Euclidean distance. The between-groups linkage, also called 
unweighted pair-group method using averages linkage, gives the distance between 
two clusters as the average distance between all inter-cluster pairs. 
K-means clustering requires the researcher to specify the number of clusters 
in advance, and then calculates how to assign case to the k clusters. K-means 
clustering is preferred when datasets are large (e.g., over 1000 cases), and is a type 
of ‘relocation clustering method’ as cases may shift from one cluster to another 
during the iterative process of converging on a solution. K-means clustering uses 
Euclidean distance. Initial cluster centres are chosen randomly in a first pass of the 
data. Each subsequent iteration groups observations based on nearest Euclidean 
distance to the mean of the cluster, with cluster centres changing at each pass, and 
the process ceases when cluster means do not shift more than a given cut-off value or 
the iteration limit is reached. K-means clustering depends on the sequence of 
observations in the dataset, with different data orders tending to yield different 
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outcomes. As such, randomisation of cases is required, in conjunction with multiple 
runs, to establish that the clusters are stable across different random orderings. 
Finally, two-step clustering creates pre-clusters, and then clusters these pre-
clusters using hierarchical methods. Two-step clustering is preferred for large 
datasets, is able to use categorical data, and is fairly robust to assumptions of 
normality and independent variable assumptions. 
Regardless of the method used to form clusters, the utility of clusters must be 
assessed by three criteria: size, meaningfulness and criterion validity. All clusters 
should have enough cases to be meaningful, the meaning of each cluster should be 
readily intuited from the variables used to make the cluster, and the clusters should 
have the expected level of association with other variables known from theory or 
prior research. 
There are several assumptions underlying hierarchical and k-means cluster 
analysis. Data must be continuous or true dichotomies, and observations must be 
independent. Variables must be comparable, generally achieved through 
standardisation. Outliers need to be screened for, as k-means cluster analysis is very 
sensitive to outliers. K-means cluster analysis assumes a large sample (over 200). 
Finally, variables are assumed to be independent. When variables used in the 
clustering process are collinear, the common constructs underlying the variables are 
given a higher weight than others, likely skewing the final solution in the direction of 
those constructs or concepts that are represented by multiple collinear variables.  
The assumption of independence of variables is, needless to say, an issue for 
conducting cluster analysis in this study, as the variables of anger experience, anger 
expression and anger control are undoubtedly related. Similarly, the constructs 
underlying styles of criminal thinking are highly likely to be related. However, the 
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techniques of cluster analysis are commonly used with variables that are collinear, 
such as personality traits clustered to form personality profiles, or clusters of 
symptoms that form the basis for diagnosis of mental illness or developmental 
disorders. Two-step clustering is fairly robust when the assumption of independent 
variables is violated, and therefore this technique will be used in this thesis to 
validate and give consensus to the clustering solutions obtained through hierarchical 
and k-means clustering.  
Cluster validation is the process of evaluating the results of cluster analysis in 
a quantitative and objective way, and has four main components: (a) determining 
whether there is non-random structure in the data; (b) determining the number of 
clusters; (c) evaluating the fitness and stability of the clustering solution to the given 
data (internal validation); and (d) evaluating the fit of the clustering solution to 
partitions obtained from other data sources (external validation) (Jain & Dubes, 
1988; Tan, Steinbach, & Kumar, 2005). 
 
Cluster Analysis Process 
Cluster analysis was used to determine whether subtypes of violent offenders 
demonstrated significantly different patterns of anger type and criminal thinking 
styles. Given the exploratory nature of this study, a hierarchical clustering procedure 
was initially undertaken to identify the number of clusters suggested by the data, 
followed by k-means clustering to determine which clustering solution was most 
meaningful and parsimonious. Finally, two-step clustering was undertaken to 
validate the clustering solutions.  
Hierarchical and k-means cluster analyses were conducted on several variable 
sets in an attempt to select the most parsimonious and clinically meaningful method 
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of clustering violent offenders for the purposes of engagement in rehabilitation 
programmes. The clustering process began broadly, gradually became more 
inclusive to capture meaningful differences in the clusters that would allow the 
identification and classification of particular subtypes of violent offenders using 
variables relevant for treatment, and then broadened again in an attempt to simplify 
the variables needed to cluster the offenders. The following variable sets were used: 
1. General Criminal Thinking and Anger Expression Index; 
2. General Criminal Thinking, Proactive Criminal Thinking, Reactive 
Criminal Thinking and Anger Expression Index; 
3. Proactive Criminal Thinking and Reactive Criminal Thinking; 
4. Anger Expression Index; 
5. Trait Anger, Angry Temperament, Angry Reaction, Anger Expression-
In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Control-Out, 
Anger Expression Index and the eight criminal thinking styles 
(Mollification, Entitlement, Cutoff, Power Orientation, Sentimentality, 
Cognitive Indolence, Superoptimism and Discontinuity); 
6. Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger 
Control-In, Anger Control-Out and the eight criminal thinking styles; 
7. Trait Anger, Angry Temperament, Angry Reaction, Anger Expression-
In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Control-Out and 
Anger Expression Index; 
8. the eight criminal thinking styles; 
9. Anger Expression Index and the eight criminal thinking styles; 
10. Trait Anger, Angry Temperament, Angry Reaction, Anger Expression-
In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Control-Out, 
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Anger Expression Index, Proactive Criminal Thinking and Reactive 
Criminal Thinking; and 
11. Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger 
Control-In, Anger Control-Out, Proactive Criminal Thinking and 
Reactive Criminal Thinking. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis with the General Criminal Thinking scale and 
Anger Expression Index variables revealed that all cases clustered in one group, with 
agglomeration (or distance) coefficients indicating that the distance of each case 
from the existing cluster was small. This result is unsurprising given that these 
variables provide an average value for anger expression and criminal thinking styles, 
and therefore would unlikely capture differences in patterns of the scale scores used 
to generate the overall scores. Similar findings emerged when hierarchical clustering 
was conducted on the following broad variable sets: (a) General, Proactive and 
Reactive Criminal Thinking scales and Anger Expression Index; (b) Proactive and 
Reactive Criminal Thinking scales; and (c) Anger Expression Index. Meaningful 
differences in subgroup profiles of the patterns of anger expression, experience and 
control and types of criminal thinking styles were assessed with hierarchical and k-
means clustering conducted on the eight STAXI-2 variables and the eight criminal 
thinking styles. 
Hierarchical clustering agglomeration coefficients suggested the possibility 
of 2, 3, 4 or 5 clusters, so k-means clustering was used to produce 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-
cluster solutions. For each variable set, five sets of random initial runs were used for 
each k, randomising the order of the data in the sample to minimise the impact of 
dataset order. Of the five solutions for each k, the solution that produced the lowest 
sum of squared distances between observations and their respective cluster centroids 
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was taken to be the solution with respect to the specified number of clusters, k. That 
is, the solution was selected with the smallest squared error, as the centroids in that 
solution were a better representation of the points in their cluster than centroids in 
the other 4 solutions for each k (Tan et al., 2005). Notably, there was minimal 
variability in the sum of squared distances or cluster membership for each of the five 
solutions. Cluster stability was further evaluated for each k by running the cluster 
procedure for each k value on a randomly selected half of the sample. 
For each k-solution, once the optimal cluster solution was selected, cluster 
composition and the significance of variables in distinguishing clusters were then 
examined. Between-group multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted with the clustering variables treated as criterion variables and cluster 
membership as the between-group variable. Separate post-hoc one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was then conducted the clustering variables. Significance of 
MANOVA and ANOVA F-tests was expected given that cluster analysis is used to 
maximise the differences between clusters. 
In the 2-cluster solution, the clusters were significantly different on all 
variables, indicating that each variable used in the clustering process was important 
in distinguishing between the two clusters. However, the 2-cluster solution did not 
appear to capture the full range of score variability in each scale observed across the 
violent offender group. Pictorial indications of the differences in anger and thinking 
style responses for the clusters are shown in Figures F1 (2-cluster solution), F2 (3-
cluster solution) and F3 (4-cluster solution). As the figures demonstrate, the average 
score range in the 2-cluster solution was restricted in comparison to the spread of 
scores in the 3- and 4-cluster solutions. Notably, when examining the figures, it is 
important to remember that follow-up treatment is only recommended on STAXI-2 
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T-scores greater than 65 (Spielberger, 1999). On the eight thinking scales, T-scores 
between 60 and 70 are considered indicative of high levels of the presence of that 
distortion, and scores over 70 are considered very high (Walters, 2010). On the 
Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales, T-scores between 55 and 65 are 
indicative of moderate elevations, and scores over 65 are considered high. 
Additionally, a difference of at least 10 points between the Proactive and Reactive 
Criminal Thinking scales indicates an orientation to the higher scoring scale. 
 
 
Figure F1. Mean T-scores for anger and thinking style clustering variables for each 
cluster identified in the 2-cluster solution.  
 
All clusters in the 3-cluster solution showed significant between-group 
differences on all variables, again indicating that each variable was important in 
differentiating between the three clusters.  
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Figure F2. Mean T-scores for anger and thinking style clustering variables for each 
cluster identified in the 3-cluster solution.  
 
The 4-cluster solution indicated that on the anger scales, there were two 
clusters that appeared quite similar, while another two clusters were significantly 
different. On the thinking style scales, there were again two clusters that appeared 
similar, and two that were significantly different; the two similar clusters were, 
however, a different combination of clusters than the two similar clusters on the 
anger scales. This is best reflected in Figure F3, which shows that clusters 1 and 4 
show similar patterns on the anger scales, while clusters 1 and 3 showed similar 
patterns on the thinking style patterns. All clusters were significantly different (p < 
.01) on all variables with the exception of: clusters 1 and 4 on the Angry Reaction 
scale; clusters 3 and 4 on the Anger Control-In scale; clusters 2 and 4 on the 
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Sentimentality scale; and clusters 1 and 3 on the Mollification, Sentimentality, 
Superoptimism, Cognitive Indolence and Discontinuity scales. 
 
 
Figure F3. Mean T-scores for anger and thinking style clustering variables for each 
cluster identified in the 4-cluster solution.  
 
Several clusters that were significantly different (p < .05) when analysis was 
conducted on the full sample were not significantly different when the analysis was 
conducted on the randomly selected half of the sample. This finding confirmed the 
emerging trend visible in the larger sample that clusters 1 and 4 were similar on 
anger scales, and clusters 1 and 3 were similar on thinking style scales. 
Finally, the 5-cluster solution was examined. There tended to be at least three 
clusters that were significantly different for each variable, however there was 
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variability in which three of the five clusters differed dependent on which variable 
was being examined, and this solution was considered too complex to be useful or 
realistic for clinicians to utilise to differentiate violent offenders for the purposes of 
offender rehabilitation. Furthermore, the 5-cluster solution appeared much more 
susceptible to effects of data ordering than the 2-, 3- or 4-cluster solutions, 
suggesting instability in the clustering solution. 
Therefore, the clustering solutions that seemed to fit the data best appeared to 
be the 3-cluster or 4-cluster solutions, using the eight thinking styles and eight 
STAXI-2 variables. In an attempt to simplify the variables that could be used to 
differentiate the violent offenders, and to reduce the multicollinearity in the 
clustering variables, the analysis was done on a simplified dataset: Trait Anger, 
Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, Anger Control-Out 
and the eight thinking styles. The two trait anger subscales were removed, given 
their strong correlations with the overall Trait Anger scale, and the Anger Expression 
Index was removed, also given its high correlation with the Anger Expression-In and 
-Out and Anger Control-In and -Out scales. Hierarchical cluster analysis was 
conducted on the new variable set, and agglomeration coefficients again indicated 
between two and five possible clustering solutions. K-means clustering was used to 
produce 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-cluster solutions, with the clustering procedure conducted on 
five sets of random initial runs and a randomly selected half of the sample for each k. 
Once again, all variables in the 2-cluster and 3-cluster solutions were 
significantly different for each cluster, suggesting that each variable contributed to 
differentiating between clusters. As in the cluster analysis with the larger variable 
set, however, the 2-cluster solution did not appear to be capturing the full spread of 
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responses on each variable. The average scores on each cluster variable are depicted 
by cluster for the 3-cluster solution in Figure F4.  
 
 
Figure F4. Mean T-scores for anger and thinking style clustering variables for each 
cluster identified in the 3-cluster solution.  
 
Using the new variable set, the similarities between two clusters in patterns 
of anger and between another two clusters in patterns of criminal thinking became 
even more pronounced in the 4-cluster solution. Figure F5 depicts the average scores 
for anger and thinking style clustering variables for the new restricted variable set. 
All clusters were again significantly different (p < .01) with the exception of clusters 
1 and 4 on the Trait Anger, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-Out and Anger 
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Control-In scales; and clusters 1 and 3 on the Mollification, Entitlement, 
Sentimentality, Superoptimism, Cognitive Indolence and Discontinuity scales. 
 
 
Figure F5. Mean T-scores for anger and thinking style clustering variables for each 
cluster identified in the 4-cluster solution.  
 
This 4-cluster solution indicated that perhaps a more appropriate solution 
may be found by conducting two separate cluster analyses: one utilising the anger 
scales only, and one utilising criminal thinking style scales only. Therefore, this was 
the next set of cluster analyses undertaken. Notably, agglomeration coefficients from 
hierarchical analyses indicated that all cases were clustered in one group for both 
sets of analyses, however k-means clustering analyses were undertaken with 2, 3 and 
4 clusters requested. 
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With respect to the eight anger scales, the groups found in the 2- and 3-
cluster solutions were significantly different on all variables. The pattern of average 
scores for the 3-cluster solution can be seen in Figure F6. In the 4-cluster solution, 
the four groups were significantly different on Trait Anger, Angry Temperament, 
Angry Reaction, Anger Control-Out and Anger Expression Index (p < .01), however 
on Anger Control-In, clusters 1 and 2 were not significantly different, and clusters 3 
and 4 were significantly different at p < .05. Clusters 2 and 4 were not significantly 
different on Anger Expression-Out, and clusters 1 and 4 were not significantly 
different on Anger Expression-In. This suggests that the best representation of the 
group is with a 3-cluster solution. 
 
 
Figure F6. Mean T-scores for anger clustering variables for each cluster identified in 
the 3-cluster solution.  
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With respect to clustering analyses using the eight criminal thinking style 
scales, the 2-cluster solution indicated that all the two groups were significantly 
different on all variables, with one group consistently higher on use of all criminal 
thinking styles. All variables were significantly different between the three groups in 
the 3-cluster solution. Figure F7 provides a pictorial representation of the mean 
thinking style pattern for the three clusters. In the 4-cluster solution, the 4 groups 
were significantly different on all thinking styles (p < .01) with the exception of 
clusters 3 and 4 on the Cognitive Indolence scale and the Discontinuity scale. 
However, the extra cluster in this group did not appear to add any additional 
information to the groups detailed in the 3-cluster solution. 
 
 
Figure F7. Mean T-scores for thinking style clustering variables for each cluster 
identified in the 3-cluster solution. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
T-
sc
o
re
s
Cluster Variables
Cluster 1 (n = 121) Cluster 2 (n = 136)
Cluster 3 (n = 47)
312 

However, clustering with anger scales only, or with thinking styles only, did 
not capture the full pattern of interaction explained by using anger and thinking style 
scales to analyse subtypes of violent offenders. For example, clustering with either 
anger or thinking styles did not capture the pattern of the group that is high on anger 
experience, anger expression and the use of cognitive distortions, the pattern of the 
group that is low on anger experience, anger expression and cognitive distortion use, 
or the group that is average on anger experience and expression but higher on 
thinking style use. Therefore, further clustering procedures were undertaken in an 
attempt to capture these patterns while simplifying the clustering variables used. 
Cluster analyses were run using the Anger Expression Index and the eight 
thinking styles, the eight STAXI-2 variables with the Proactive and Reactive 
Criminal Thinking scales, and five of the STAXI-2 variables with the Proactive and 
Reactive Criminal Thinking scales. However, these clustering solutions were not 
considered sufficiently detailed to provide a picture of the groups found in the 
solutions, as the Anger Expression Index is an overall score that does not take into 
account differences in patterns of anger inward and outward control and expression. 
Furthermore, the Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales are composite 
scales that have been derived from particular thinking style, factor and content 
scales. While these scales are generally more stable and reliable than individual 
scales, they do not capture the full pattern of criminal thinking styles used by the 
offender. Furthermore, the scales can be used to determine the orientation of an 
offender’s criminal thinking (proactive or reactive), however this relies on the 
difference between the Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking scales, and within 
each of the groups identified in the clustering solutions, these differences did not 
exceed the 10 points required to determine the orientation of an offender’s criminal 
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thinking. For example, in the 3-cluster solution, the first cluster was low on 
Proactive and Reactive Criminal Thinking, the second cluster was average on both, 
and the third cluster was higher on both. Therefore, attempting to cluster the group of 
violent offenders using these variables was considered appropriate or meaningful. 
In light of the results of the multiple clustering analyses undertaken, the 
optimal clustering solution chosen was that using the five STAXI-2 variables of 
Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In and 
Anger Control-Out and the eight criminal thinking styles (pictured in Figures F4and 
F5 above). Selection of the optimal cluster solution followed examination of the 
different cluster solutions looking at internal criteria, including the appropriateness 
of cluster size and distribution of the scale variables within the clusters. This solution 
was chosen as it was the simplest solution that provided meaningful information 
concerning differences between groups, for the purposes of identifying treatment 
targets. Furthermore, the degree of multicollinearity between variables was lower 
than when overall scales such as the Anger Expression Index or the General 
Criminal Thinking scale were used.  
In deciding between the 3-cluster and 4-cluster solution for this variable set, 
two-step clustering analyses was undertaken. As described above, this technique is 
more robust and stable when assumptions of normality and independence of 
variables have been violated. As with the k-means analysis, the analysis was run five 
times with differing random initial values, to check for stability of the solution. 
Results from the two-step analysis confirmed that a 3-cluster solution provided the 
best fit for this group of violent offenders.   
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 Cluster demographics Appendix G.
Table G1  
Offender-Identified Demographic Characteristics and Offending Characteristics as 
a Percentage of Each Cluster 
Variable Cluster 1 
Regulated 
(n = 129) 
Cluster 2 
Overregulated 
(n = 100) 
Cluster 3 
Unregulated 
(n = 58) 
Level of education attained:    
Year 10 or below 62.8 57.0 63.7 
Year 11 13.2 10.0 10.3 
Year 12 7.0 6.0 3.4 
University degree 0.0 2.0 1.7 
TAFE certificate 2.3 5.0 5.2 
Apprenticeship 2.3 7.0 0.0 
Unknown 12.4 13.0 15.5 
Employed prior to incarceration    
Employed 37.2 52.0 31.0 
Unemployed 43.4 32.0 43.1 
Unknown 19.4 16.0 25.9 
Marital status:    
Single 61.2 48.0 43.1 
Married 5.4 11.0 3.4 
Divorced 3.1 8.0 5.2 
De facto 19.4 25.0 29.3 
Unknown 10.9 8.0 19.0 
Parent    
Children 46.5 54.0 41.4 
No children 31.8 26.0 29.3 
Unknown 21.7 20.0 29.3 
Ethnicity    
Australian 62.8 65.0 55.2 
Indigenous Australian 10.1 6.0 6.9 
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Variable Cluster 1 
Regulated 
(n = 129) 
Cluster 2 
Overregulated 
(n = 100) 
Cluster 3 
Unregulated 
(n = 58) 
Pacific Islander 2.3 1.0 3.4 
New Zealander / Maori 3.9 3.0 1.7 
European 3.9 9.0 8.6 
Asian 4.7 2.0 3.4 
Middle Eastern 2.3 5.0 0.0 
Other 4.7 3.0 5.1 
Unknown 5.4 6.0 15.5 
Index offence(s)    
Violent index offence(s) 72.1 75.0 67.2 
Serious violent index 
offence(s) 
27.1 29.0 17.2 
Index offending unknown 5.4 3.0 6.9 
Prior offence(s)    
Violent prior offence(s) 60.5 64.0 65.5 
Serious violent prior 
offence(s) 
11.6 12.0 10.3 
Prior offending unknown 7.0 4.0 6.9 
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 Violence Risk Level Comparisons Appendix H.
Re-offending risk is generally the primary contributor in determining whether 
an offender is recommended for offence-specific treatment, with risk level key in 
considering the appropriate program intensity for the offender. Best practice 
principles state that the level of treatment services delivered to an offender should be 
proportional to their risk of re-offending (Bonta & Andrews, 2007). Empirical 
evidence indicates that higher risk offenders should receive more intensive treatment 
and lower risk offenders should receive minimal, routine or no intervention (Bonta & 
Andrews, 2007; Ogloff & Davis, 2004; Ward et al., 2007). 
While risk-level comparisons were not a specific aim of this thesis, it is an 
important consideration, given that recommendations for treatment would usually be 
based on their assessed risk of re-offending. Since the rationale for identifying 
subtypes in the current research is aimed at improving selection of treatment 
candidates and treatment outcomes, it is paramount to consider whether the clusters 
identified reflect differences in re-offending risk that may be captured by the risk 
assessment process and potentially remove the need for identifying subtypes. 
The 305 violent offenders was separated into low, moderate and high risk 
offenders on the basis of VRS score and the three groups’ STAXI-2 and PICTS 
scores were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis test. Score distributions in the three 
groups differed significantly on all STAXI-2 scales (except the Angry Reaction and 
Anger Expression-In scales) and on all PICTS scales (except the Sentimentality and 
Cognitive Indolence scales) (p < .05). STAXI-2 and PICTS scores for the three 
groups are outlined in Table H1. All STAXI-2 T-score scales were under 65, and 
therefore below levels at which Spielberger (1999) recommends treatment. 
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Table H1  
Mean STAXI-2 and PICTS Pre-program T-Scores for the Low, Moderate and High 
Risk Violent Offender Groups 
Scale Low risk 
(n = 25) 
Moderate risk 
(n = 155) 
High risk 
(n = 77) 
 M SD M SD M SD 
STAXI-2 (n = 23) (n = 146) (n = 74) 
Trait Angera 45.22 9.81 48.33 10.79 54.27 14.20 
Angry Temperamenta 44.96 8.50 48.85 10.34 54.35 13.72 
Angry Reaction 42.26 10.08 43.26 9.20 46.38 10.76 
Anger Expression-Outa 43.70 9.77 49.86 10.37 54.62 12.23 
Anger Expression-In  49.17 10.41 50.19 10.68 52.59 12.10 
Anger Control-Outa 51.30 9.62 46.27 10.70 42.95 10.65 
Anger Control-Ina 50.52 8.83 48.41 10.05 44.49 10.33 
Anger Expression Indexa 49.09 10.42 52.18 10.32 57.00 12.16 
PICTS (n = 25) (n = 154) (n = 77) 
General Criminal Thinkinga 47.04 7.48 52.81 9.63 56.04 10.48 
Proactive Criminal Thinkinga 47.68 8.24 51.94 9.46 56.96 11.10 
Reactive Criminal Thinkinga 50.48 8.06 56.29 10.11 58.61 9.48 
Confusion-Reviseda 49.24 6.57 55.06 10.12 60.09 13.19 
Defensiveness-Reviseda 48.60 7.79 45.27 10.58 41.83 9.39 
Mollificationa 44.80 7.11 49.05 9.76 51.87 10.43 
Cutoffa 51.60 8.87 56.32 9.96 60.10 9.43 
Entitlementa 47.56 7.15 50.82 9.20 55.88 10.90 
Power Orientationa 47.40 8.36 50.52 10.02 55.19 12.01 
Sentimentality 43.88 7.33 47.99 9.35 47.99 8.89 
Superoptimisma 45.96 7.46 49.97 9.42 53.25 10.51 
Cognitive Indolence 50.64 9.52 54.58 9.01 54.81 9.12 
Discontinuitya 48.16 6.99 55.60 10.71 56.52 10.32 
Current Criminal Thinkinga 49.12 7.69 55.39 10.47 57.18 10.28 
Fear of Changea 50.44 11.14 53.18 12.26 56.70 11.41 
aScales for which scores differed significantly (p < .05) across the three groups. 
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The groups’ impression management scores were also compared, and 
significant differences in impression management scores were found between low 
and high risk offenders (F (2,253) = 5.31, p < .01), replicating the findings of Mills 
and Kroner (Mills et al., 2003; Mills & Kroner, 2005, 2006). Offenders with the 
lowest impression management scores (measured with the Df-r scale) had the highest 
violent recidivism risk estimates, and the highest impression management scores 
were seen in those with the lowest risk estimates. The moderate and high risk groups 
also differed significantly on impression management. No significant differences 
were found between the low and moderate risk groups. With regard to ‘fake bad’ 
responding style (measured using the Cf-r scale), significant differences were found 
between the three low, moderate and high risk groups in pre-program assessment (F 
(2,252) = 9.84, p < .01); low risk offenders had the lowest ‘fake bad’ scores and high 
risk offenders had the highest ‘fake bad’ scores. Moderate risk offenders’ ‘fake bad’ 
responding scored between the two. 
The VRS scores of each of the three clusters (Unregulated, Regulated and 
Overregulated) were also compared. There was a significant interaction between 
cluster membership and VRS risk rating (Ȥ2 (4, n = 242) = 17.54, p < .01). VRS 
dynamic risk factors were considered treatment targets for a greater proportion of 
Cluster 3 offenders, while Cluster 2 had the lowest proportions (see Figure H1).  
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to determine 
whether treatment targets different significantly between clusters. The Chi-square 
values are provided in Table H2, as are the direction of significant differences. 
Despite clusters having significantly different STAXI-2 and PICTS scale scores, the 
emotional control and cognitive distortion dynamic risk factors of the VRS were not 
assessed as significantly different between clusters. Criminal attitudes were 
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considered a treatment target for a significantly higher proportion of Cluster 3 
violent offenders, Ȥ2(2, n= 240) = 6.22, p < .05. 
 
 
Figure H1. Percentage of violent offenders in each cluster for whom VRS dynamic 
risk factors were considered treatment targets prior to commencing a VIP. 
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 Measures of Violent Offender Cognition Appendix I.
Few measures have been developed to measure cognitions specifically 
associated with violent behaviour: two exceptions are the Maudsley Violence 
Questionnaire (MVQ; Walker, 2005) and the Firestone Assessment of Violent 
Thoughts (FAVT; Doucette-Gates et al., 1999). The FAVT assesses thoughts and 
feelings from the perspective of an internal ‘voice’, an integrated system of negative 
thoughts and attitudes directed at the self and others (e.g., ‘you’re stupid’, ‘they 
don’t give a damn about you’, ‘you’ll show them who’s the boss’) and is thought to 
measure automatic thoughts. Factor analysis supports the presence of four factors: 
social mistrust (e.g., ‘get them before they get you’), perceived disrespect or 
disregard (e.g., ‘they’re just doing this to make you get upset’), negative critical 
thoughts of self and others (e.g., ‘people act afraid of you’) and thoughts and 
expression of overt aggression (e.g., ‘I’ll show you what pain’s all about’). The 
FAVT manual suggests that the tool has excellent internal consistency, acceptable 
test-retest reliability and convergence with other measures reﬂecting pro-violent 
cognitions (Firestone & Firestone, 2008). However, few studies have been published 
utilising this tool. 
The MVQ was designed to evaluate thoughts and beliefs about violence and 
violent acts, and beliefs about what are acceptable, justifiable and reasonable actions 
in certain situations (Walker, 2005). The MVQ appears to measure dysfunctional 
assumptions (e.g., ‘it’s ok to hit someone if they make you look stupid’), core beliefs 
(e.g., ‘I see myself as a violent person’) and related cognitions. Two key factors 
thought to contribute to violence-related attitudes, beliefs and rules were suggested 
in initial research with adolescents: ‘machismo’ and ‘acceptance’ of violence. 
‘Machismo’ related to stereotypical expectations of men, particularly toughness and 
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
manliness; violence and aggression in men was expected and desirable as it was 
associated with strength and assertiveness. ‘Acceptance of violence’ referred to 
attitudes and beliefs suggesting acceptance or rejection of violence in society in 
individual behaviour and in the media (Walker, 2005). Walker (2005) suggested that 
the four FAVT factors were complimentary to the two MVQ factors, with the FAVT 
factors representing triggers or automatic thoughts for aggression and violence and 
the MVQ factors representing other cognitions that predict violent behaviour (e.g., 
core beliefs, dysfunctional assumptions or rules).  
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 Study 2 Sample Demographics Appendix J.
The following tables provide demographic and offence characteristics for the 
Treatment Completer sample used in the second study, grouped by the intensity of 
the program completed (i.e., MIVIP or HIVIP) and by cluster membership. 
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